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Vaclav Havel and Gyorgy Konrad are representative of a political theory that consciously
works  to  avoid  the  ideological  traps  and  illusions  packaged  within  modernity's
displacement of the authority of the natural world with the Cartesian promise to be able
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oration On method in contemporary fields of study (1710) recognized the presence of this
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This dissertation aims to address what Jeffrey Isaac referred to as the “strange silence of
political theory” regarding the revolutions of 1989.1 Political theory, he had argued in
1995, seemed to avoid taking seriously those revolutions that were as much about ideas
as they were about governments and politics. Isaac outlines several possible reasons for
this, some of which I will address here. But strategically, this is perhaps not surprising.
Limiting our understanding of 1989 to localized politics and regime change does a lot to
contain their critical power, the object of which was modernity itself, and of which our
own western liberal-democracies are an obviously central part. The politics of the day
happily enlisted dissident theorists as allies of their cold war strategies and rhetoric, and
the political theory that emerged reflected this. Isaac points to a popular attitude by which
“the Central European literature of revolt may be historically or politically significant but
it  is  [seen as]  not  especially innovative or genuinely theoretical....no deep issues are
raised or discussed in their writings, and there is thus no reason to incorporate what they
have written  into  our theoretical  discussions.”2 In  order  to  overcome such prejudice
theorists  like  Vladimir  Tismaneanu  in  a  1993  special  edition  of  Partisan  Review
characterized the dissidents of 1989 as the re-discoverers of “the values of the American
Revolution.”3 However, for Tismaneanu and Isaac dissident contributions extended well
beyond the parroting of American liberalism by “interrogating the foundations of the
1 Jeffrey C. Isaac, “The Strange Silence of Politica Theory,” Political Theory 23, no. 4 (November 1, 
1995): 636–52.
2 Jeffrey C. Isaac, “The Strange Silence of Politica Theory,” Political Theory 23, no. 4 (November 1, 
1995): 639–640.
3 “Special Issue: Intellectuals and Social Change in Ce tral and Eastern Europe,” Partisan Review 59, 
no. 4 (Fall 1992): 617.
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status quo”  and rehabilitating “the  political  significance of  doubt,”  doubt  that  would
expose in society and political life “the camouflage of barbarism” wherever it might be
found.4 American political theory was uninterested in acknowledging such a revolution in
ideas and in many ways it remains hesitant to do so even today. Isaac openly wondered if
this “strange silence” wasn't  at least in part a consequence of these ideas being “too
contemporary,  too  recent,  and...too  early  to  expect them  to  be  incorporated  into
scholarship.”5 But nearly two decades later, it  is not Havel, Konrad, and Michnik that
have  been  engaged  by  a  new  era  of  political  theory  invigorated  by  the  economic
catastrophe of 2008 and the Occupy movements of 2011 that emerged in its wake, but
Marx, Lenin and Communism itself. In Isaac's review of Jodi Dean's popular new book
The  Communist  Horizon,  he  finds  himself  once  again  defending  the  theoretical
importance  of  the  anti-totalitarian  dissident  experience  against  a  new  generation  of
deniers, though now from the heart of the so-called revolutionary left.6 Dean's first salvo
in this criticism is a preemptive broad shot against all liberals and democrats who might
question  the  viability  of  communism  as  belonging  “in  a  set”  with  capitalist  and
conservative partisans. It is a language that recalls the memory of “running dogs” and
“useful idiots”, as well as a category that Isaac identifies as including himself and, we can
assume, the entire generation of 1989 dissidents.
“Those who suspect that the inclusion of liberals and democrats in a set with
capitalists and conservatives is illegitimate are probably democrats themselves...
they should consider whether they think any evocatin of communism should
come with qualifications, apologies, and condemnatio s of past excesses. If the
answer  is  "yes,"  then  we have a clear  indication that  liberal  democrats,  and
4 Ibid.
5 Isaac, “The Strange Silence of Political Theory,” 637.
6 Jeffrey C. Isaac, “The Mirage of Neo-Communism,” Dissent 60, no. 3 (2013): 101–7, 
doi:10.1353/dss.2013.0062.
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probably radical democrats as well, still consider communism a threat that must
be suppressed-and so they belong in a set with capitalists and conservatives.7
It is a criticism that announces a distrust of democracy and that reassures fellow travelers
that “'communism' isn't the bad thing its critics have claimed, and communists on the
authentic Left  ought  to  stop  worrying  about  the  history  of  twentieth-century
communism.”8 In short, it is a return to critiques that seek to marginalize the theory that
emerges from 1989. It  makes little difference if  this is  done by conflating their  anti-
communism with that of “capitalists and conservatives” as Dean does, or, arguing in the
opposite  direction,  as  Aviezer  Tucker  did,  that  Havel  and  the  other  dissidents
misunderstood  modernity  and  democracy  and  therefore did  not  sufficiently  credit
consumerism  for  its  positive  anti-totalitarian  role.9 In  either  case,  we  are  asked  to
subordinate  their  voice  to  the  chorus  of  already establi hed  ideological  perspectives
understood to be “universal” and more critically powerful, thus drawing political theory
back  into  the territory of  twentieth-century “illusions,  and the communist  illusion in
particular.”10 For British philosopher Tony Judt the importance of the experience of the
“communist  illusion”  as  well  as  the  other  illusions of  the  twentieth-century,  were
essential  to understanding its politics,  particularly the traps that lay within modernity
itself.  However,  for  Dean  such  an  experience  “is  again  becoming  a  discourse  and
vocabulary for the expression of universal, egalitarian, and revolutionary ideals.”11 It is
seen as  the only  means of  successfully  mobilizing “energy and rage”  of  the  people
7 Jodi Dean, The Communist Horizon (London ; New York: Verso, 2012), 7–8.
8 Isaac, “The Mirage of Neo-Communism,” 103.
9 Aviezer Tucker, The Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence from Patočka to Havel, Pitt Series in 
Russian and East European Studies (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 165–169.
10 Tony. Judt and Timothy. Snyder, Thinking the Twentieth Century (New York: Penguin, 2012), 70.
11 Dean, The Communist Horizon, 8.
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against capitalism. But as Isaac points out, “giving no indication that this “energy and
rage” is something to be slightly troubled about,” a rage that similarly fueled the utopian
illusions of the twentieth-century.12 The crisis of society that we are living through may
invite the kind of energy and rage that Dean identifi s. We need only observe it in the
“new global revolutions” expertly covered in books like Paul Mason's Why It's Kicking
off Everywhere.13 However, Isaac is correct when he insists that for any alternative to be
truly viable it must maintain a “serious commitment to democracy.”14 This leaves little
room for a revived communist horizon and especially one that leans heavily on Lenin
while avoiding any mention of Gramsci.15 This being the twenty-fifth anniversary of the
revolutions of 1989, such assertions should not be ak n lightly. The excuses that it is
“too contemporary, too recent”, or that the theorists of 1989 were too “conservative”, or
that they have simply failed to tell us something new are certainly no longer valid. 
This dissertation will argue that the theory of politics and action that emerges from 1989
is representative of a larger established philosophical critique of what Havel called the
crisis of modernity, a crisis of truth, regimes, and politics. The dissident experience was
shaped by their struggle with what James C. Scott referred to as “high modernism”, the
late  twentieth-century  “faith”  in  the  possibilities of  science  and  technology  in  the
planning  and  organization  of  society  be  it  through  capitalist  entrepreneurism  or
12 Isaac, “The Mirage of Neo-Communism,” 104.
13 Paul Mason, Why It’s Still Kicking off Everywhere: The New Global Revolutions, Rev. and updated 2nd 
ed (London: Verso, 2013).
14 Isaac, “The Mirage of Neo-Communism,” 106.
15 There is no mention of the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci anywhere in Dean's book. The great 
socialist historian Eric Hobsbawm believed that Italy was a unique microcosm of world capitalism and 
thus a theorist like Gramsci where especially sensitive to both formal and informal power in the 
modern state.
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communist “planning”.16 However,  while Scott  makes it  clear that  Cold War regimes
were  largely  defined  by  this  high  modernist  commitment,  social  theorist  Marshall
Berman also refers to Solidarity and the struggle against those very same regimes as
“modernist breakthroughs” as well.17 This modernism of “antimodernity” would help the
dissidents  of  1989 form  and embrace  distinctive  conceptions  of  truth,  regimes,  and
politics. Taken together the experience of modernity and all of its contradictions, which
may have peaked with Cold War high modernism, were in fact something much older and
attendant to the development of humanist reason itself. It begins with the displacement of
the  authority  of  the  natural  world  with  the  Cartesian  promise  to  both  know and
subsequently modify that world. While the  crisis of modernity may be understood as a
particularly  contemporary  dilemma  brought  into  sharp  relief  by  the  overwhelming
capacity of our technology, it is one with deep historical and intellectual roots. It is the
recognition that packaged within the promise of scientific knowledge are unanticipated
dangers and evils. In his oration On method in contemporary fields of study, elivered in
1708 at the University of Naples, Giambattista Vico recognized almost immediately this
powerful tension that would come to occupy his thoughts and especially those of ensuing
generations of Italian activists and intellectuals like Bendetto Croce, Piero Gobetti and
Antonio Gramsci when confronted by the modern state made grotesque.18 He asked his
audience  to  at  once  “consider  the  many great  and  wonderful  discoveries  by  which
mechanics, enhanced by geometry and physics as they are taught today, seems to have
16 James C. Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed, Yale Agrarian Studies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 4–5.
17 Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity (New York, N.Y., 
U.S.A: Viking Penguin, 1988), 12.
18 Vaáclav Havel, Open Letters: Selected Writings, 1965-1990, ed. Paul R. Wilson, 1st Vintage Books ed 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 259.
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enriched society! One may assert, without fear of contradiction, that the warfare of our
time derives from these three sciences. So far in advance of that of former times that,
faced with our method of fortifying and storming cities, Minerva would hold her own
Athenian fortress in contempt, while Jupiter would curse his three-forked thunderbolt for
being blunt and clumsy.”19 This struggle to come to terms with and to mediate against
such dangers would become increasingly characteristic of the experience of modernity,
such that Berman would later conclude with all the irony that modern life could muster
that “to be fully modern is to be anti-modern”.20 Havel understood the nature of this
fundamental  threat  to human life as well  if  not better than any philosopher and it  is
sharply reflected it in his theater work. 
It is with this in mind that this dissertation will reach back to the Neapolitan philosopher
Giambattista Vico and enlist him in the effort to demonstrate a coherent but independent
effort on the part of Vico, the Italian antifascists and the anticommunist dissidents of east
and central Europe in identifying within modernity a rupture between “truth”, “concrete
reality”, and humanity itself. A rupture that produced regimes which promised liberty at
the price of submission to authority, and a politics hat emerges from the contradictions of
modernity  and  contributes  to  a  kind  of  systematic  threat  to  human  autonomy.
Consequently,  it  speaks  to  a  conception  of  modernity that  sets  aside the ideological
illusions of the twentieth-century for “the only horizon worth keeping in view...that of
democracy itself” and the need to preserve human autonomy.21 Read collectively they
19 Giambattista Vico, Vico: Selected Writings, trans. Leon Pompa (Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; N w 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 36.
20 Berman, All That Is Solid Melts into Air, 14.
21 Isaac, “The Mirage of Neo-Communism,” 107.
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represent more just a critique, but also a sophisticated set of political ideas that answer
those who would otherwise approach them as naïve revolutionists. And as Isaiah Berlin
argued in his famous study on Vico and Herder, “when an idea of genuine audacity and
power is met in he history of thought, the question of its sources is bound to present itself
to historical scholars.”22 Isaiah Berlin was speaking in general terms about the hought of
Giambattista  Vico,  though  he  may as  well  have  been  talking  about  Croce,  Gobetti,
Gramsci, or even Havel and Konrad. For Berlin, Vico was a figure of such originality that
this question of sources had to be asked and on this point he followed: “Is it possible to
trace  the  origins  of  [Vico's]  view  and  method...  Or was  his  vision  spontaneously
generated in his own fervid imagination?”23 Our inability to resist asking such questions,
however tempting or important they might be, leaves B rlin cautious about their tendency
to  force  “the  assumption  that  no  idea  can  ever  be  wholly  original.”24 Vico,  it  was
assumed, must be standing on the shoulders of giants. As a method, such a directive
“applied rigorously, threatens to melt the individuality of any human achievement into
impersonal factors, and so lead to a kind of historicist depersonalization.”25 However,
such questions—questions that pertain to the history of ideas—contribute to developing a
greater perspective on the text or theorist at hand as well as our own ideas and theories.
They project the text and theorist's voice into philosophy and political theory, making any
“strange silence” either impossible or unbearably loud and so, unavoidable. Berlin tells us
that philosophers “turn to the historian because we do not understand the copy of the text






we already have. Giving us a second copy will not help. To understand the text just i  to
relate it helpfully to something else. The only question is what that something else will
be.”26 The key to better understanding the dissident thoug t of 1989 is then to be found in
the careful selection of something appropriate with which to properly compare it. Richard
Rorty's approach to “great dead philosophers,” what he called “rational reconstructions”
offers a method well  suited to relating the dissident  theory of  1989 to contemporary
democratic theory and establishing their importance. In his monograph on Rorty, Alan
Malachowski argues that in the hands of Rorty himself such an approach “confers dual
philosophical favours. Rorty ostensibly does the thinkers a favour by reformulating their
position so that it ends up in better overall shape, nd he does himself a favour in thereby
creating new allies.”27 If we are to take Isaac at his word—and I see no reason not to—the
position of the theorists of 1989 seem to be in need of a similar reformulation or at least a
recasting, and I would argue that there is no shortage in history of ready allies. 
Rorty recognizes the value of a more esoteric approach to philosophy and the need to
understand “what a philosopher says in his own terms,” but he describes this as a very
“minimal  sort  of  understanding...like  being able  to exchange  courtesies  in  a  foreign
tongue.”28 Such an understanding and particularly a political theory wholly invested in
this method risks becomes arcane and unrelatable. It therefore it becomes necessary to
26 Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner, eds., Philosophy in History: Essays on the 
Historiography of Philosophy, Ideas in Context (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 11.
27 Alan Malachowski, Richard Rorty (Chesham [England]: Acumen, 2002), 50, 
http://site.ebrary.com/id/10455579.
28 Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner, eds., Philosophy in History: Essays on the 
Historiography of Philosophy, Ideas in Context (Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 52–53.
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draw any given philosopher and their  philosophy into our own time and relate them
adequately  to  our  practices.  Rational  reconstruction  as  a  process  not  only  brings
relevance to “dead philosophers”, but it also arms the present. Rorty argues that “it is
perfectly reasonable” for those trying to come to terms with a dead philosopher to believe
that such a task is only possible after bringing them into our own context. Furthermore,
one could even say that the philosophers themselves—Locke in his example—could have
found out “what he really meant...in the Second Treatis ,  only after conversations in
heaven with, successively, Jefferson, Marx, and Rawls.”29 This is not to say that each
thinker is necessarily dependent upon another, or even necessarily connected to them, but
rather that placing philosophers in conversation with each other and with contemporary
thought in this manner acts as a force multiplier of ideas.  
Rational reconstructions typically aim at saying that the great dead philosopher
had some excellent ideas, but unfortunately couldn't get them straight because of
'the limitations of his time'...They are written in the light of some recent work in
philosophy which can reasonably be said to be 'about the same questions' as the
great  dead  philosopher  was  discussing.  They  are  designed  to  show  that  the
answers  he  gave  to  these  questions,  though  plausible  and  exciting,  need
restatement or purification – or, perhaps, the kind of precise refutation which
further work in the field has recently made possible.”30
The dissidents of 1989 are, in this way, also positioned to be best understood and their
theory strengthened only after conversations with those who, in coming before them,
faced similar conditions and challenges. By relating hem to the experience of the Italian
antifascist struggle of a generation earlier, as well as Vico's critical appraisal of the then
new geometrical method of science and his own subsequent “new science”, intellectual
connective tissues are constructed between each of them and strengthened. In so doing it
29 Rorty, Schneewind, and Skinner, Philosophy in History, 54.
30 Ibid., 57.
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demonstrates their relevance and importance and in Isaac's terms helps political theory
itself avoid “intellectual obscurity”.31
In his essay on “The Future of Truth”, Leszek Kolakwski argued that the drive to find
objective truth, truth that can be known and tell us about “how things really are”, is hard
wired  into  the  psyche  of  humanity.32 The  consequences  of  this  compulsion  are  as
remarkable as they have been devastating, and echoes an observation made nearly three
hundred years earlier by Giambattista Vico. Because there is little reason to believe that
humanity will ever tire of its search for truth in this absolute sense, it is important that we
come to terms with the consequences of that search, those who claim to have found truth,
and especially when they seek to impose that truth on others. This dissertation examines
the human search for truth  and the effort  to balance that  search against  a dangerous
tendency of some of the consequences to lead society down the path to regimes and a
politics characterized by ideological domination and dehumanization. When Vico was
confronted with the remarkable achievements of Descartes' “new critical method” he was
justifiedly impressed.  “Consider  the many great  and wonderful  discoveries by which
mechanics, enhanced by geometry and physics as they are taught today, seems to have
enriched human society!” However, Vico tempers thisenthusiasm with caution  and the
question that is then posed by Vico and subsequently carried through the development of
his  New Science is whether or not there is a conception of truth that can harness the
productive power of rationalism, but preserve the human dignity and autonomy essential
31 Isaac, “The Strange Silence of Political Theory,” 650.
32 Leszek Kołakowski, Is God Happy?: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 295–296.
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to maintaining a “free” society. Is there an available conception of truth that can act as a
mediating force  against  ideological  domination,  while  resisting the tendency of  such
unified theories to  become dangerous themselves? And it  was a question that  would
ultimately underlie and occupy the Italian antifascists and East European anticommunist
dissidents as they too sought the means, in both theory and practice, to come out from
under the lies and inverted truths that dominated th ir societies.
Italy in the period following the First World War presented what was perhaps a perfect
storm of  conditions contributing to  the  rise  of  the first  great  exercise  of  ideological
domination in the twentieth-century. Troops returning to Italy from the battlefields found
themselves disillusioned by a war that failed to live up to the democratic promises made
by the liberal regimes that had lead them to the trenches. A whole generation, angry and
demanding change believed that Italy's liberal government under Giolitti failed to account
for the interests of all Italians and that the First World War was, in the end, little more
than a bourgeois war fought by the masses in name of bourgeois interests. This was at
least in part a consequence of the political method practiced by the liberal government of
Giolitti  that came to be known as Giolittism. For Gobetti,  this practice of procedural
compromise wasn't politics at all, rather it was the very negation of politics and so it
encouraged  an  apolitical  citizenry.  Parliamentary  government  as  a  form  of  rational
consensus  building,  had  reduced  politics  to  debates over  administrative  concerns—
debates over debt limits, budgets, oil pipelines, fracking, and tax regulation—but it had
assumed as settled any debate over its fundamental values. In such an argument it is not
11
always possible to arrive at consensus, compromise, or ven an agreement on principles
or institutions upon which consensus or compromise can be based. To do so necessarily
privileges one truth against all others. The Church a ts in this way, as does the Science
that  followed  it;  however,  in  the  case  of  science,  rationalist  methods  based  on
mathematical  reason  and  objective  empirical  observation  replace  scholastic  methods
premised on faith and scriptural exegesis. The natural endency to resist such powerful
ideological  constructs  by  embracing  a  more  pragmatic  relativist  approach,  in  turn
presents even more pernicious political problems, as it it has the unintended consequence
of stripping humanity of its capacity to identify ideological and subsequently existential
threats. Such a pragmatic agreement might work well for the purposes of efficiency and
stability; however, reducing truth to a matter of procedure and consensus leaves open the
possibility for the manipulation of  that  manufactured consensus in name of the best-
armed truth.  Machiavelli  was brutally aware of  this when he argued that  “all  armed
prophets have conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed.”33 For Gobetti this
is exactly what happened under Giolitti's  government,  whereby a small  “well-armed”
clique of ideologues came to dominate Italian society. It wasn't because they possessed
the truth that they came to power, but rather because they accumulated power and a brutal
willingness to use it that they could dictate truth. Relativism had become a convenient
instrument of manipulation because, as Kolakowski would later argue, it “sanctions our
indifference.”34 Paradoxically truth understood in relativistic terms makes possible the
domestication  of  a  people,  where  the  prophet  armed  with both  physical  as  well  as
33 “Machiavelli: The Prince: Chapter VI,” accessed October 4, 2014, 
http://www.constitution.org/mac/prince06.htm.
34 Kołakowski, Is God Happy?, 275.
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ideological weapons can impose there own conceptions of truth. While not a danger in
principle,  understood  in  this  way  relativism,  in  conjunction  with  a  predilection  for
paternalism, makes totalitarianism possible. Gobetti emphasizes this when he argues that
“those who identify liberalism with tolerance and with problem-oriented technique have
no understanding of what liberalism is.”35 True liberal tolerance, he adds, “is a matter of
moral education.”36 The distinction that Gobetti is making here is one that can be traced
back  to  Vico  and  is  present  in  all  of  the  theoretical  perspectives  examined  in  this
dissertation. 
Prepared in part by the paternalist legacy of the Curch and weak institutions of an only
partially  completed  Risorgimento,  Italy  represented a  dangerous  constellation  of
conditions that threatened political life. But emerging from those who confronted this
system was a unique theoretical reconstruction of liberalism that rescues its strongest
assets while guarding against its greatest defects. Many at the time, disillusioned by the
perceived failures of liberalism, saw in Marxist socialism a highly attractive alternative.
“To give oneself to Marxism”, argued Carlo Rosselli, “was like diving into the open sea
after paddling around in a pool, so rich did its uninhibited realism seem in comparison
with  all  the  ideological  haze  and  low-grade  patriotism  before.”37 Marxism was  thus
embraced as a fiery and exciting continuation of the incomplete Risorgimento that had
seen  the  bourgeois  liberals  entrench  themselves  in  power  and  historical  materialism
seemed to provide the revolutionary answer, the “light from above”, that would show the
35 Piero Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, ed. Nadia Urbinati, trans. William McCuaig (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2000), 129.
36 Ibid.
37 Carlo Rosselli, Liberal Socialism (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1994), 35.
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way.  However,  the  workers’  movement  emerged  in  respon e,  quickly  stifling  its
revolutionary energy, with the change occurring so quickly that it lead to a crisis within
Italian  socialism  and  Marxism.  How  could  they  square  the  successes  of  the  labor
movement—something that was the result of direct initiative and independent will—with
Marxist historical materialism? This lead to an intellectual crisis and revisionism within
the  parties,  and  liberals  and  socialist  revisionists  alike  ultimately  stripped  historical
materialism from the ‘Marxist  system’ among them Benedetto  Croce and also Carlo
Rosselli. This had the immediate effect of weakening the old socialists and Marxists and
generated two broad consequences. Stripped of its unified orthodox reading Marxism as a
‘system’ was crippled and became severely fragmented: “Various political and cultural
currents could now legitimately claim a connection t  Marx, and the adjective “Marxism”
became increasingly generic and vague.”38 As the party submitted to the critiques of the
reformists, it became less revolutionary and increasingly satisfied with working within
the very Giolittian framework that so many believed had failed and led to the war. It was
seen as a return to the Giolittism that the antifasc st , and especially Gobetti, had rejected,
and it  reduced  Marxist  socialism in  Italy  to  just  another  class  of  liberal  politicians,
sapping it of its capacity to both challenge liberal dominance as well as inoculate against
the emergence of fascism. Having lost its  energy and “ethical  fire” it  was no longer
attractive  to  the  youth  and  they  quickly  became  disillusioned.39 It  was  in  such  an
environment that the weakened Socialists were unable to stand up against the threat of




condemned Mussolini, but they were unable to match him. Disillusionment demanded
new alternatives and from the perspective of  those clamoring for  change during this
period in Italy there were few visible options. And it was in this fertile ground that the
first seeds of Fascism began to sprout and quickly demonstrated itself—to those willing
to see it—to be a considerable a threat, not merely to Italy, but to modernity itself. Unlike
all prior ideological systems fascism exposed all of m dernity's principle weaknesses. In
a  world  increasingly  committed  to  rational  truth,  but  characterized  by  politically
domesticated  persons,  society  was  exposed  to  the  reeme gence  of  aggressive
“totalitarian” programs willing to be everything toeveryone. The fascist ideology was a
method more than a morality or ethic because it knows no morality and “shifts constantly,
avoiding coherence, firm positions, or precise distinctions.”40 It is the ironic presence of
“liberal tolerance” that paves the way for fascist intolerance and makes space for the
incoherent and aggressive fascist doctrine. The intransigence that Gobetti identifies as the
solution cannot  rest  on the  determinist  truth  of  the old idols  of  blood,  territory and
religious dogma, or we return to the same trap that we were promised emancipation from
in the first place.
The  solution  as  Gobetti  understood  it  was  not  to  redouble  the  conservative  liberal
strategies of Giolitti, but neither was it to “get rid of the bourgeoisie” or the “possessors
of capital” and replace them with wholly anti-bourgeois government. To Gobetti's way of
thinking such a strategy would be akin to tossing the baby out with the bathwater. What
needs to be recognized is that in the end, even the prol tariat are “bourgeois” insofar as
40 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 61.
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they are fundamental components of the modern bourge is world. And like Vico, for all
its faults, modernity has brought with it considerable achievements that should not be
abandoned.  It  is  precisely  the  workers  own  liberal  tendencies,  that  give  them their
revolutionary potential as producers. 
“Certainly in the modern world it was the owners of industry who came to think
of  themselves  as  producers  before  the  workers  did.  And the  revolutionary
potential  of  the  workers  lies  in  their  capacity  to  become  more  vigorously
bourgeois (as producers) now that many industrialists no longer know how to
fulfill  their  function  as  investors  and  entrepreneurs,  because  the  bourgeois
system, with its challenge to Catholicism on the ideal plane and its proven impact
on industrial production, is not headed for decline; on the contrary, it awaits fuller
realization at the hands of a new elite (even if the new elite should prove to be the
dictatorship of the proletariat).”41 
What  was necessary was finding a  way to  harness the productive  power  of  the
bourgeois class, but prevent that class from reserving to itself privileges that threaten
the autonomy and liberty of the masses. And even if a movement or a regime rejects
the fascist or totalitarian label, and does not follow policies that were put in place by
the actual fascist regimes of the 1920s and 1930s, if they are born out of middle-
classes fears and anxieties – fears of socialist cla s antagonism, fears of immigration,
and of victimization – then they are, whatever their  names, cousins of  fascism.42
“Fascism was not a function of the presence of fascists.”43 It  was the function of
those segments within society that enabled and evenwelcomed fascism or something
very much like fascism. It  is for this reason that “f scism” as a specific threat is
perhaps more credible than one might anticipate. Rather it is the social, political and
economic structure that facilitates and makes possible fascism (or something very
41 Ibid., 91.
42 David Ward, Piero Gobetti’s New World: Antifascism, Liberalism, Writing (Toronto; Buffalo: 
University of Toronto Press, 2010), 42.
43 Ibid.
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much like it) that is important. This is what made Gobetti's goal “to be everywhere
oneself” so significant. The call to “replace the last remains of revealed truth with the
truth won day by day through the labor of all” was not merely a rhetorical exercise,
the likes of which we are too familiar with these days, but an invitation that draws
attention to the vital need for political renewal. As such, we cannot help but turn to
another  set  of  thinkers  whose  most  popular  slogan  cptures  a  similar  ethic  of
resistance and renewal. “Living within the truth.” The slogan made famous by Vaclav
Havel in his essay “The Power of the Powerless” argues that “living within the lie
can constitute the system only if  it  is universal.  The principle must embrace and
permeate everything. There are no terms whatsoever on which it can co-exist with
living within the truth.”44 It is an essential call for a moral and political reformation
commensurate with the Italian antifascist effort. It is a call to follow Rosselli and
“tear down a world” and to cry out as Havel  instrucs, “The emperor is naked!”
Havel makes this connection clear when he offers his interpretation of the reality of
the Prague Spring as “usually understood as a clashbetween two groups...those who
wanted to maintain the system as it was and those who wanted to reform it.”45 “It is
frequently forgotten,” he adds, “that this encounter was merely the final act and the
inevitable consequence of a long drama originally pla ed out chiefly in the theatre of
the spirit and the conscience of society.”46 While Gobetti and Gramsci did not live to
see the long drama of fascism “played out,” it was clear to them, as it would later
become clear to anti-communists dissidents like Vaclav Havel,  that  “winning” in




dissident terms did not necessarily equate to the assumption of state power alone. In
fact, it was quite possible to imagine a “victory” in their terms that results in total
defeat.  As  Gobetti,  Gramsci  and  Michnik  make  clear, without  a  corresponding
transformation in the moral base, one that agrees with a self-conscious revolutionary
class, the victory will be short-lived and tend to recreate the very superstructure is
sought  to replace.  This sat  at  the heart  of  Havel's own anxieties  and misgivings
around his own political  career,  and why in nearly a l  situations,  when asked he
identified himself as a playwright first and foremost. His hesitance to take ownership
of political power was not an act of modesty or political gamesmanship on his part,
though this is often the case of many politicians i our cynical era, but rather one
prompted  by  his  own  “antipolitical”  perspective  and its  accompanied  anxieties.
Consequently, antipolitics and its strain of liberalism by definition cannot present a
complete political program of the kind demanded by the politics of both parliaments
and politburos. Because it cannot claim special access to truth is cannot know what
its future looks and so cannot guide us there. Havel dds, “there is nothing more
illiberal and utopian than to want to assign it an obligatory path to be followed.”47
Instead, it advocates struggle, not the “permanent revolution” of Marx that was used
to justify Stalin's ideological violence that steadily whittled away a society in pursuit
of its utopian ideal, but the “unfinished revolution” that Havel and Michnik see as
fundamental to democracy and is a process that is continually unfolding.48 Michnik
47 Rosselli, Liberal Socialism, 90.
48 Here I am reminded of the figural sculptures of the Swiss artist Alberto Giacometti (1901-1966). While
I am told his works represents a kind of distillation of man to their “cores”. To me they appear to reflect
this totalitarian approach to truth, politics, and ultimately humanity caught in between. The sculptor, 
much like the State, reduces the figures in brutal m nner to their very “cores” in the effort to establish 
conformity with the social ideal. Consequently, there is a disturbing equality observed between 
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adds, “a completed revolution is in essence a betray d revolution” it turns into its
opposite.49 This is what Gobetti believed had happened to the Risorgimento, a liberal
revolution  that  stalled  and  became its  opposite.  And what  also  happened  to  the
Jacobins and Bolsheviks who having completely their revolutions began to enforce
its pathologies on society. 
Each of the antifascist and anticommunist theorists discussed in this dissertation was
subject to the criticism that they do not provide a complete political theory. Even
Gramsci's celebrated notebooks, as extensive as they are, do not comprise a “system”
as such. And so they they are criticised for not prviding an adequate alternative
program to the systems of which they are critical. However, this is precisely the point
because as Konrad points out, “If the moral opposition ries to act like a political
opposition, it may soon find that millions are standing behind it asking, “Where do
we go from here?””50 This is what the opposition wants to avoid because it is under
conditions like these that movements fall into the routines of the very “politics” and
dogmatism they are resisting. It misunderstands the kind of pressure that antipolitics
is trying to exert. They are not looking to establish a new ideological platform which
can be assimilated, rather their focus sees the central task as being moral, ethical and
critical. It is why Gobetti rejected political parties outright, and why Gramsci did not
Giacometti's various figures; however, as they approach this core they become increasingly deformed, 
unrecognizable, and inhuman, absent personality or individuation. Absent faces or what could be called
functional limbs, they appear powerless to speak or act on their own behalf or on the behalf of others. 
They are no longer capable of life or politics.
49 Vaáclav Havel, Adam Michnik, and Elżbieta Matynia, An Uncanny Era: Conversations between 
Václav Havel and Adam Michnik (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 2014), 82.
50 Gyoörgy Konrád, Antipolitics: An Essay, 1st ed (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1984), 119–
120.
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adopt as his own the Leninist model of the Party, but struggled to construct his own
concept of the party that was less the embodiment of a select vanguard and more that
of a perpetually dynamic collective will of the masse . To the antipolitician the crisis
of the regime is that its institutionally based politics is fundamentally conservative.
Konrad makes this clear when he argues that “no matter what ideology a politician
may appeal  to,  what  he says  is  only  a  mean  of  gaining  and  keeping  power.  A
politician for whom the exercise of power is not an end in itself is a contradiction in
terms.”51 And as Michnik and Havel point out, “traditional parliamentary democracy
is no solution.”52 There is no “program” that  can be introduced that  will not  be
absorbed by the regime and put in service of system'  own ends. It  was for this
reason that civil society became the terrain on which the antipolitician engaged in
ideological struggle and served as the conscience of the regime. And it was only
through  an  autonomous  independent  civil  society  that an  individual  can  avoid
becoming the domesticated apolitical  subject  criticized by Gobetti  and become a
fully conscious individual capable of full political engagement capable, in Gramscian
terms,  of  being  a  philosopher.  The  Gobetti's  “revoluti nary  liberal”,  Rosselli's
“liberal  socialist”,  Gramsci's  philosopher,  Konrad's  antipolitician,  and  Havel's
dissident are all, in effect, this individual capable of full political engagement. And it
is why both Gramsci and Havel are unwilling to limit their respective categories to a
particular group or class.53 There are however two principles broadly identified with
this  activity.  A commitment  to  political  conflict  and  liberal  pluralism,  or  non-
51 Ibid., 95.
52 Havel, Michnik, and Matynia, An Uncanny Era, 179.
53 Havel, Open Letters, 167–171.
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domination; and a commitment to a renewed moral life. “To be ourselves at every
moment; to realize every possibility of action for ourselves and for others at every
instant.”54 That is, “our idealism cannot be limited to theoretical endeavor; it must
pervade  us  and  everything  with  a  single  breath  of  intimate,  intense  life.”55 It  a
position  captured  completely  in  Havel's  famous call “to  live  in  truth”.  Such an
idealism is  one that  recognizes the historical  processes that  make totalitarianism
dependent upon a society already deformed by arrested development, that has stunted
its capacity for  further  social  and political  development,  and that  has effectively
alienated the people from their own moral and political life. Overcoming this is the
goal of all the figures addressed in this dissertation. 
But as we tear down a world of prejudices and shortcomings we are building a
world of concrete reality with ardor and patience. L t us replace the last remains
of revealed truth with the truth won day by day through the labor of all, and
generic abstractions with patient, open-minded scrutiny of the little problems and
the big ones as they arise. Only in this finding of s lutions and making them
systematic are we really doing politics.56
As ideological reformers, these theorists evoke Havel's intransigent mission that believed
that “the intellectual should constantly disturb, should bear witness to the misery of the
world, should be provocative by being independent, should rebel against all hidden and
open pressure and manipulations, should be the chief doubter of systems, of power and its
incantations.”57 It is my hope that I have been able to demonstrate in he course of this
dissertation that there is a particular strain of liberal theory laying amidst the proverbial
historical  reeds that  once  recovered  helps  us  unpack  the nested  challenges  posed  to
54 Rosselli, Liberal Socialism, 73.
55 Ibid., 76.
56 Ibid., 74.
57 Vaáclav Havel, Disturbing the Peace: A Conversation with Karel Hvížďala, 1st American ed (New 
York: Knopf : Distributed by Random House, 1990), 167.
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human freedom and autonomy by a society dominated by a commitment to ideological
truths. In view of this analysis, an often disparate nd previously narrowly interpreted set
of activists and philosophers—figures like (Chapter 1) Giambattista Vico and Benedetto
Croce; the Italian antifascists (Chapter 2) Piero Gobetti and (Chapter 3) Antonio Gramsci;
and  the  anticommunist  dissidents  (Chapter  4)  Leszek Kolakowski,  Adam  Michnik,
Vaclav  Havel  and  Gyorgy  Konrad—become  much  more  intresting,  and  a  critical
assessment of  their  contributions to political  theory more complex when read as key
figures in developing a broader  theoretical  challenge to  the “crisis  of  modernity”  as
identified by Havel, and recognized by both Dean and Isaac.
Both the Italian antifascists and dissident theorist of 1989 were faced with unique sets of
historical conditions that exposed them to particularly extreme and grotesque images of
already existing modern tendencies, what Havel had described as “the Avant-garde of a
global crisis”.58 This experience is something that the anticommunist dissidents, faced
with a state powerfully armed with material weapons, as well as ideological weapons and
truth claims, came to understand so well, but it was Gramsci who, in the face of Italian
fascism that  perhaps  offered  the  most  complete  analysis  with  his  theory of  cultural
hegemony. And so, In order to draw attention to the seriousness of these political and
philosophical  claims,  I  turned to  the work  of  the Italian  antifascists  of  a generation
before, who made similar claims regarding what is effectively the “weaponization” of
truth by political regimes in the form of ideology. Both sets of thinkers and activists—
ultimately  rooted  in  Vico's  approach—appeared  to  offer  a  two-fold  approach  to  the
58 Havel, Open Letters, 260.
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problems they observed in their respective societies. On the one hand there was the need
to engage in an active resistance against a real and persistent threat in the form of the
state or those institutions that wield ideological truth (scientific or otherwise) for the
purpose of social and political domination and contr l. And on the other, the need for an
equally powerful and “universal” source of truth that avoided replicating the ideological
traps of the regime it replaces. Beginning with Vico there is a recognition of being faced
with a profound problem. If  we are driven by our nature to seek out  truth,  and our
understanding of truth becomes a precondition for establishing the “facts” that construct
“reality”, then how can we hope to resist or change “reality” when we are an instrument
constituted by the very “reality” we hope to change? The answer is found in what are
essentially  three corresponding  arguments.  First,  Vico's  concepts  of  “verum factum”,
common sense, and divine providence. His novel approach to divine providence is means
of finding a mediating force by which concrete moral  and ethical  boundaries can be
established  without  sacrificing  autonomy.59 Second,  Gobetti's  concepts  of  politics  as
conflict and a self-conscious intransigence. Third, the Gramscian concepts of common
sense, “critical self-consciousness” and cultural hegemony. Fourth, the concepts of truth
articulated by Kolakowski  as its  manifests  itself  in the work of  Michnik,  as  well  as
Havel's own concepts of “Living in Truth”, “memory of being” & “God as horizon”. It is
an investigation of these ideas that form the core of the the four chapters that make up
this dissertation and will be organized in the following manner.
59 Consider the sphere of social media. Collectively it represents a force that guides, shapes, and 
influences the decisions and lives of its composite parts. However, social media (in its uncorrupted 
form, a problem into itself) does not exist as an independent force itself that externally wills or 
influences humanity, rather is i  humanity, or construct of humanity itself that in turn influences it.
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Chapter One will turn to the earliest days of what we call modernity and the point of
liberalism's earliest development in order to acquire a sense of the terrain of the struggle.
It  begins  with  an  examination  of  the  shared  efforts of  the  scholastics  and  early-
Renaissance thinkers to understand humanity's place in god's plan. Modernity emerged
not as a definitive break from earlier philosophical efforts, but rather as its continuation
of those efforts by other means or methods, and a rec sting of the question. I will then
explore the revolutionary potential of Vico, position ng him as a powerful precursor to
radical dissident politics from Gramsci to Havel and the Occupy movement.  Somewhat
marginalized in American political thought, I will argue that Vico's contributions to the
twin fields of epistemology and historiography, as well as his distinctive conception of
providence provide a path to understanding the struggle for an alternative path within
modernity  that  challenges  the  dominance  of  Cartesian  determinism  and  offers  a
significant step down the road to a theory of knowledge and politics that is more open-
ended while remaining rooted in the concrete experience of history. Taking up the diverse
interpretations of  Vico as both anti-modernist  and conservative symbol,  as  well  as  a
precursor to Marx and post-modernism, he will be positioned as an original theorist who
escapes  conventional  categories  while  contributing o  an  alternative  interpretation  of
liberal modernity. It will then be argued that we can recover some of these lost assets in
the  form  of  the  unique  intellectual  legacy  of  Italy,  particularly  as  observed  in  the
experience of Italian cultural and intellectual development, and the work of Vico and
much later Benedetto Croce, his most powerful voice in the 20th century. 
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Rooted in the unique Italian historical-intellectual tr dition of Italy characterized by the
influence of Vico and Croce, Chapters Two and Three, explore the political theory of the
revolutionary liberal Piero Gobetti and the communist philosopher and organizer Antonio
Gramsci.  Representing a broad range of  political  and intellectual  commitments  these
theorists  nonetheless  converge  on  a  singular  approach  to  the  political  challenges  of
ideological domination present in the rise of Italian Fascism. Both theorists were steeped
heavily in the in an intellectual culture dominated by the philosophical heritage of Vico's
critical  stand  against  Cartesianism and the dominant  intellectual  figure  of  Benedetto
Croce. Their experience under the ascendency of fascism and the failure of Italian social
and political life to adequately meet the fascist threat led them to explain fascism, not as
the  result  of  determinist  external  forces—what  had  been  described  by  some  as  an
anomalous  parenthesis—but  rather  as  a  distinct  product  of  Italian  life  and  historical
development.  They wanted to understand what it  was about Italy itself that produced
fascism and, perhaps more importantly, develop a further understanding of how it might
be resisted. The antifascists were distinctive from earlier resistance movements because
they realized that ultimately, fascism was an evil of their own creation, and consequently
the key to  its  defeat  lay  largely  in  difficult  task of  critical  self-examination.  Italian
intellectuals responded to the emergence of fascism by not only looking towards the State
or towards external influences, but also by asking what it was about Italian life itself that
contributed to the Italy's decline into Fascism. Chapter two will focus on the work of
Piero  Gobetti,  a  self  proclaimed  liberal  who  early  on identified  fascism  as  “the
autobiography of the nation”.60 Gobetti's project was focused not merely on a politica
60 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 213.
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revolution, but also on a reformation of the people th mselves. He was most concerned
with  establishing  conditions  that  would  create  in  the  Italian  people  a  mentality  or
personality that was absent the defects that led to fascism. First and foremost this meant
rethinking completely the foundations of moral and ethical life. Thus, he became a liberal
critic  of  liberalism.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  Gobetti  arrives  at  the  conclusion  that
traditional  liberalism  had  become  incapable  of  creating  the  kind  of  dynamism  and
revolutionary  energy  that  is  required  to  maintain  the  emancipatory  character  of
liberalism. To do so, Gobetti set out in search of new locations of liberal revolutionary
energy. And for Gobetti, it turned out that liberalism thrived in unexpected places. This
chapter will examine his distinctive ability to locate liberal values at the heart of political
theories  and  activities  often  understood  as  decidedly  antiliberal,  such  as  the  factory
council movement of the communist philosopher Antonio Gramsci, as well as his critique
of liberal atrophy in the form of Giolittism. Chapter Three will focus on Antonio Gramsci
a figure much admired by Gobetti and who was thought of favorably in return.61 There is
perhaps  no  figure  who  understood  the  twentieth-century  that  was  to  come,  and
consequently our own twenty-first, better than Antonio Gramsci. While he is probably
best remembered as a radical anti-Capitalist, it must also be remembered that while he
always  understood himself  to  be  a  follower  of  Marx, he  was  deeply critical  of  the
scientific Marx and “of Marxism contaminated with positivism and scientism”.62 And yet
it was this Marxist system, which in the hands of the political program of Lenin paved the
way to one of the only examples of a politically realized socialist state. For those like
61 Antonio Gramsci, The Modern Prince: And Other Writings (New York: International Publishers, 1957),
49–51.
62 Maurice A. Finocchiaro, Gramsci and the History of Dialectical Thought (Cambridge [England] ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 71.
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Leszek Kolakowski,  who saw Marxism as inexorable linked to  Lenin and ultimately
Stalinism, the theoretical work of Gramsci by comparison is an increasingly “liberal”
alternative. It was for this reason that both Gobetti and Gramsci converged on both the
need for class alliances, as described in 'The Southern Question' and the critical need for
the development of a spontaneous and independent politics that can exploit cracks in
even the most dominant hegemonic order. To further t is effort Gramsci introduces the
idea of cultural or hegemonic struggle, rather than revolutionary violence, as a means of
organizing  independent  social  movements  within  society.  And  this,  as  Gobetti  also
recognized, was dependent upon the right kind of education and intellectual guidance.
This reflects Gramsci's strategy of social transformation by way of a “war of position”
that would avoid the pitfalls of direct confrontation, where even if victorious, would only
succeed in replicating the same defects that led to fascism. While tactically significant,
what is often missed in Gramsci, but is brought into clearer focus when read alongside his
Vician heritage, is a critical struggle for 'truth' and the capacity to know it autonomously
and piece it together in ourselves; to make our conception of the world coherent and to
then square it with the social and political order. It is this transformation, what Gramsci
calls “critical self-consciousness” that is the goal, to “'know thyself' as the product of the
historical process”.63 “The goal”, for Gobetti, was “to be everywhere oneself.”64 In these
two  important  figures  of  the  antifascist  movement  we  see  the  development  of  an
approach to politics and philosophy that leans heavily on a Vician/Crocian concept of
liberal  “idealist”  pluralism and an open-ended politics.  And it  is an understanding of
63 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 59.
64 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, xi.
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politics that positions them as precursors to the “antipolitics” of the liberal anticommunist
dissidents of Central and Eastern Europe. 
Finally, Chapter Four turns to the anticommunist disident movements of Eastern Europe
and in particular the work of Leszek Kolakowski, Adam Michnik, Vaclav Havel, and
Gyorgy  “George”  Konrad,  who  echo  the  original  approach  to  both  Marxism  and
liberalism  characterized  by  Gobetti  and  Gramsci.  Beyond  their  shared  “Gramscian”
conceptions of 'hegemony' and 'civil  society';  the concepts of 'antipolitics', 'solidarity',
and 'living in truth' as uniquely expressed in the East European dissident movements can
be  closely  connected  to  the  decidedly  “open  Marxist”  and  “Revolutionary  liberal”
theories of the Italian revolutionary left. For seventy years the people of Eastern Europe
suffered  under  the  ideological  domination  of  communism.  Despite  its  theoretical
intention to provide greater social justice, its focus on the centralization of authority and
economic  planning  smothered  any  hope  for  a  truly  free  society.  This  was  a  direct
consequence of the belief in scientific progress towards a knowable universe and the
privileged status afforded those who claim special access to that knowledge, namely the
Party. Kolakowski similarly argued that it was “Marx's anticipation of man's perfect unity
and his myth of the proletarian consciousness that led o his theory being turned into the
ideology of the totalitarian movement.”65 And yet, without any sense of irony, politicians
and  ideologues  declared  victory  for  a  similarly  constructed  economic  ideology  in
neoliberalism  and  the  politics  of  advanced  capitalism.   Having  offered  to  solve  the
problem  of  ideological  domination  by  replacing  one  unified  ideology  with  another
65 Kołakowski, Is God Happy?, 104.
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“infinitely more subtle and refined”, the more insightful observers, who had just emerged
from life behind the “iron curtain” and whose experiences under communism sensitized
them to ideological propaganda, responded en force.66 In turn they offered critiques not
merely  of  the  totalitarianism  and  post-totalitarianism  that  dominated  their  own
experience, but of one whose contours they recognized even in the west and as more
broadly associated with modernity itself. Antipolitics, as it came to be known, built on a
historicist liberal tradition first revealed in Vico's New Science and what he understood as
the limitations inherent within the seemingly limitless potential of Cartesian science. It
was a struggle, not merely for politics—though this was a profound consequence of the
outcome—but for “truth” itself, and the right to reasonably claim access to it. And this is
a struggle that has continued through both the Italian antifascist movement and the East-
European anticommunist  dissident  movements.  However,  rather  than be viewed as a
contributing to an alternative narrative around both epistemology and political life, they
are often viewed as relevant only within their own local and narrowly historical contexts,
which are intimately tied to the particular conditions of their times. However, a closer
comparison of the two, and read in light of Vico's wn critique of Cartesian rationalism,
reveals that the theory and action that comes out of these movements represent a more
coherent and widely relevant model of liberal resistance to ideological domination of all
stripes. 
66 Havel, Open Letters, 208.
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The argument introduced in this dissertation begins with Vico and Croce, and enlists the
Italian  antifascists  and  anticommunist  dissidents  of  Eastern  Europe,  constructing  an
historical and theoretical narrative that emphasizes a compelling philosophical alternative
to dominant political programs. This is especially evident when brought to bear on any
political  form that  asserts  its  own theoretical  conlusions as assumed premises upon
which societies and economies ought to be built. As such, they have considerably more to
say about contemporary political theories of democracy and political life than they have
been given credit for. They represent significant critical appraisals of both the form, and
particularly  the  underlying  function,  of  ideology as  an  instrument  of  hegemony and
democratic and personal manipulation. Their contribu ions in a number of areas relevant
to the challenges facing our contemporary democracies are considerable and important as
their successes in facing down fascism and state communism demonstrate. Incidentally,
the efforts  of  the more organized social  and political  movements  that  fall  under  the
Occupy heading exist as a testament to the vitality of such a position.  It also indicates
that such movements can be understood as organic to their respective societies no matter
how  varied  and  diverse;  a  product  not  of  external  forces,  but  rather  of  historical
conditions and the people that  make them.  It  acknowledges the fundamental  need to
persistently defend human autonomy in any struggle for freedom where the claims are
individual,  personal  and  represent  an  effort  to  find  truth  and  create  a  politics  that
coalesces around the commitment  to “replace the last remains of revealed truth with the
truth won day by day through the labor of all, and generic abstractions with patient, open-
minded scrutiny of the little problems and the big ones as they arise.”67 Such a position
67 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 77.
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can  serve as  the  foundation  for  both  the  critical  tools  and the  practical  methods  of
engaging  with  our  increasingly  complex  and  deeply  integrated  political  world;  a
'philosophy' in the active sense that need not be burdened with the baggage that one
defined by either either a communist or capitalist horizon demands.
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Chapter 1: The Other Liberalism: the Liberal Philosophy of Giambattista Vico
Vico's radical introduction of a  new science sought to emancipate humanity from the
transcendent  forces of  Cartesian determinism on the one hand,  while  simultaneously
working  to  preserve the  transcendent  nature  of  god—f a  concrete truth—through a
unique interpretation of divine providence as expressed through autonomous human life.
The Church, which had played an incredible role in creating in Italy an insulated cultural
environment  allowed for  the development,  via  Vico,  of  a unique intellectual  culture.
Benedetto Croce, himself a Neapolitan deeply steeped in the legacy of Vico, represented
a key figure in creating an intellectual culture in the late 19th and early-20th centuries
and served as both inspiration and symbol for the Ialian antifascist movement through
his unique liberalism that adheres to the traditional liberal focus on the individual, seeing
the individual as lying at the center of a process of continual struggle for freedom that
was not associated with any particular ideological vision. In this sense, Vico via Croce
affirmed  a  commitment  to  pluralism,  liberal  freedom and a  democratic  way of  life,
providing a potent  formula for  Italian antifascism. And Vico via Croce and Gramsci
would make his presence felt in the work of the latr dissident politics of the theorists of
1989 if only because his presence was “in the air”.68 In a chapter on “Civil Society and
the Polish Solidarity Movement”, David Beem argues that the “conceptual connection”
between the Solidarity and Gramsci is “stiking.”69 He points to Kolakowski's critique of
Marxism, “especially the passivity born of a belief that the coming revolution had been
68 Christopher Beem, The Necessity of Politics: Reclaiming American Public Life, Morality and Society 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 115.
69 Ibid.
32
scientifically established.”70 In Gramsci, such a criticism was under the influence of Vico
and Croce.
If this conclusion demands more attention it is only because Italian political theory has
always been a bit unfamiliar to the rest of Europe, and especially the United States. In
part, this can be traced to their having been spared th  religious reformations and their
association with the positivist scientific revolution that swept through the rest of Europe
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Simply put, the assumptions that the northern
enlightenment brought with it elsewhere, quite often, have not been taken for granted in
Italian intellectual life. Though often seen as a source of backwardness, I will argue here
that it is precisely this isolation and these novel conditions that would contribute to the
originality found in the best of Italian thought. Though we might trace elements of this
legacy as far back as the ancients, it is an intellectual tradition begins in earnest with its
first great point of departure from the rest of Europe in the work of Giambattista Vico
(1668–1744). In what is perhaps his best known work, the  Scienza Nuova or the  New
Science, the Neapolitan philosopher developed a distinctive philosophy of history that
introduced new concepts of knowledge and culture, challenging what was then becoming
the dominant Cartesian and positivist perspective. While he was largely unknown in his
own time, today his influence can be seen throughout the humanities and social sciences.
Yet, rather than representing an anti-modernist position that implies a kind of resistance
to the progress and development of scientific modernity, or the position of precursor to
post-modern  skepticism that  seeks  to  leave behind  a 'corrupt'  or  'broken'  modernity,
70 Ibid., 279.
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Giambattista Vico stands as a powerful forerunner of forms of radical politics from Italian
Antifascism, through the dissident politics of the revolutions of 1989 and 2011. But to
understand him as such we must invest in a reading of Vico as neither anti-modern, nor
post-modern, but rather as (lacking an adequately distinctive term) new-modern.71 What
was necessary was a new science that accounted for the contingent nature of man, but
simultaneously strove for the same degree of rigor, that aimed to find truths that were as
useful  as Cartesian truths had been in their  respective fields.  For this Vico turned to
'common sense',  which he understood as knowledge nec ssary to  conduct  oneself  in
everyday life. It is 'good sense' precisely because it h lps us understand that the historical
development of a given society is not the manifest r ult of a single force or will external
to human life,  but  rather a force that  emanates from the historical  expression of the
independent and capricious wills of that society.72 Reason cannot offer a road map to
understanding this society, but 'good sense' or 'comm n sense' if studied with great care
could.  Vico's  New Science,  without  denying the  value of  knowledge  in  the  form of
abstract and transcendent truths (he was, after all, a devout Catholic) nonetheless makes
the claim that alone such truths cannot tell us much about human life, not because man is
unaffected by these truths (such as the laws of physics or mathematical constants), but
that  such  truths cannot  be transferred  effectively to  the  sphere  of  human social  and
political life. “Thus those whose only concern is for the truth find it difficult to attain the
means, and even more the ends of public life. More often than not they give up, frustrated
71 I use this term as a nod to both the term 'post-modern', though I wish to avoid it, instead preferring to 
acknowledge Vico's best know work the N w Science, which he recognized as every bit a part of the 
modern task of human emancipation.
72 While Vico doesn't make this distinction, Gramsci will later point to a variant of common sense he calls
'good sense' and which he identified with the 'spontaneous philosophy' of the masses and that for 
Gramsci contained the germ of alternative conceptions of the world.
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in their own plans and deceived by those of others.” 73 This passage is among the most
radical ever written and prepared those Italians steeped in his intellectual tradition to see
the approach of those who would seek to “use force to make their way through the maze
of life” and run roughshod over history.74It  was a warning that  was to anticipate the
ideological horrors of twentieth and twenty-first century political life. And it is also Vico,
who challenges us to rethink how we understand the relationship of the individual and the
State in the context of the ideological struggles that even to this day consume us. 
The Struggle for Modernity
While a full account of the intellectual struggle tha  shaped modernity lies beyond the
scope of this dissertation, it is necessary to sketch out to some degree the conflict that
would lead to this unique philosophical development in Italy and captured in Vico. This
begins with an analysis of  the two distinctive though interconnected paths by which
liberal modernity might have come to be understood. And their differences lie in the very
nature of our understanding of knowledge and how it is that one constructs a theory by
which decisions can be made and informed action can be taken. How to achieve this is
one of the essential political questions—for it sets the stage, in some sense, for all others
—and it is the arguments associated with answering this question, a question of means
and method, that forms the basis of the struggle for m dernity. 
73 Giambattista Vico, Vico: Selected Writings, trans. Leon Pompa (Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 42
74 Vico, Vico, 43
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For most of history humanity has turned to either t revealed wisdom of their gods or, in
the context of the West, the wisdom of their most ancient philosophers. In both cases
these  sources  of  wisdom have  been  seen  as  irreproachable  authorities  in  matters  of
philosophy, metaphysics and even natural science. All of this changed with the arrival of
what has come to be known as the enlightenment, which brought with it the introduction
of the concepts of self-consciousness and individualism; concepts from which we derive
our modern ideas of liberty and the pursuit of human freedom and emancipation. In time,
intellectuals increasingly dismissed the authority of  the ancient  idols as indicative of
prejudice, more often rooted in custom and habit than in truth. It is a complicated effort
that lingers with us even today as we dismiss so many attitudes and perspectives seen as
pre-modern  myth  or  superstition,  while  many others  persist  and  in  some cases  even
proliferate. Philosophers and intellectuals began to try and establish a means by which
these old assumptions could be replaced with a more objective truth, truths upon which
sounder theories could be built,  and more effective actions taken, all  in the effort  to
develop a clearer picture of the universe and humanity's place in it.  From this effort
emerged  two great methodological perspectives that have since guided the progress and
development  of  the  modern  search  for  knowledge  and  truth,  with  one  quickly
overshadowing the other. The first one, with which we are most familiar, sees humanity
as  subject  to  immutable  laws and  principles  and  assume  that  these  laws are  either
revealed to us through some divinity, or that they are ultimately discoverable through the
application of the rational methods of science. This was most famously characterized by
Rene Descartes and relied upon a kind of formal logic r reasoning insulated from the
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subjectivity  and  uncertainly  of  perception  and  experience.  This  could  be  achieved
through  a  kind  of  methodological  purity  derived  from  either  purely  abstract  or
mathematical  reason,  or  based  on  the  strict  “objectivity”  of  empirical  observation.
Method would become a filter through which only the most refined truths could pass.
Descartes set himself to the task of achieving this with the famous opening lines of his
Meditations on First Philosophy (1639) in which he declared that he was,
“struck by how many false things [he] had believed, and by how doubtful was the
structure of beliefs that [he] had based on them. [He] realized that if [he] wanted to
establish anything in the sciences that was stable nd likely to last, [He] needed –
just once in [his] life – to demolish everything completely and start again from the
foundations.”75
What had held up humanity in the search for knowledge and undivided truth was not the
inability to reason, but rather our irrational commitment to opinion, custom, and in many
cases beliefs that without the benefit of objectivity were reduced to superstition. 'Real'
truth, as opposed to the 'perceived' truth of common sense, could be achieved through the
rigorous  application  of  reason or  good  sense—understood  differently  than  Vico  or
Gramsci  understood  it—what  we  now call  the  scientific  method.76 Looking  past  the
uncertain world of men, the Cartesians turned their attention to the world of reason that
they understood lay beneath it. The great achievement of science was the discovery of the
existence of a natural order to the structure and forces that guide the universe that is
independent of any divinity. It did not dismiss entirely the possibility of the divine, and
here I paraphrase the American physicist Stephen Wei berg, but it made appeals to a
75 Descartes, Rene, “Meditations on First Philosophy by Rene Descartes,” Marxists.org, accessed 
September 20, 2014, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/descartes/1639/meditations.htm.
76 Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method.
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divinity no longer necessary. In this sense science, following on the heels of religion,
supplants it, but not before adopting its structure.  In both cases, knowledge is predicated
on  one's  ability  to  access  objective  laws  and  is  measured  by  their  productivity,  a
demonstration of the power of the laws to provide answers in the form of self-evident
truths. Humanity's place in such an order is that of a subject and insofar as one possesses
any autonomy it is to recognize oneself as subject and to tinker (perhaps in vain) amongst
the complex of existing a priori laws and principles in hope of arriving, ultimately, at the
godhead.77 While knowledge is obtainable by us, it is also external to human experience,
and though we may suffer its effects, and recognize or ven anticipate its movements, we
do not contribute fundamentally to their creation and so we cannot ultimately know them
as their creator does. 
The  second  perspective  sees  in  man  a  purposive  actor,  moved  by  his  own  will  in
participation  with  history  as  well  as  those  independent  and  impersonal  laws.  This
perspective argues that  while humanity might be subject to certain external  laws that
govern the physical world, though these laws may be converging upon truth they cannot
ultimately reach that horizon. However, human life is also subject to conditions that are
themselves human created; that is, they are historical. And because we have created them,
77 Vico, Vico. 
Despite all of the great achievements made by science we are still no nearer to answering the 
existential questions of meaning and purpose. Since all is subjected to scientific skepticism save the 
first truth of reason itself, “since nothing is excluded, it is infinite.” The scientific search for such 
answer is an infinite regress. “The only way in which skepticism can be refuted is if the criterion of the 
true is to have made the thing itself...when we arrange these elements we make the truths which we 
come to know through this arranging; and because of this, we grasp the genus or form by which be do 
the making.” That is, we come to know its purpose. D duction can only carry us so far. In the end, 
Sherlock Holmes, for all his powers of perception and reason, required as confirmation of the Truth of 
his deductive analysis access to the “organizing power” of Moriarty.
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they can be known to us and provide us with truths the likes of which are only available
to creators themselves.
“...the universal principle of [Vico's] theory of knowledge, that the condition under
which a thing can be known is that the knower should have made it, that the true is
identical with the created : verum ipsum factum. 
This, he explained, is precisely what is meant by sa ing that science is to
know by causes,  per causas scire.  Since a cause is that  which has no need of
anything external in order to produce its effect, it is the genus or mode of a thing:
to know the cause is to be able to realise the thing, to deduce it from its cause and
create it. In other words, it is an ideal repetition of a process which has been or is
being  practically  performed.  Cognition  and  action  must  be  convertible  and
identical, just as with God intellect and will are convertible and form one single
unity.
Now once this connection of the true with the created is recognised as the
ideal, and indeed, since the ideal is the truly real, as the true nature of science, the
first consequence of such a recognition must be that science is unattainable to man.
If God created the world, he alone knows it per causas, he alone knows its genera
or modes, he alone possesses scientific knowledge of it.” 78
History understood on one hand as the consequence of external causes and on the other as
a product of human will, a nod to the later development of the concept of the inversion of
praxis, which sees man as subject to forces of his own creation. For Vico, the study of
these forces in the form of history could reveal their own useful truths discoverable, not
through abstract reason but rather, through creativ imagination. This perspective took a
different view towards common sense truth and consequently the methods that would
undermine its significance. It  is a method of reasoning based in historical or practical
knowledge, and came to be know as hi toricism. Marx, as it will later be shown, picked
up this mantle only to run with it straight into the arms of science. Historicists argued that
their premises rooted as they were in practical life rather than abstraction could be used to
78 Benedetto Croce, The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, trans. R. G. Collingwood (London: Howard 
Latimer, Limited, 1913), 5.
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arrive at equally significant truths, especially regarding human life. Both perspectives
lead to a radically different understanding regarding the forces that characterize human
life and subsequently how we can best come to understand and manage the conditions of
human life.  However, in its defense of 'old prejudices' the latter has often been described
as  anti-modern  or  even  reactionary;  Descartes  and  the  scientific  method  having
demonstrated themselves to be the 'truly revolutionary' and 'progressive' method. While
much  of  modern  life  has  been  dominated  by  Cartesian rationalism,  both  of  these
perspectives contributed enormously to the expansion of human knowledge and emerged
from the enlightenment struggle for modernity. Far from having been decided, it remains
an ongoing battle with great consequence. Vico found himself at the crossroads of this
theoretical struggle,  and will  be presented as a decisiv  figure in this tale of the two
modernities.
Liberal-modernity begins in earnest with the emergence of the Renaissance Humanist
position that says man is capable of ordering his environment in such a way that it is
knowable in a permanent and intelligible manner.  To this we add the idea that  such
knowledge can be arrived at, not through any reveald wisdom or truth, but through the
application of human reason. That such an ordering is possible—and that humans are in a
position to create such an ordering—answers a basic human need to make sense of the
world and human experience in such a way that makes th  individual an agent in the
making of that world. The careful distinction to be made here is that is it humanity itself
and  human  individuals  themselves  that  are  understood   be  able  to  establish  real
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knowledge  of  human  experience  and,  moreover,  on  the basis  of  that  knowledge,
transform that experience in such a way as to improve it and make it more comfortable. It
is the introduction of the modern concept of progress. Locke, one of the great architects
of modernity understood in this manner, spoke of the social contract as human creation
devised as a means to escape the “inconveniences” of the state of nature. This placed
humanity  itself  squarely  at  the  heart  of  civilization's  foundation  and  made  of  their
contract  a formula for good government.79 Modernity exists then, not so much as an
original conception of the world as it is a powerful confirmation and reorientation of that
age old human struggle to order it and locate humanity within it. In this manner the idea
of a teleological  absolute,  or transcendent guiding force remains within the bones of
modernity  and  is  passed  on  from Plato  and  Aristotle,  to  the  scholastics,  and  on  to
Descartes,  Marx  and  Hayek  to  name  a  few.  The  difference  here  rests  largely  in
methodology and in how we have come to categorize and v lue knowledge. 
The development of this process during the enlightenment is deeply tied to the existential
questions  of  faith  that  emerged  from  the  conflicts  that  arise  at  the  frontiers  of
Christianity's cultural and political expansion. For more than a millennia, and at least
since the time that Peter was declared the rock upon which the universal Church would
be  built,  Christianity  grew  and  expanded  as  all  comprehensive  ideologies  do,  by
incorporating into itself  what it  could of  the local  traditions it  sought to replace and
eliminating or suppressing that  which it  cannot.  That  is,  it  grew like a fruit  tree,  its
branches pruned and cauterized to promote a designated outcome, with all other ends
79 John Locke, Second Treatise on Government. 
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forgotten. The establishment of holidays like Christmas and Easter are perfect examples
of this. And, like most dominant ideologies, it  was the very success of the Christian
expansion that would sow the seeds of crisis that is so central to the story here. The
Church,  which  had  until  this  time  consolidated  its  power  and  authority  in  Europe
increasingly  found  itself  facing  the  challenge  of  accounting  for  knowledge  and
achievements that did not always conform to the reciv d wisdom of the Church. It was
the newly established global  reach of Christianity that  lead to the rediscovery of the
knowledge and achievements  of  the  ancient  and non-Christian world,  in  many cases
through contact with Islamic thought at the frontiers of Christendom. For a faith that
relied upon the revealed word of god in the form of scripture as the source of all true
knowledge, such conflicts commanded the full attention of period scholars. It became the
task of medieval Christian philosophers to  resolve the contradictions that emerged in the
effort  to  establish and maintain  universal  Christian  truth  and to  harmonize  Christian
dogma with a world  that  was increasingly pluralistic.80 This was achieved through a
method developed by the scholastics and most widely recognized in Thomas Aquinas'
Summa Theologica. It is important that we begin with scholasticism precisely because it
is foremost a method, and as such it represents a first step in the direction of what is
ultimately a conflict over not just political theory, but political action.81 It was a system of
thought, relying less upon what a single man could achieve as individual than what that
80 It was an experience that confronted western philosophy with the challenges associated with what we 
today refer to collectively as globalization. It is a story altogether familiar and exhibits the tensio  that
exists at the heart of any deterministic or transcedent ideology. This will be addressed further in later 
chapters.
81 The scholastics were not strictly speaking 'the first step' in this battle. In fact, were space to permit it 
we can probably trace the substance of this paper's critique to the “ancient quarrel” between poetry and 
philosophy made famous by Plato.    
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individual might bring to bear upon the growth and development of a body of human
knowledge. In this we see the source of that famous dictum attributed to Newton and later
cherished  by  all  men  of  science—but  almost  certainly  of  Catholic,  and  moreover
scholastic,  origin—regarding dwarfs  standing on thes oulders  of  giants.82 It  was  an
intellectual movement based on rigorous dialectics; a method of critical thought that was
highly structured, emphasizing logical reasoning and the pursuit of knowledge through
inference drawn from scripture. It was a worldview that placed God squarely at its center
and as such perceived causation as transcendent or x ernal to human will, such that the
development and progress of human life acted according to laws that existed independent
of humanity itself, that is, divine laws. As agents, humanity was largely written out of the
equation and the medieval scholastics, in their pursuit of knowledge, could now retreat
into their abbeys and quietly engage in their dialectical study of the laws that shape not
only historical processes, but all of life. It was most certainly Jesuit monks and not the
lone philosopher  of  the ancients that  stood as the template for the modern scientific
academy. The scholastic method became more esoteric as it was refined in the effort to
produce more 'accurate' scholarship through the applic tion of an increasingly formalized
and abstract logic. Bacon, Descartes, and Newton would later draw heavily from the
scholastics while formulating their own new methods f inquiry, though Descartes would
break from the scholastics when he replaced scripture as the causal model, for a modern
82 John of Salisury and Daniel D McGarry, The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: A Twelfth-Century 
Defense of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1955), 
167.
“We frequently know more, not because we have moved ahead by our own natural ability, but because 
we are supported by the [mental] strength of others, and possess riches that we inherited from our 
forefathers. Bernard of Chartres used to compare us to [puny] dwarves perched on the shoulders of 
giants. He pointed out that we see more and farther than our predecessors, not because we have keener 
vision or greater height, but because we are lifted up and borne aloft on their gigantic stature.” 
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model rooted in a geometrical view of the universe. However, it was not for nothing that
the British economist John Maynard Keynes, in a lecture read before the Royal Society of
London, referred to Newton as “not the first of theage of reason, he was the last of the
magicians.”
Before Descartes,  an alternative method of inquiry emerged in the late medieval and
renaissance period as a response to the rigid logic of s holasticism, which it saw as overly
subject to mechanical argument and whose achievements were ultimately seen as largely
unproductive.  This  of  course was  largely  a  matter  of  perspective  as  the  task  of  the
scholastics  was  not  the  creation  or  discovery  of  knowledge  so  much  as  it  was  the
consolidation  of  it.  After  all,  the  Summa  Theologica roughly  translated  means  the
“summary  of  theology”,  a  unified  theology.  This  methodological  focus  on  the
consolidation of knowledge, rather than its creation or discovery, would prove the perfect
template  for  strategies  of  ideological  defense  in  the centuries  to  come.  Pico  della
Mirandola,  a  Florentine  philosopher  of  the  generation  that  preceded  Machiavelli—
motivated in  part  by the now flourishing trade in ideas from the Muslim world  and
Europe's  own  recovered  legacy—presented  the  humanist  philosophy  of  the  Italian
Renaissance in perhaps its most developed form in his oration On the Dignity of Man.83
Humanism, it must be remembered, particularly the early form of humanism to which
Mirandola was part, was not yet secular and the early humanists saw themselves as very
much  part  of  the  scholastic  effort  to  empower  their Christian  faith.  However,  they
83 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, On the Dignity of Man, trans. Charles Glenn Wallis (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).
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rejected the esoteric and dry method of the early-middle ages with a renewed interest in
classical antiquity's  focus on a universe with humanity at its center,  in an attempt to
strengthen Christianity through a renewed interest in human potential.  The humanists
reemphasized the Christian position that man was the peak of God's creation and their
primary task became finding humanity's place in God’s plan. Subsequently, humanists
came to question what it was that made humans distinctive among all of God’s creations,
and in his oration Mirandola offers an answer based on man’s capacity to make himself.
Man, created in god's image, was himself a creator because “at man’s birth the Father
placed in him every sort of seed and sprouts of every kind of life. The seeds that each
man cultivates will  grow and bear  their  fruit  in him.”84 In  this Pico argues for  rank
hierarchy of varying degrees of an active and contemplative life in which man can create
himself. Because man is able to make himself he is free to “equal their lot”, to make
himself an animal or be as the angels.85 For Mirandola the divine order was not to be
found outside of man, but as an expression of his will, an idea that will find its way into
Vico's  humanist  interpretation  of  divine  providence.  Until  this  point  philosophy,  and
particularly the work of earlier 'humanists' like Aquinas, had not focused so clearly on
understanding the human condition as a function of human capacity and potential. It is
this that makes man distinct among all of creation, his ability to change himself, and it
constitutes one of the earliest and most complete articulations of what we have come to
understand as the liberal freedom of creative autonomy.86 Mirandola finds the dignity of
84 Ibid., 5.
85 Ibid., 7.
86 Vico, Vico, 209–211.
For Vico, it was this imaginative, creative capacity of humanity and especially early humanity that 
counted as the “the first wisdom” and poets rather an philosophers who were responsible for the 
spontaneous creation of the world of nations.
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man, his freedom, is rooted in his ability to contrl his own fate and his own destiny. This
is  a  decidedly different  conclusion  from that  of  the  scholastics  who  sought  only  to
understand the laws of god to whom man was subject and establish an accord with them,
and did not see man as a constitutive part of god's will and thus an agent in their own
creation.87 It  is not without significance that Mirandola, for all his commitment to his
faith, was condemned, in part, as a heretic of the C urch. This legacy of Italian humanism
had a profound impact on Italian intellectual life as did the domineering influence of the
Church. And it would ripple all the way from Machiavelli to the debate with which this
dissertation engages, and which has been systematically displaced by the assumed self-
evidence of Cartesian rationalism.88
Thus two opposing though fundamentally related currents of thought were established on
the  basis  of  the  proper  method  of  regarding  the  world  and  the  proper  source  of
knowledge. Each offered their own key to unlocking the processes that guide humanity's
development. On the one hand, knowledge as achieved through the application of formal
logic  to  natural  law  as  revealed  through  scripture, resulting  in  an  understanding  of
87 As we will see later, this forms the crux of the distinction between the two liberalisms as it were. One 
perspective sees human autonomy as paramount. The capacity of humanity to create itself and act as an
agent in its own destiny. The other perspective sees humanity as subject to discoverable forces outside 
of human control. This latter perspective, which came to dominate, reduces human agency to a function
of the environment, albeit an environment that we can ome to know and perhaps even dominate. It is 
the latter half of this equation that presents itself as 'revolutionary', but in whose name and in whose 
interests? Whatever liberating effort is entered upon on such grounds finds itself unavoidably 
susceptible to exploitation and the forces of ideological domination.  
88 Gyoörgy Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics (Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1971), 111–113.
Lukacs famously points to this in History and Class Consciousness when he argues that “What is novel 
about modern rationalism is its increasingly insistent claim that it has discovered the principle which 
connects up all phenomena which in nature and society ar  found to confront mankind. Compared with
this, every previous type of rationalism is no more than a partial system. In such systems the ‘ultimate’ 
problems of human existence persist in an irrational ty incommensurable with human understanding. ”
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knowledge as divine,  universal  and transcendent.  And o  the other hand,  knowledge
understood  as  a  function  of  the  human  capacity  for  self-creation,  resulting  in  an
understanding  of  knowledge  as  both  particular  and  pluralistic,  and  fundamentally
contingent  though  no  less  'true'  as  a  result.  These two forms  of  knowledge  thrived
alongside each other, each in many cases complementing the achievements of the other.
This was the position that Vico would take on on scientism. “With astonishing ease of
method, analysis provides solutions to geometric problems which were unsolved by the
ancients.”89 But this balance of power was upset with the introduction of a remarkable
innovation in the pursuit of knowledge that would set the course of modernity until our
own time,  and arrived at  the  confluence of  both religious  reformation  and scientific
revolution. The method of the scholastics would be reborn in the wake of a protestant
reformation sparked by Italian humanism in northern and western Europe and introduced
a new universalism in the form of Baconian and Cartesian scientism. The seventeenth and
early  eighteenth  centuries  were  a  revolutionary  period.  Educated  men  of  letters—
scientists,  philosophers,  politicians,  etc—saw  around  them  a  confusing  and  often
bewildering world  and one increasingly marked by religious violence,  and sought  to
understand it and arrange knowledge of it in a more orderly and harmonious manner.
Like  the  scholastics  before  them  who  sought  to  bring  harmony  to  an  increasingly
pluralistic  world  through  the  application  of  formal logic  in  the  effort  to  establish
continuity with  the underlying divine law,  these  scientists looked beyond or  beneath
history and the world of  man to a world of  reason guided by natural  law. Descartes
believed that his scientific method could be used to iscover these underlying truths and
89 Vico, Vico, 35–36.
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principles that guide all things, including human society. These discoverable laws exist
independent of human society and it is human society that is instead governed by them.
The implications of this on the order of human life and politics was profound. In the
absence of a divine constant in the form of the universal Church, Cartesianism revealed a
natural constant around which knowledge could be similarly ordered.90 Vico calls this
constant the “first truth” of the Cartesian Method and we find it articulated in that famous
Cartesian maxim, cogito ergo sum or, “I think therefore I am”.91 Much effort has been
expended on coming to terms with this maxim and it has been challenged, defined, and
redefined  over  the  years  in  every  way  imaginable.  We can  understand  this  as  the
culminating statement of Cartesian doubt or skepticism; that radical doubt that tells us
that we must eliminate all beliefs that are possible to doubt. Essentially, this eliminates
very nearly all existing knowledge. You even have to subject yourself and the very nature
of  your  existence to  this  radical  doubt,  and  it  is  the  consequence of  this  that  leads
Descartes to his famous first truth. The very act of doubting your existence is proof of
that  existence,  or  at  least  a  proof  of  the  existence  of  your  thought.  If  you  doubt
something, you are engaged in the act of thinking about it, and for someone to think
implies one who thinks, or, simply put one who exists. However, this didn’t confirm the
existence of the body as such, which still remains u known, but rather the existence of
the  mind  and  of  the  capacity  to  think  and  express  thought.  Therefore,  Descartes
90 This was, almost without reservation, an enormous advance in the cause of human emancipation. No 
longer could innovative discoveries of natural world be called on in a way that could be taken seriously
to defend their theories on the grounds of religious dogma. That they continued to do so in practice 
only highlights the absurd decline of religious influence. Here I am reminded in part of effort by certain
political factions in the US Congress to submit questions of statutory civil rights or scientific research 
to religious tests, an equally absurd proposition, wherein its purpose is anything but rhetorical.
91 Vico, Vico, 56.
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concluded that the first truth was the existence of reason and it is from this first truth—
through  the  application  of  the  critical  method—that Cartesians  would  step  by  step
construct a new system of philosophy and science. Like the scholastics before them the
Cartesians, armed with methodological certainty, can retreat from history and human life
itself in pursuit of a unified theory. It is this methodological application of reason for the
purposes of discovering truths and creating knowledge that Descartes and Vico referred
to as analysis. 
The success of the "Scientific Revolution" rested largely on these methods and principles,
which were seen as so powerful that they eventually found their way from the field of
theology and the study of scripture to other fields as well, and eventually would be reborn
in what has come to be known as the 'scientific' method of inquiry. Rather than providing
a logic based on inferences made from the irrefutable premises of scripture, scientific
logic turned to the irrefutable and self-evident premises of mathematics, geometry, and
above all reason. This in turn came to be perceived as having universal application across
all fields. The excitement that accompanied the great achievements made in the fields of
physics and the natural sciences eventually spilled over into other areas that asked why
they should not also reap the benefits of these methods. It  was on this basis that the
abstract  and  disinterested  ideas  that  characterized mathematical  thinking  became the
guiding principles for nearly all imaginable areas of human endeavor and inquiry. It was
on these grounds that the study of philosophy and politics became dominated by this
mathematical and geometrical method of investigation. This proved significant for human
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development in Europe for a number of reasons, not the least among them being that it
provided for an absolute foundation for truth in the absence of traditional divine sources
of  Truth.92 This was significant  for no less a reason than maintaining the social  and
political order of the age, which was marked by the widespread chaos and factionalism as
a result of the Protestant Reformation, the Thirty Years' War and wane of the Holy Roman
Empire, and the bloody decline of Catholic influenc in England. It seemed to respond to
the demands of the time which sought out, if it were possible, the means by which order
could be restored without god as the referent. It was through this process that the social
sciences were established using these mathematical scientific methods to identify and
then  demonstrate  the  universal  and,  moreover,  s lf-evident validity  of  the  concepts,
principles and foundations of political authority and government. And this was especially
important where religious conflict meant that universal agreement on divine arguments
could no longer be assumed.
“A universally  valid  method  had  finally  been  found  for  the  solution  of  the
fundamental questions theat had exercised men at all times—how to establish what
was true and what was false in every province of knwledge; and, above all, what
was the right life that men should lead if they were to attain those goal which men
had  always  pursued—life,  liberty,  justice,  happiness,  virtue,  the  fullest
development of human faculties in a harmonious and creative way.”93
No figure perhaps in the history of philosophy recognized and applied this as effectively
as the great English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. 
Hobbes thought that the geometrical methods of science might be used to bring peaceful
92  Much later, Hegel would later present another variation on the theme in the form of his concept of 
'absolute immanence'.
93 Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy 
(London: John Murray, 1990), 51.
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resolution  to  questions  of  political  legitimacy  in  the  chaos  of  England's  'glorious
revolution'. The greatest example of this is Hobbes' classic of political philosophy:  The
Leviathan.  In  this work Hobbes sets out  to resolve the bloody violence and disorder
brought about by this unprecedented loss of stabiliy at the hands of the 'liberating' forces
of the reformation, through an appeal to the new constant around which the consolidation
of power could be made legitimate. Hobbes' response to this dilemma was remarkable in
that it both upheld the disaggregation of political power from religious power, but also
challenged the newer more radically democratic conceptions of political  authority by
arguing instead—on the principles of logic and scientific reason—for a set of principles
that would act as a kind of universal, but secular source of political authority. This reveals
the underlying tension that exists within the new emancipatory framework supplied by
the scientific  enlightenment, one  that  promised humanity's emancipation  from  the
superstitions and absolutism of our irrational past, nd normalized humanity's subjugation
in new and more sophisticated ways. It is a pattern that would repeat in the centuries that
followed at great human cost. Existing as he did in a ation reduced to a state of chaos
and  disorder,  Hobbes  believed  that  access  to  a  universal  and  self-evident  truth  was
necessary for the preservation of order and security even if it meant a leviathan.
He was convinced that there can be no true knowledge anywhere without proper
method, and that here the geometers and physicists held the key. Increasingly he
felt the inadequacy, even in social and political inquiry, of other purported paths to
truth. He abandoned an early belief that universal verities about men and states can
be reached by induction from a study of history; indeed, he urged, in no inquiry
will  the  mere  amassing of  observations,  however  regular  and  consistent,  yield
general laws-"experience concluded nothing universally.” 94
94 Hardy Grant, “Geometry and Politics: Mathematics in the Thought of Thomas Hobbes,” Mathematics 
Magazine 63, no. 3 (June 1, 1990): 148–149, doi:10.2307/2691132.
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This reading of Hobbes makes clear the dramatic shift and separation that takes place in
the wake  of  the  scientific  revolution  and sets  a  precedent  for  nearly  all  of  western
political  philosophy to  follow;  the belief  that  despite the evident  plurality of  human
existence, if there was to be stability and order in the realm of human affairs it could only
be accomplished through the proper understanding and ordering of the universal laws
underlying human life. This assumed premise for the healthy functioning of a society and
especially an economy would be challenged by radical liberals and democrats as well as
Vico, Croce, Italian antifascism  and  later  anticommunist  dissidents.  Enlightenment
theorists like John Locke would provide for institutional and procedural reforms all in the
effort to mediate the ill effects of this new approach to politics, but without calling into
question the foundations of the method that had otherwise proved itself beyond reproach.
While  the  continental  rationalists  and British empiricists  may have disagreed on the
relationship of experience to the nature of knowledge, they did agree on the virtues of
Descartes methods. And thus reborn, the methods of late-medieval scholasticism were
adapted to a wide variety of fields and the results were nothing short of spectacular. Such
was  the  singular  success  of  the  scientific  revolutin  that  for  the  children  of  the
enlightenment, it only seemed natural that the social sciences and metaphysics—spheres
until now dominated by the humanist tradition—could be equally conquered though the
application of scientific method as Hobbes and Locke had appeared to do. Reason alone,
whether  applied  to  divine  law,  the  natural  laws  of  the  physical  world,  or  the  laws
underwriting human life, was capable of producing kowledge. It is a view that says that
observation, subject to strict methodological contrls, and the application of logic and
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mathematical analysis are the only source of worthwhile knowledge capable of granting
us access to the principles underlying the universe. Increasingly the humanities took a
back seat to science even in those areas where the humanities had traditionally held sway
and could be observed in philosophical analytics as well as Abbé Sieyès and Auguste
Comte's sociologie that created “methods in essence analogous to those of, if not physics,
at any rate the biological sciences.”95
The  first  shift  in  this  process  occurred  with  the  movement  from  late-medieval
scholasticism to Italian humanism in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and then with
the movement away from Italian humanism as a consequence of the emergent Protestant
Reformation and the associated Cartesian revolution in north and western Europe in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Both shifts contributed fundamentally to establishing
the  very  framework  upon  which  we  construct  our  understanding  of  the  individual's
relationship  to  society,  politics,  and  knowledge  itself.  However,  the  narrative  that
emerged  from  these  dynamic  periods—particularly  their  varied  perspectives  on
knowledge, history, and science—has often been viewed as a singular progressive path
marked  by  the  dominance  of  the  “modern”  method  championed  by  Descartes.
Consequently, this dominance was then seen to be suj ct to periodic interruption by
moments of ‘backwardness’ or ‘anarchic radicalism';  rather than being understood as the
legitimate expressions of an alternative liberalizing movement in history these 'moments'
were  seen  as  aberrations  that  needed  to  be  suppressed  or  eliminated.96 In  this  way,
95 Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 50.
96 Vico, Vico, 40.
“...one cannot deny any part of it [the method] without attacking its very basis.”
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movements that might have been seen as advancing the cause of human freedom, have
often been rejected as the enemy of that effort, or have to tread lightly in positioning
themselves in this manner. Often in such cases they ar  forced to sacrifice their wider
concerns for narrower and more localized interests. Such is the dominance and tenacity of
this narrative that one is often compelled from the outset to adopt models of resistance
that  conform  to  the  very  premises  that  they  are  looking  to  confront,  and  often
unconsciously  at  that.  They are  “like  people  whose parents  have left  them property
lacking nothing in the way of splendor and usefulness, so that all that remains for them to
do is to rearrange [their] plentiful furniture, or adorn it with some slight embellishment to
suit their current taste.”97 It is this musical chair theory of action to which Vico was so
adamantly opposed. It  stripped from humanity any real autonomy and while it  might
serve the interests of advancement in the knowledge of the natural sciences, in the “world
of nations” and practical life it would only serve to obscure that advancement, contain it
within the prescribed narrative.98 Understood in terms of political action, Vico introduces
what amounts to a theory of ideological domination smuggled in this powerful Cartesian
method, but one that also provided a key to unlocking the potential for radical progress
and transformation that escaped even the dominance of Cartesian methods. To Vico, it
was a key component of what he called his  'new science', and to those who fell under his
influence it provided a clear path out from under similarly constructed and dominating or
totalizing world views, be they fascist, communist, or otherwise. Under such obscured
conditions of ideological domination resistance tends to fall into one of three categories.
97 Ibid.
98 One such example is the scientific study of economics, which has come to dominate a field one called 
political economy, and at lest on purely scientific grounds has provided results that are anything but 
self-evidently reliable.
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The first can be described as an 'illiberal' or 'anti-liberal' position that rejects 'liberalism'
itself—seen from within this game of musical  chairs as oppressive and immanent to
modernity—as the problem, then struggles impossibly to maintain itself as essentially
modern, careening back and forth between ideological extremes unable to get its bearings
and see beyond the assumptions that at the core of th ir premises. This is the position that
I  believe  we  are  most  familiar  with  and  is  observed in  the  Capitalist-Communist
dichotomy  and  their  failure  to  recognize  a  common  vulnerability.99 The  second  is
similarly  anti-liberal,  but  sees  the  solution  in  reactionary  revolutionism,  seeking  to
essentially re-set modernity on the model of a more 'heroic' time, usually theocratic or
absolutist in design.  Berlin keys in on this to some degree in his well known essay on de
Maistre and of whom he said, “seemed to be gazing calmly into the classical and feudal
past , but what he saw even more clearly proved to be a blood-freezing vision of the
future.”100 This is the position that is most familiarly observed in Fascism, Nazism, and
conservative extremism of the kind endorsed by de Maistre. The third position can be
described as something of a 'counter-enlightenment' position that recognizes the entire
enlightenment project as somehow tainted, a position that identifies itself as distinctly
apart from from that tradition, in search of new theoretical horizons, something entirely
post-modern. However, it is a position that remains blind to the radical skepticism that
keeps them frozen in their own antipathy or drives them to revolutionary action that
remains tethered to the object of their criticism. Aspects of all three positions will be
analyzed here, but it is the post-modern tradition hat ought to be kept in sight throughout
99 Later, this vulnerability was famously tabbed by Francois Lyotard in the Post Modern Condition as that
of the “grand narrative”. There are, however, considerable distinctions between this and Vico 
perspective. 
100 Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 102.
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this analysis. In assuming the 'post-modern' label, th orists recognized the failures of the
liberal/anti-liberal struggle and indicated a decisive break from what they observed as
moment of crisis. But they also fall into a two-fold trap of allowing themselves to first be
driven from the table and the discussion they have e ry right  to be part  of;  that  of
defining  liberal-modernity  itself;  and  second,  trapped  by  their  own  antipathies,  the
struggle for  change appears simultaneously violent, ineffective,  and without  concrete
direction.  While such positions may be variously recognized as bold,  ambitious,  and
perhaps  even  romantic,  they  are  also  more  than  likely  wrong.  In  reflecting  on  the
development of liberalism since its earliest incarnations of the late-medieval period it
becomes clear that the problem is not one of finding a new or different future, but of
revisiting the scenes of struggle in the development of liberal-modernity and recovering
the lessons of another conception of modernity that finds “universal” expression through
a few key “localized” movements.
One such 'movement'  begins with Italy. In sight of these revolutions, but out of their
complete reach, Italy was cut off from these developments by the still powerful presence
of the Catholic Church, whose influence had been sharply felt by Mirandola, Machiavelli,
and Galileo alike,  and which saw many of these innovati ns  as tied to the heretical
religious  reformism of  western  and  central  Europe.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  Italy's
enlightenment  followed  a  unique  path  that  presents  a  distinctive  variant  of  liberal
modernity that  remains deeply suspicious of  the  truth  claims of  Cartesian scientism.
Nurtured in part by its isolation from rest of Europe, it was an isolation that would have
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profound  effect  on  the  intellectual  and  cultural  development  of  Italy  and  whose
consequences and critical potential were relegated to the sidelines of western political and
philosophic thought until  it  resurfaced in dramatic fashion in the 20th century during
Europe's  darkest  hours  of  crisis  and especially  in  Italy—where a  nation found itself
subject to a terrifying union of myth and reason in Fascism—and turned to their unique
intellectual heritage for a “new” theory of resistance, whose legacy can still be felt today
and form the critical heart of this paper.
Vico and his Critics
Italy  occupies  a  rather  unique  position  in  the  intellectual  development  of  Europe.
Possessing  the  rich  cultural  and  intellectual  tradiion  of  the  Romans  and  the  early
Renaissance, Italy was positioned to be one of the most influential forces in the rise of
‘modernity’ and in some ways it  has; however, despite the significance of the Italian
enlightenment, the force and influence of the Vatican and the Catholic Church was such
that the great reformation that swept the rest of Europe and ushered in so much radical
change somehow passed Italy by. It is this lack of a reformation that contributes to what a
great many Italian intellectuals believe is the political backwardness of Italy in twentieth-
century.  Piero  Gobetti,  among  others,  would  lament  that  “Italy  did  not  have  a
Reformation of its own and that  the absence of a religious protest here accounts for
Italy’s political and ideal immaturity.”101 Though Gobetti would later add that Machiavelli
represented an Italian equivalent to the reformation and that it was due to the dominant
101 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 137.
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presence of the Church that “his ideas were unable to find any social terrain in which to
take root or individuals who would live them out.”102 Outside of Machiavelli's Florence
and the overwhelming presence of the Vatican, none contributed more to the shaping of
what  would  become  modern  Italian  culture  and  Italian  dentity  than  Naples,  which
Benedetto Croce described as “one of the most important states of old Europe... [and] one
that  had  been  first,  or  one  of  the  first,  in  social progress.”103 Chief  among  Naples'
contributions was Giambattista Vico and it was the unique experience of Italian cultural
and intellectual development captured in the highly original and creative work of this
seventeenth century Neapolitan philosopher that contributed to the development of Italian
culture and thought, which was to become something entirely unique and separate from
that  of  the  rest  of  Europe.  Consequently,  he  would  come  to  shape  the  Italian
understanding  of  wider  European  cultural  concepts  in  ways  that  would  reverberate
through 'post-modernity'. Though Gobetti would later argue that in Vico's own time he
had “found no echo in the practical world.”104 It was through Benedetto Croce—perhaps
the most influential intellectual figure in twentieth-century Italy—that Vico would find a
new audience and a new purpose in recasting liberal thought and politics in a century that
had suffered unbearably the unintended consequences of scientism's unrivaled dominance
in the form of fascism, Nazism, communism and capitalism. Of Vico Croce declared that
he,
“...would never in the world temper the admiration a d indeed amazement with
which I regard Vico's Scienza Nuova. Every time I rtu n to this book I recognize
its unique place in the history of thought as the powerful forerunner of a whole
102 Ibid., 111.
103 Benedetto Croce, History of the Kingdom of Naples (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 7.
104 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 111.
58
group  of  important  doctrines  and  of  a  manner  of  thinking  and  feeling  which
contrasted sharply not only with the intellectual framework of the author's own
time but also with that of the age which immediately followed, and was to find an
echo only amid the circumstances that ripened a whole century later.”105
While Vico recognized the successes of Cartesianism he remained critical of its potential
when applied to human life, which he saw as forever subject to the indeterminate nature
of free-will. Thus human life was not the subject of universal laws, but the contingent
experience  of  individuals  and  societies.  This  histor cal  understanding  of  human  life
exposed the tension that existed between Cartesian sc e ce and human agency.106 Though
Cartesian science had contributed to  man's  ability to rationally understand the world
around him and even at times his ability to shape it in ways never before achieved, it also
contributed to the understanding of a world in which the individual however expanded
his abilities remained largely powerless. He was subject not to the force of his will, but to
the myriad of known and as-yet-undiscovered natural laws, among them those laws of
man said  to  be predicated  on  the  newly discovered  and scientific  constants  that  lay
beneath them. It  was this tension that Vico's historicism, his “new science” sought to
overcome through the human sciences [humanities]. To this end Vico famously declared
that:
The criterion and rule of the true is to have made it. Accordingly, our clear and
distinct idea of the mind cannot be a criterion of the mind itself, still less of other
truths. For while the mind perceives itself, it does not make itself.107
This concept of truth as being rooted only in what is made deeply influenced Vico's work
and the core of his argument in the Scienza Nuova (The New Science, 1725) in which he
105 Croce, History of the Kingdom of Naples, 39.
106 This tension between scientific determinism and human agency constitutes in one form or another the 
true heart of the crisis of modernity.
107 Vico, Vico, 55.
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argued that political life is wholly constructed byhumans and not subject to immutable
abstract ideas and truths that can be known independent of history.  For Vico,  human
beings and the civil world in which they existed, what he called the 'world of nations',
was both historical and created by humanity itself. We can know history because we
created it and it is through our study of history and human life that we can come to learn
“the universal and eternal principles, necessary for every science, upon which everything
in nations arose and is preserved”.108 Today, we call these sciences the social sciences.
What he essentially proposes is that Cartesianism is not the only game in town and that
they do not hold a monopoly on the ability to make truth claims. It is an argument whose
core thesis Gramsci would later pick up, whether cons iously or unconsciously, in “The
Southern Question” where he picks up on the use of pr paganda as an instrument of
subjugation on the basis of politically motivated 'biological' and 'natural' truth claims,
declaring  that  “once  again  “science”  had  turned  to  crushing  the  wretched  and  the
exploited.”109
To understand what Vico means here we ought turn briefly to what it is that he is arguing
against specifically. Let us take for example the root of all ‘scientific’ inquiry, the self-
evident logic of mathematics. Mathematics represents a pure construction of the mind
and as such, according to Vico, it can yield certain ruths. For example, 2 + 2 = 4, or if all
sides of a triangle are equal in length then then all of the angles of that triangle will also
108 Ibid., 198.
109 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 31.
Interestingly enough, he concludes this passage with a critique aimed at socialism, stating that “this 
time it was cloaked in socialist colours, pretending to be the science of the proletariat.” Here Gramsci 
alludes to a critical shortcoming that he observes in Marxism as a 'science' and perhaps the antipathy 
that the Italian antifascists shared for marxist determinism.
60
be  equal.  However,  for  Vico,  understanding  humanity was  not  simply  a  matter  of
applying mathematical truths to the study of the social sciences, as Hobbes had hoped.
While such a method might give us an approximation of truths with relation to humanity
it can give us no definite knowledge on the order of fundamental guiding principles of
human  life.  Social contract theorists like Hobbes try to explain the movement of
humanity from a state of nature in which there is an absence of law into the state of
civilization and law on the basis of a 'social contrac ' or the idea that government is the
result of an agreement of or among the people. A social contract, therefore, presumes the
understanding of a kind of institutional framework and cannot be in an of itself the
foundation of human life without representing a set of a priori interests. It is this set of
human interests, independent of those 'immutable' princi les that guide the natural world,
that represent the object of Vico's historicism, and for Vico those human interests are
largely contingent and not wholly rational. Instead,  Vico argues that it is the humanities
that can offer real knowledge of human life, that is knowledge that is superior to that of
Cartesian  science  because  societies  are  themselves, lik  mathematics,  our  own
construction.  And  like  mathematics,  the  study of  which  is  best  done  through  direct
analysis, it is through the study of human creation, the catalog of which is human history,
that we can best arrive at real  knowledge about human life. And this is perhaps best
achieved through the study of 'practical wisdom' and 'common sense'. Vico makes his
meaning clear in his critique  On Method in Contemporary Fields of Study,  where he
argues that “since the sole aim of study today is truth, we investigate the nature of things,
because this  seems certain,  but  not  the nature of  men,  because free will  makes this
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extremely uncertain.”110
In this he divides truth into 'knowledge' and 'practical wisdom' and it was Vico’s belief
that the humanities were capable of providing truth in the form of practical wisdom in a
way that was every bit as ‘true’ as knowledge achieved through scientific methods in
their  own  respective  fields.  Vico  explains  that  this  is  because  “those  who  excel  in
knowledge seek a single cause to explain many natural effects, but those who excel in
practical wisdom seek as many causes as possible for a single deed, in order to reach the
truth by induction.”111 It was an idea that contributed significantly to the development of a
philosophy of history that captured much of what would become central to ‘humanist
historicism’  and  ‘revolutionary  historicism’.  It  began  a  movement  away  from
assumptions about about human nature as a known constant that underlies all of human
life and is wholly subject to eternal laws outside of human influence to a condition in
which every detail of human life becomes an object of study and knowledge. Central to
this emerging philosophy of history was not only the capacity of human beings for self-
knowledge,  but  the  role  of  'common  sense'  as  a  chronicle  of  that  collective  self-
knowledge in making the 'world of nations'. At its core it represented the understanding
that human life and the historical world was made by men and women rather than having
been imposed upon them by transcendent laws and prici les. This constituted an open
hostility to both enlightenment natural law theory as well as religions that saw humanity
as subject to such laws. It is also a theoretical position that would reject the materialist
110 Vico, Vico, 41.
111 Ibid., 42.
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conceptions  of  history  associated  with  Hegel  and  Marx  that  merely  replaced  the
transcendent  providence of  Christianity  and  the  Church,  with  that  of  a  transcendent
‘world spirit’ that superseded man in the form of the state, or a materialist conception of
the state rooted in the “productive forces” of any historical moment. Thus emerged this
unique Italian perspective that declared that it was man and man alone who created his
world, and therefore man alone who had the ability and duty to remake it! 
The foundation of humanist historicism is the belief that a true understanding of
man can come only from an objective assessment of man as he is, not as he ought
to be, man as he is revealed in the historical record rather than man as revealed in
the visions of  theologians  and philosophers.  This  study of  man as  he actually
developed  in  history  involved  a  revolutionary  change  of  perspective,  for  it
constituted a rejection of the well-established belief that only that which is constant
can be an object of knowledge112
Here Edmund Jacobitti emphasizes the idea that human history and societies were created
through the long and difficult process of change marked by contest and struggle, and not
the outcome of transcendent and uncontrollable forces—be it that of religious dogma,
Marxist  determinism,  or  even  the  economic  determinism  of  the  neoliberal  faith  in
Capitalism. The key to understanding the world, which man created, was to understand
history and how history itself was ‘made’. It was those who understood the twists and
turns  of  history  and could glean  from it  truth  in  the  form of  practical  wisdom and
common sense that could follow the indirect route to truth and “will be successful in the
long term, as far as the nature of things allows.”113 In this way, Vico follows Machiavelli's
lead in developing a human science that brackets, but does not deny the influence of a
force that exists beyond human will, be it “fortuna” or God's will. It is an understanding
112 Edmund E Jacobitti, Revolutionary Humanism and Historicism in Modern Italy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1981).
113 Vico, Vico, 43.
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of the relationship between human life, the making of history, the practice of politics, and
the role of  the individual  that  would again  surface in  Gramsci's  development  of  the
concepts of culture, praxis and hegemony.114 
While Vico is not widely read in American philosophy departments and even less so in
departments of political science, those who are famili r have often become so through a
handful of essays by Isaiah Berlin and Leo Strauss, two powerful figures in twentieth-
century American intellectual  life.115 However,  even Strauss began as something of a
skeptic, once revealing in a lecture that he initially “did not see any reason why [he] must
study Vico. Of course [he] had read about Vico in the literature, but whatever was there
was not sufficiently attractive to [him] to devote s rious study to it.”116 In time he would
change his mind. Isaiah Berlin, on the other hand, saw Vico as nothing less than “the true
father of the modern concept of culture and of what one might call cultural pluralism.”117
Edward  Said  too  took  Vico  seriously,  but  that  was  literary  criticism,  which  draws
regrettably little attention from political scientists and philosophers.118 Consequently, Vico
has remained something of an obscurity in American political thought and almost entirely
the reserve of those specialists who frame his thoug t in the context of  the counter-
enlightenment, therefore positioning Vico as something of an “anti-modern” and this idea
has, for the most part,  stuck.119 However, in 1983 a volume edited by the late Italian
114 These concepts are explored thoroughly in Gramsci's Prison Notebooks, ed. Selections from the Prison 
Notebooks. (New York: International Publishers, 1992)  and especially his essay on “The Southern 
Question”, The Modern Prince & other writings. (New York: International Publishers, 1992)
115 Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity; Berlin, Vico and Herder.
116 Leo Strauss, “Seminar in Political Philosophy: Vico” (University of Chicago, Autumn Quarter 1963).
117 Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 59.
118 Edward W Said, Beginnings: Intention and Method (New York: Basic Books, 1975).
119 Mark Lilla, “G. B. Vico: The Antimodernist,” The Wilson Quarterly (1976-) 17, no. 3 (July 1, 1993): 
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theorist  Giorgio  Tagliacozzo  took  up  the  question  of whether  or  not  the
seventeenth/eighteenth-century  Neapolitan  philosopher  shared  some  “affinities”  with
Marx, which is to inquire about his affinities with modernity itself.120 The results were
mixed,  but  it  was  a  remarkable  question.  To  what  extent  could  we  consider  Vico  a
“revolutionary”  in the modern sense of  the term and what,  if  any,  affinities did this
relatively  obscure  Neapolitan  philosopher  and  career  academic  share  with  with  a
progressive politics of the left as characterized by Marx? For a figure so often regarded as
anti-modern  this  association  suggested  fractures  exi ted  in  the  commonly  held
interpretations  of  Vico,  Marx,  and  modernity  itself.  By  revisiting  this  question  and
exploring the revolutionary potential of Vico in the face of his contradictory reputations.
While Vico's  anti-cartesianism is  widely agreed upon,  as is  his  noted defense of  the
humanities in the face of scientific encroachment, Vico is better understood as an original
thinker who was, in many ways, ahead of his time, as Berlin suggests. To do this we must
first engage with some of his best known interlocutrs.
Historically, the most dominant reading of Vico has been that of the Italian philosopher
Benedetto Croce, whose book The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico (1913) was the first
major  treatment  of  Vico's  work  published  in  English.121 Croce's  reading  of  Vico  is
significant  here  for  two reasons.  First,  it  is  through Croce that  Vico's  philosophy is
introduced into modern Italian intellectual life. His idealist interpretation of Vico saw in
him something more that just a precursor of nineteenth-century German idealism. Croce
32–39.
120 Giorgio Tagliacozzo, Vico and Marx, Affinities and Contrasts (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities 
Press, 1983).
121 Croce, The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico.
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goes so far as to argue that the nineteenth-century is “an advance upon Vico” and his
“distinction of the the two worlds of mind and nature.”122 It is an interpretation that would
set the agenda of Vician scholarship and establish Vico's significance in two major fields
of  study that  will  rest  at  the  core  of  this  paper:  the  philosophy of  knowledge,  and
consequently the philosophy of history.123 For Croce, Vico's theory of knowledge takes
direct aim at Cartesianism, which he argues, “had gui ed European thought for more than
half  a  century,  and  was  to  maintain  its  supremacy over  mind  and spirit  for  another
hundred years.”124 By enlisting Vico, Croce had hoped to upset the dominant position that
Cartesianism had enjoyed.125 Croce presented at once the two central themes that were to
dominate Vico studies for the century to come. He argued that Vico called into question
the elevation of the “geometrical method” of deductive analysis as “the ideal of perfect
science”, which isn't to denounce its evident utility as such. For both Vico and Croce, no
such perfect science was possible. Vico's concern with Cartesian rationalism was not that
122 Ibid., 241.
“Almost all the leading doctrines of nineteenth-century idealism, we have seen, may be regarded as 
refluxes of Vician doctrines. Almost all; for there is one of which we find in Vico not the premonition 
but the necessity, not a temporary filling but a gap to be filled. Here the nineteenth century is no longer 
a reflux of, but an advance upon Vico... His distinction of the two worlds of mind and nature, to both f
which the criterion of his theory of knowledge, theconversion of the truth with the thing created, was 
applicable, but applicable to the former by man himself because that world is a world created by man, 
and therefore knowable by him, to the second by Godthe Creator, so that this world is unknowable by 
man; this distinction was not accepted by the new philosophy, which, more Vician than Vico, made the 
demigod Man into a God, lifted human thought to the level of universal mind or the idea, spiritualised 
or idealised nature, and tried to understand it speculatively in the “Philosophy of Nature” as itself a 
product of mind. As soon as the last remnant of transcendence was in this way destroyed, the concept 
of progress over looked by Vico and grasped and affirmed to some extent by the Cartesians and their 
eighteenth-century followers in their superficial and rationalistic manner shone out in its full 
splendour.”
123 Benedetto Croce, Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx. (New York: Russell & 
Russell, 1966), 67.
It is through Croce that we are introduced to the int rpretation of Marx's philosophy of history as a 
reduction of history to economic forces. In this reading history was not the product of expressed 
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it lacked the capacity to contribute to human knowledge. In fact, he was well aware of the
incredible contributions that the Cartesian method a brought with it. However, he was
concerned by the intoxicating effects of its own seemingly limitless success. In a manner
not  entirely unlike  that  of  Rousseau,  he feared that humanity itself  was dangerously
diminished by this subordination to rationalism. Modernity's increasing commitment to
scientific truth begins a process by which scientism begins to isolate methodological or
scientific thinkers from the rest of society. In this manner society's system of institutions
and  social  relations—under  the  direction  of  scientism—have  the  effect  of  reducing
humans under such conditions to a 'dehumanized' state, diminishing in their capacity for
creative agency and rendering their “everyday behavior.. strange and intemperate.”126 For
Vico the stereotype of the socially awkward scientist  is  no mere cliche,  but  rather a
potentially dangerous and dehumanizing effect of the de-emphasis of liked history and
the humanities. Descartes rejected all knowledge that had not been subject to geometric
analysis, in particular historical knowledge since th se modes of thought were, in his
opinion,  illusory  and  untrustworthy  because,  as  Collingwood  would  later  point  out,
history “never happened exactly as they describe” and this suggests that the truth of
history  is  somehow  “concealed  or  distorted”  in  order  to  favor  a  particular
interpretation.127 To become real knowledge, they must either “become clear and distinct”
in which case they lose their original character, or, cease to be worthy of any serious
126 Vico, Vico, 37.
127 R. G. (Robin George) Collingwood, “The Idea of History” (Oxford University Press, 1956), 61.
Incidentally, this amounted to a major criticism of history as a 'philosophic' discipline and on the face 
of it is not without merit. However, where this led to Descartes dismissing history as not providing a 
path to true knowledge, Collingwood points out that t is was, in fact, a kind of historical criticism in 
itself. He points out that Vico would later carry this critique out more completely in his analysis of 
history and of Cartesianism itself. Later, we will find this reflected in Gramsci and particularly his
concepts of culture and hegemony.
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consideration.128 Croce likens Descartes view of history to daylight as compared to light
of  a  lamp.  Decartes  believed that  “the daylight  of  the mathematical  method renders
useless the lamps which, while they guide us in darkness, throw deceptive shadows.”129
History, like the myths and superstitions are valuab e only as approximations of the truths
that Descartes' method can—and has—revealed.
Strauss famously dedicated a series of seventeen lectures to Vico whom he ultimately
recognized as a key figure in addressing the “problem of history”, and he describes this
problem  as  fundamental  and  one  that  calls  into  question  the  very  nature  and  even
possibility of political philosophy, understood as “the quest for the good society or the
just society.”130 The question that is brought to bear upon the problem of history is the
idea  of  progress  itself,  and  its  relationship  to  knowledge.  Strauss  argues  that  the
fundamental questions of political philosophy have been raised since the beginning and
that  from  this  has  emerged  innumerable  responses.  Thi  led  to  a  condition  that  he
describes  as  “the  anarchy within  political  philosophy”  because  unlike  in  the  natural
sciences, no general progress has been made. Which is to say that there is little consensus
in the field and even less “law” and this, he argues, “lends to skepticism” within the
field.131 It  is the notion of progress—of the pursuit of knowledge as working towards
128 Croce, The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, 2.
129 Ibid.
130 Strauss, “Seminar in Political Philosophy: Vico”; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Marx-Engels 
Reader, ed. Robert C. Tucker, 2d ed (New York: Norton, 1978), 84.
Karl Marx saw himself as struggling to find a solution to the “riddle of history” which he believed was 
achieved by communism. Their affinity it would seem rests at least on this fact, that both Vico and 
Marx struggled to make coherent sense of the apparent narchy of history. But where Descartes' 
modernity (and consequently Marx's) saw the solution in the discovery of rational laws that in effect 
transcend history and guide it, Vico introduced a uniq e concept of providence contained within human
history that preserved human agency.
131 Strauss, “Seminar in Political Philosophy: Vico.”
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“consensus”  and  a  seamless  whole—an  assumption  championed  by  the  scientific
revolution that has come to define modernity. The qu st for the good society is possible
only if philosophy can be understood as part of this progress. Understood on these terms
the study of history can either be seen as Descartes saw it, “unworthy of intelligent men
interested in the advancement of objective knowledge.” Or, it can be made to conform to
the task which scientism has set modernity and make the study of history and philosophy
more scientific, reducing their normative claims to measurable data points, which—when
subject  to  proper  methodological  tools—may yield  discoverable  laws  that  guide  the
progress  of  human  life  in  same  manner  that  the  motion  of  heavens  is  guided  by
astronomical laws. It is on the basis of this understanding of the laws that guide human
life that humanity can make progress towards the good society. With Vico however, a
third possibility is presented; one that presents history not a problem to be overcome or
conquered by science, but one that presents history as part of a “new science”, one that
fundamentally  calls  into  question  the  scientific/Cartesian/positivist  conception  of
progress' claim to modernity itself. Berlin dedicated even more time to Vico than Strauss
and makes clear exactly how significant Vico was to resolving the “problem of history”.
However,  Berlin is  quick to  point  out  that  the pluralism of Vico is nothing like the
anarchic pluralism described in part by Strauss and deplored by Descartes and apparently
resolved through the introduction of his methods.132 History and inherited culture did not
132 Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity, 60.
"Vico did not suppose that men are encapsulated within their own epoch or culture, insulated in a box 
without windows and consequently incapable of understanding other societies and periods whose 
values may be widely different from theirs and which they may find strange or repellent. His deepest 
belief was that what men have made, other men can understand . It may take an immense amount of 
painful effort to decipher the meaning of conduct or language different from our own. Nevertheless, 
according to Vico, if anything is meant by the term 'human', there must be enough that is common to all
such beings for it to be possible, by a sufficient ffort of imagination, to grasp what the world must 
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serve to disconnect various societies from one another and shroud them in the mists of
provincialism and superstition as Condorcet once lamented.133 Instead of cutting them off
from progress, it represented a record of that progress. History, captured in culture and
language,  represented  an  autobiography  of  a  given  society  and  of  their  imaginative
responses to the conditions of their development. For Vico, it wasn't necessary to look
beyond human experience to immutable laws in order to chart the path of history, much
less recognize it. Berlin describes this as “the same sort of method as that used by modern
social anthropologists.”134 It differs only in Vico's reliance on his unique interpretation of
providence and it is through the exercise of human co sciousness, what Isaiah Berlin
referred to “the divine spark in man”, that providenc  works its will.135
In  spite of  this potentially radical  claim, much ofwhat had been written about Vico
centers on a reading that positions Vico as anticipating the German historical school and
Romantic poets and has been been widely associated with a movement referred to as the
“counter-Enlightenment” or “anti-modernism”.136 The identification of Vico as an anti-
modernist  or  vanguard  of  a  counter-enlightenment  has  come  to  dominate  Vico
scholarship and as such has made of Vico something of a favorite in those circles of
political theory where he has been read in strict contrast to the radical forms of politics
have looked like to creatures, remote in time or space, who practised such rites, and used such words, 
and created such works of art as the natural means of self-expression involved in the attempt to 
understand and interpret their worlds to themselves.”
133 Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat Condorcet and Elkanah Tisdale, Outlines of an Historical View of the 
Progress of the Human Mind (Philadelphia: Printed by Lang & Ustick, for M. Carey, H. & P. Rice & 
Co. J. Ormrod, B.F. Bache, and J. Fellows, New-York., 1796). Chapter: “Eighth Epoch: From the 
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that emerged in the nineteenth century and especially Marx.137 Consequently, this has
placed Vico at the center of a struggle for the very orientation of “modernity” itself. This
has  lead  to  at  least  one  notable  symposium  in  particular,  organized  by  Giorgio
Tagliacozzo, which resulted in an ambitious volume of essays called  Vico and Marx:
Affinities and Contrasts (1983).138 It is a symposium that seems to have been provoked by
three passing references to Vico that Marx made among his works: the first was in a letter
to Ferdinand Lassalle, the second in a letter to Engels, and last, in a footnote to Capital.
In  each instance the reference was brief,  but later Ma xists took this as a sign of an
affinity  between  Vico's  cyclical  interpretation  of  history  and  Marx's  own  materialist
conception of history.139 Kenneth Minogue—the popular conservative Australian political
theorist—in his review of Tagliacozzo's edited volume responded to the suggestion that
Marx and Vico shared certain affinities with a joke, comparing Vico's influence upon
Marx as “gnat-like in scale” and resting upon “a handful of references.”140 For Minogue,
whose commitment to a conservative brand of liberalism was famously and skillfully
argued  in  the  Liberal  Mind (1964),  Vico's  influence  on  a  more  radical  variant of
liberalism is limited to similarities exhibited between Vico's famous claim that: 
“The civil  world  itself  has certainly been made by men,  and that  its  principles
therefore can, because they must, be rediscovered within the modifications of our
own human mind. And this must give anyone who reflects upon it cause to marvel
how philosopher have all earnestly endeavoured to attain knowledge of the natural
world which, since He made it, God alone knows, andhave neglected to meditate
upon this world of nations, or civil world, knowledge of which, since men had made
it, they could attain.”141
137 Kenneth Minogue, “Marx & Vico,” Encounter, March 1986.
138 Tagliacozzo, Vico and Marx, Affinities and Contrasts.
139 Karl Marx, Marx-Engels Collected Works: 1860-64, Letters. (1985) Vol. 41, p.355, 352
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And what Minogue argues is its similarity “with a little pushing and shoving”142 to Marx's
own claim that:
“Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do
not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances
directly found, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead
generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living.”143
This,  argues Minogue, is  nothing more than a “superficial  resemblance to the Vician
doctrine.”144 And to those who dismiss the affinities of  Marx and Vico this is  easily
argued, after all in Marx's body of work there are only scant references to Vico. That Vico
was an innovative and original thinker may be argued, but he was no prophet to Marx or
for that matter to radicalism in general. It is an attempt at nothing less than a cutting of
the  line  that  tethers  Vico  to  the  radical  political struggles  of  the  nineteenth  and
subsequently the twentieth and now twenty-first centuries. 
Minogue makes the distinction between Marx and Vico a clear one. Vico stresses the
importance of the creative capacities of humanity, with “emphasis on the imagination” in
a way that Marx missed completely.145 Marx, on the other hand, “presents man as an
animal  whose mind merely reflects  the world.”146 It  is  a question of  agency and on
Minogue's  reading  Marxian  man  is  without  agency  in  the  world.  In  spite  of  any
consciousness  he  might  achieve,  he  remains  wholly  subject  to  its  various  forces  as
expressed in Marx's theory of historical materialism. While Marx's “famous formula”
142 Minogue, “Marx & Vico,” 60.
143 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 595.




might  appears  to  be similar  to  Vico's  own,  it  completely loses  sight  of  Vico's  most
original  and important contribution, his “brilliantly colorful”  account of  the origin of
civilization  that  placed  human  life  squarely  at  itscenter,  under  the  guidance  of
providence.147 Vico's concept of providence was unique to say the least. His was not a
strictly causal theory of providence in that it did not exist outside of humanity, or external
to it—to be discovered as one might discover the laws of physics—but rather within
humanity and as an expression of the “world of nations” or “civil world” of humanity and
understood through its history.148 Minogue recognizes providential development as the
“interpretive key” to Vico's philosophy and that seems correct. It was this understanding
of providence that Leon Pompa argues helps Vico answer what was the central question
of his philosophy: “how it can be that, in the absence of a rational capacity for discerning
the truth,” which is to say that in matters of rational development humanity did not spring
into this world fully formed, “...the poetic imagination should produce beliefs which,
though false, nevertheless contain the elements of later true beliefs rather than later false
beliefs.”149 How is it that man, brought into this world that has been divinely ordered—
perhaps as confirmed by scientific and mathematical discoveries of the day—came to
find  its  way  to  reason  with  only  the  benefit  of  creative  imagination?  How  did
imagination transform  itself  into  reason?  For  Vico,  divine  providence  provides  the
answer. Because the divine order of the universe is both infinite and eternal it “must
express its orders through ways as easy as our natural human customs; and with infinite
wisdom to advise it, what it arranges must be wholly [permeated by] order.”150 All of
147 Ibid.
148 Vico, Vico, para. 331,1108.
149 Ibid., 21.
150 Ibid., para. 343.
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human experience therefore, is at the same time a manifestation of divine providence and
human imagination, the collected wisdom of which—expr ssed in language and culture
—is what Vico calls common sense.151 Marx—like Condorcet and Descartes before him
—ultimately saw history as some something to be conquered by reason, unlocked by the
formula of historical materialism. 
For Vico scientific knowledge based on Descartes “first truth” and what he called “the
instruments of the sciences” were ill-equipped to address the problems of human life. The
problem begins with this new critical method dismissing common sense in favor of self-
evident reason because when this method comes to dominate a field, its authority must
remain absolute.152 This is a problem for Vico because unlike the natural world which he
understood, as Descartes did, to be guided by reason, deduction as a method simply could
not work. Humanity was not without free will and as such it was a product of human
action and therefore its  creation was a collective act  largely contingent upon a great
variety of independent human wills, rather than say an abstract concept of “god's will” or
“natural law.” Therefore, no “single cause” could ever be ascribed to human life, which is
the methodological goal of deductive reasoning. To emphasize the point, Vico declared
that  “men  are  for  the  most  part  fools,  governed  notby  reason,  but  by  caprice  or
151 Ibid., 163.
Vico would famously refer to common sense as “judgment lacking all reflection, felt in common by a 
whole order, a whole people, a whole nation or the w ole of mankind.” This concept along with the 
Vician concept of providence will be discussed later t greater length, especially as they relate to 
Gramsci, whose own concept of common sense and  historic m draws heavily on Vico.
152 Ibid., 40.
“One cannot deny any part of it without attacking its very basis.” This is because like the scholastics 
before them the integrity of knowledge is founded an built upon a single self-evident premise and as 
such it cannot tolerate any challenge to that premis .
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fortune.”153 To understand humanity then required a more “indirect route” that had to
account for the “many causes” representing the diversity of independent human wills.
Vico was convinced that for this task even the incredible rational power of Cartesian
science would fail, it simply did not fit the object of its study. Vico cautions, “since those
who transfer this method to the sphere of practical wisdom have not cultivated common
sense and, content with a single truth [the self-evident truth of reason], have never sought
after probabilities, they fail altogether to consider what men feel in common about this
one truth or whether the probabilities appear true o them.”154 This for Vico represents a
real problem for politics and especially democracy, because the necessary assertion of a
“single cause” or truth onto society, especially “in the case of princes and rulers...has
sometimes been the cause of great damage and evil.”155 What does this mean for politics
and political action? This is the central question we must carry forward from here. As
Vaclav Havel once argued, “system, ideology, and apparat [the methods of our time] have
deprived us—rulers as well as the ruled—of our consience, of our common sense and
natural speech and thereby, of our actual humanity.” 156 Recapturing humanity's freedom
from the domination of a system or method becomes critical and for Vico doing so relied
on the careful  interpretation of  divine providence, what  he understood as the natural
means by which god guides a humanity that possess fr e will.157 However, how are we to
understand 'free will' if providence is somehow intermingled with humanity's exercise of
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a question posed by Vico, but also one that concerns all who would try to come to terms
with imposed ideology or ideological domination. 
Vico calls into question interpretations of providenc  by those who would equate them
with those true principles of Descartes, deduced only by proceeding “solely from the light
of  reason”  from  self-evident  first  principles.  Croce  explains  that  for  Vico,  divine
providence is dialectic in nature, springing forth from human creative imagination in the
effort  to  help  regulate  the  course  of  history.  Croce  argues  that  Vico  rejected  any
understanding of providence as the “final cause” in and of itself, as we might understand
Descartes concept of pure reason.158 Much like Mirandola's formulation of humanity's
role in the divine order, Vico offered a careful defense of human autonomy that did not
require that man forgo the existence of certain laws nd principles that guide the universe,
be they a divine or scientific, only that such laws do not  dominate human will, but are
instead known through the expression of that will. Croce explains this by showing that
for Vico divine providence is simultaneously individualistic and transcendent. 
“History is made by individuals: but individuality is nothing but the concreteness
of the universal, and every individual action, simply because it is individual, is
supra-individual.”159
The individual is known relative to its social context and that context is known as an
expression of multiple individual wills.
“Neither the individual nor the universal exists as a distinct thing: the real thing is
the one single course of history, whose abstract aspect  are individuality with out
universality and universality without individuality. This one course of history is
coherent in all its many determinations, like a work f art which is at the same time
158 Croce, The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico, 112.
159 Ibid., 116.
76
manifold and single, in which every word is inseparable from the rest, every shade
of colour related to all the others, every line connected with every other line. On
this understanding alone history can be understood.” 160
It is the space between the individual and the universal in this “work of art” that captures
providence. Vico argues that this introduces a conception of history and human society
that is not absent external influences, but also not determined by first causes beyond that
of human creative action itself. Vico explains this by first pointing out that though human
nature seems to be rife with vice—pointing to “violence, avarice and ambition” being
“prevalent throughout all of mankind”—humanity has l o demonstrated the capacity to
“create in him good practices in human society”.161 Humanity, though seemingly driven
by the determined force of these vices, through the creative action of legislation under the
guidance  of  providence  “creates  civil  happiness”.  It  is  free  will  that  makes  this
transformation  possible  and  is  the  basis  for  the  “civil  orders”  that  establish  human
society.162 And it is “divine providence” that guides humanity towards this end. Similarly,
history and especially language and “common sense”, being the catalog of human action
under  the  guidance  of  providence,  becomes  uniquely  capable  of  providing  valuable
knowledge regarding human life that is beyond the reach of “pure reason”. 
The question it seems is not whether Vico can be understood as a precursor to Marx—it
might be said that Marx's failures can be attributed precisely to his departure from Vico—
but rather why it is that Marxists and figures of the left would feel the need to develop
such a connection and, furthermore, why others still would feel it necessary to defend
160 Ibid.
161 Vico, Vico, para. 132.
162 Ibid., para. 132–133.
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Vico against that claim. Neither of these perspectiv s gets it quite right. Vico is not the
key by which we can come to better understand Marx, but rather the key to understanding
those who follow Marx; especially those who, steeped in the traditions of Vico and on the
basis of  this influence, developed more sophisticated interpretations of  socialism and
liberalism that demanded a shift in how we understand modernity and the possibility for
social and political transformation.163 Vico laid out the blueprint for a rejection of the kind
of determinist economic and social philosophies that would come to dominate the 19th
and especially the 20th centuries and lead it headlong into crisis. It is therefore safe to say
that Vico's impact on the development of Italian identity and especially its relationship to
20th  century  Marxism and  Capitalism  was  unparalleled  if  only  for  having  provided
Italian intellectual life with the theoretical germ that would help to temper the extreme
'idealist'  and 'rationalist'  impulses of the day and give rise to robust forms of liberal
theory as  distinctive  alternatives  to  'old-style'  liberalism,  parliamentarianism and  the
Marxist  system.164 Simply  put,  the  ideas  that  came  about  through  the  religious
reformation  and scientific  revolution,  the  positivist  philosophic  trend  that  dominated
Europe in that period dating back to Bacon and Descartes never really gained favor or
163 This was particularly evident in the work of theItalian Anti-fascists and later the Eastern European 
Anticommunist dissidents, figures who escaped definition within “modern” political categories. Two 
key figures that connect Vico to Italian Antifascim and subsequently East European Anticommunism 
are Bennedetto Croce and Antonio Gramsci. I address these figures more closely elsewhere, instead 
focusing in this paper on the characterization of Vico in such a manner as to provide the basis for such
a connection. Edmund Jacobitti (Professor Emeritus of History at Southern Illinois University) 
develops aspects of this connection in his book Revolutionary Humanism and Historicism in Modern 
Italy (1981) and his essay “From Vico's Common Sense to Gramsci's Hegemony” (1984) in the 
Tagliacozzo volume.
164 Jacobitti, Revolutionary Humanism and Historicism in Modern Italy, 142–143.
I do not wish to suggest here that there is an absence of idealism in Italy as a consequence of Vico's 
humanist historicism. In fact, idealism would come to define much of Italian life in the build-up to 
World War I as it would throughout Europe and was even present at the core of Benedetto Croce's 
philosophy. However, for Croce and consequently throughout Italian intellectual circles there was an 
understanding of idealism tempered by the rejection of the unitary implications of dialectical synthesis 
that resolved every human aspect into a singular truth.
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took hold in Italy. While it may have been understood to have contributed to a certain
kind of backwardness it also provided the conditions for the development of a radically
different,  though  still  fundamentally  liberal,  interpretive  key  to  understanding  the
development of human life and the organizing structures of society and it is through the
lens  of  this  alternative  historical-intellectual  path  that  we  can  best  reconstruct  our
understanding of contemporary liberal theory. Vico's legacy is to those who engage with
his work and particularly his critics. He is a figure who is often just as likely to be read as
part  of  an  historical  counter-enlightenment  as  he  is  a  forerunner  to  'postmodern'
conceptions of radical democracy. However, neither reading of Vico does justice to Vico
understood on his own terms, as he was by his inheritors in his own native Italy. We can
come to recognize this through the influence that his ideas had in shaping the political
theory of Italian antifascism in the 1920s and 1930s and particularly the work of Piero
Gobetti and that most Vician of Marxists, Antonio Gramsci. A figure who in his own
political theory had sought to reshape Marxist materi lism in the light  of  Vician and
Crocean historicism. 
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Chapter 2: Italian Anti-fascism: Piero Gobetti & th e Politics of Liberal Revolution
The last chapter identified the foundational significance of Vico's challenge to Descartes'
“new critical method” and the unique conditions that led to its development. For Vico,
Descartes' claim to have established a whole new way of conceiving of the universe and
consequently human life, even knowledge itself, represented a particular danger. Vico did
not ignore the incredible contributions that the new critical method made to unlocking the
secrets of the universe, rather, he was concerned with what he saw as the considerable
risk involved in falling completely under its spell.165 Central to his philosophy of history
and ideas was an understanding regarding the limits to hese new modern methods and
particularly their adoption at the expense of alternative methods now rendered obsolete,
antiquated or 'anti-modern'. It  was for this reason that Vico set himself to the task of
developing what he called the 'new science', the goal of which was to provide a path out
from under the dominant and rapidly totalizing world view of Cartesian modernism. By
the twentieth century Vico was largely forgotten and on the world stage neither classical
liberalism nor the Marxist socialist system escaped th  dominance of a modernity defined
almost exclusively by the standards imposed by scientific methods and conceptions of
knowledge. Consequently,  they emerged as the  ideological poles of twentieth century
politics, but remained two sides of the same Cartesi n coin. 
If the unique conditions of Italy in the seventeenth and eighteenth-centuries were enough
165 Vico, Vico, 36.
“Consider the many great and wonderful discoveries by which mechanics, enhanced by geometry and 
physics as they are taught today, seems to have enrich d human society!”
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to give rise to the original philosophical perspective of Vico, the same could be said for
the  twentieth-century.  Owing  to  its  “historical  peculiarities”,  Social  historian  Eric
Hobsbawm believed  that  Italy  was  uniquely  positioned  to  produce  original  political
thinking. Vico and Croce were clearly evidence of this. For Hobsbawm, Italy was “a
microcosm of world capitalism.”166 What this meant was that within a single relatively
small country you had the experience of both advanced industrialism as well as regions
largely untouched by capitalism and modernity. The factories of the north, especially with
the Fiat plant in Turin standing as a testament to the former, with the rural peasant south
and its status of semi-colonialism representing the latter.167 Consequently, Italy's  labor
movement  was  both  industrial  and  agrarian,  both  proletarian  and peasant.  Italy also
possessed an old but fragile bourgeoisie, which has initiated an incomplete revolution in
the Risorgimento.168 Thus, the Italian bourgeoisie had never acquired th  same footing as
it had elsewhere in Europe or America. They were also “especially conscious” of their
revolutionary role, in a way that the more established bourgeois nations were not.169 Italy,
as mentioned in the previous chapter, was also a uniquely Catholic nation, having resisted
the protestant reformation under the powerful influence of the Catholic church. “Italy was
the great  nonparticipant  in  the  wars  of  religion,  which  were  the  principal  leaven of
liberalism, the birth pangs of modern man.”170 It kept the Italians politically passive, but
166 E. J Hobsbawm, How to Change the World: Reflections on Marx and Marxism (New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale University Press, 2011), 317.
167 Ibid.
168 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 148–149.
The Risorgimento “had created a specific revolutionary situation without being able to bring it to completion
or to satisfy it and which, although it remained potential while the technicians and diplomats were stiving to
create the Italian state as a work of art, became turbidly explicit when the completed state revealed itself to 
be void of ideal significance and incapable of receiving life from the masses.”
169 Hobsbawm, How to Change the World, 318.
170 Rosselli, Liberal Socialism, 104.
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for Hobsbawm, it also meant that Italians were keenly aware of a significant ruling elite
that existed beyond the formal state.171 It was an experience, common to all Italians, that
made  them  uniquely  sensitive  to  the  concept  that  Gramsci  would  later  refer  to  as
'hegemony' and that other antifascists would point to as a particular 'mentality' of the
masses created by their historical and cultural experience.172 Thus Italy sat as cauldron of
diverse political experiences that positioned them in such a way as to offer unique insight
into political conditions that remained absent elsewh re.  
The focus of this chapter will largely be on the first of a series of key figures in the Italian
antifascist movement. Piero Gobetti (1901–26), one f the earliest and most influential
liberal antifascists, championed a unique form of plitics in response to the moral and
political threat represented by the rise of Fascism in Italy. In developing what he called
Revolutionary Liberalism, Gobetti  drew on the philosophical  heritage of Giambattista
Vico's  critical  stand  against  Cartesianism  as  Gobetti  and  the  Antifascists  faced  the
ideological and material threat of fascism. They set out to explain the rise of Fascism, not
as an externally imposed historical 'parenthesis', but as a product of historical and cultural
contingency; explain why the conditions of Italy, which might have resulted in either a
Liberal or Socialist revolution, instead produced fascism; and lastly faced with such a
threat examine the strategies and tactics that might be employed to bring about change. In
a  way  that  differed  from  resistance  movements  before  them,  the  Italian  antifascist
movement took its lessons from their Vician heritage nd become one of self-examination
171 Hobsbawm, How to Change the World, 318.
172 Ibid.; Rosselli, Liberal Socialism, chap. 7.
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and self-criticism. Italian intellectuals responded to the emergence of fascism by not only
looking towards the State or towards external influences, but also by asking what it was
about Italian life itself that contributed to the Italy's decline into fascism. 
It  was clear to all that fascism represented a significa t problem, but what the Italian
intellectuals understood immediately, in a way that others facing oppressive regimes had
not was the role that Italian life had played in allowing fascism to rise to power in the
first  place. This attitude towards engaging the rise of  fascism in Italy was famously
captured in Piero Gobetti's characterization of fascism as as the 'autobiography of the
nation'.173 It was a characterization that challenged the then dominant perspectives that
argued that fascism represented an historical 'parenthesis', albeit one that Gobetti wryly
suggested would nonetheless “probably not be short”.174 This difference of interpretation
regarding  the  origins  and character  of  fascism represented  a  fundamentally  different
understanding of history and knowledge, and therefore the role of the individual and the
masses in meeting the challenges posed by fascism. For Gobetti and those who shared his
autobiographical perspective on fascism the struggle a ainst fascism became as much an
individual responsibility as it was collective. And this understanding of history, moreover
this understanding of man as historically contingent has its roots in historical-intellectual
tradition of Vico that called into question the positivist philosophic trend that dominated
his  time.  Cartesianism,  with  its  emphasis  on  truth  being  rooted  in  observation  and
verification  had  unquestionably  contributed  to  a  wealth  of  advances  in  the  natural
173 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 274.
174 Ibid., 24.
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sciences and for the children of the enlightenment, it only seemed natural that the social
sciences and metaphysics could be equally conquered though the application of Descartes
“scientific  method”.  Vico  embraced  the  idea  that  truth  is  plural  and  varies  between
perspectives and that a rational  and 'geometric'  understanding of the human world is
necessarily a distortion that contributes to an imperialist perspective. This understanding
of humanity as messy, unpredictable, and resistant to empirical thinking has resonated
throughout the postmodern world, but in his time Vico was largely without an audience
save in his native Italy. The individually empowering legacy of Vico (via Croce) and the
deeply felt perception of man’s ability, even obligation, to create the world for himself
was so pervasive that it even found its way into the fascist ideology. However, where it
failed to remain true to the Crocean legacy was fascism's faith in a dogmatic nationalist
imperative that would see that their own ideological nterests come to dominate Italian
life,  and  the  suppression  of  the  pluralism  that  Gobetti  saw  as  integral  to  his  own
revolutionary liberalism. For Gobetti, such a nationalism meant “a collapse to the lowest
grade of dogmatism” that “has no reality and no content other than imperialism.”175
Croce's Critique of “Absolute Idealism”
The  manifold  success  of  Descartes'  “new  critical  method”  had  led  to  Vico  being
overlooked throughout the Cartesian dominated west. However, in Vico’s own Italy his
thought became infused with the very intellectual culture of Italy. This became especially
apparent during the period of Italy’s Fascist rule. Vico would make this transition to the
20th  century  on  the  back  of  perhaps  the  single  most influential  figure  in  Italian
175 Ibid., 72.
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intellectual life in the first half of the 20th century, Benedetto Croce. It is under this twin
influence of Vico and Croce on the cultural  and intellectual  climate of  Italy that the
Vician theory of history and knowledge would contribute to the arming of a subsequent
opposition movement.176 The question of just how this arming took place has us turn to
what Edmund Jacobitti points to as “the central purpose of Croce's mature thought” and
the overcoming of 'Hegelian dualism'.177 Croce wrote extensively on the work of Vico,
Hegel, and Marx all in the effort come to terms with a dualism that he argued saw Hegel's
philosophy “rent into two factions: those who accepted the physics and materialism of the
philosophy of nature and made of it an immanent materialism, and those who accepted
the philosophy of the Logos and made of it a transce dent God.”178 Croce understood
both of these perspectives as divided into an extreme left (as characterized by the iron
necessity of the materialist conception of history) and right (that of a divine animating
force in transcendent theology) as being unable to properly account for the “concrete
reality” of human autonomy in history. This echoed Vico's attempts to call into question
the tendencies  of  both  Cartesian  scientism as  well  as  the  tendency within  dogmatic
Christianity to strip humanity of their central role in the making of human life.179 In this
176 Giovanni Gentile, Origins and Doctrine of Fascism: With Selections from Other Works (New 
Brunswick, N.J: Transaction, 2002), 51–52.
Vico cultural influence was so great that he was even enlisted by the Fascists themselves in their 
attempt to legitimize Fascist ideology. Calling upon Vico and his famous theory of corsi e ricorsi in 
their defense of barbarism as part of an “heroic morality”. 
177 Jacobitti, Revolutionary Humanism and Historicism in Modern Italy, 145.
178 Ibid., 144.
179 In the previous chapter it was argued that the Italian Renaissance philosopher Pico della Mirandola 
represented the earliest critique of the dogmatic Church through his humanist philosophy developed in 
his oration On the Dignity of Man in which he focused on man’s capacity to make himself as both his 
defining characteristic as well as his most intimate connection to God. For Mirandola the divine order 
was not to be found outside of man, but as an expression of his will. He found the dignity of man, his 
freedom, in his ability to control his own fate and his own destiny. The Church, having been disarmed 
by this new Christian interpretation branded him a heretic.   
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manner Croce establishes Vico's historicism as something entirely distinctive from that of
Hegel.180 Croce sought to reconcile the existence of history as the unfolding and indeed
making of  concrete reality with  the emerging dominance of  systems of  thought  that
presented  themselves  as  self-contained.  Contrary  to the  overreaching  fascist
interpretation, Vico provided a formidable foundation for such a task. Nothing in Vico's
work suggests that any individual or ideological form, is capable of knowing the entire
past, present or future of a society.181 On the contrary, Hegel appears to provide the path
for  ideologies  of  both  the  right  and  left  to  establish  regimes  and orders  capable  of
ignoring history as 'concrete reality' in favor of an absolute idealism.182 The problem as
observed here is not so much the attempt on the left and right to preserve the 'ideal' or
their  own conception  of  the  'true',  but  in  its  attempt  to  dissolve  their  attachment  to
concrete reality,  which is  contingent and plural.  To do so,  for  Croce,  is  to deny the
individual an autonomous role in history. Consider for instance the individual under the
universal and transcendent Church, or, the individual under Marx's determinist historical
materialism or under neoliberal capitalism. In each case, be it the 'truth' contained in the
theological doctrine of providence, the 'iron necessity' of historical materialism, or the
'invisible hand' of the “free market”, human will is reduced to a mere instrument of the
essential 'system' or process.
180 Gentile, Origins and Doctrine of Fascism, 63.
This is key because the Fascists present an understanding of the state that sets “Italian and German 
thought” on a singular path in which “the State is not a superstructure which imposes itself from 
without on the activity and initiative of the individual in order to subject him to coercive restriction.” 
Rather, “the State and the individual are all of a piece.”
181 Berlin, Vico and Herder, 4,73.
182 Indeed Hegel is the subject of several critiques that consider his philosophy as having contributed to 
the ideological foundation of 20th century authoritarianism, among them are Karl Popper in The Open 
Society and its Enemies (1945) and in various works of Isaiah Berlin.  
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It is true that the concept originated a century ago in the extreme deliriums of the
extravagancies of the exhausted Hegelian school; nevertheless, I feel nothing but
astonishment at the conception of man and his history as the prey of a god or
demon (economy) who drags him along, trailing illuson  of truth, beauty, moral
and religious sublimity, all of which are of economic substance.183
Croce's project—like Vico before him—becomes one of unifying truth with “concrete
reality” or, in a borrowed page from Vico, unifying thought with action in asserting the
role of will  in human life. This, in the effort to keep such theoretical programs from
alienating themselves from the 'truth' of lived human life. It was a project he referred to
as 'absolute historicism' and was clearly distinct from Hegel's own 'absolute idealism',
focusing  on  the  autonomy  of  history  and  the  assertion  of  history  as  creative  self-
knowledge. 
 
In examining Hegel, Croce engaged in a critique of the kind of historical determinism
that  would find its  way into Marx  and more broadly into  all  utopian or  teleological
visions of political idealism, while retaining the dialectical nature of experience. It was
for  this  reason  that  Croce's  sympathetic  interest  in  Marx's  materialism  remained
consistent  with  his  eventual  rejection  of  Marx,  on  the  grounds  of  his  economic
determinism.184 For Croce, there was no 'end of history'. Unlike Hegel or Marx, he did not
promote a distinctive subject,  instead arguing for a pluralist  approach that  was more
open-ended. History was an endless process of self-making, building on Vico's distinctive
dialectical concept of corsi e recorsi. Like Hegel's dialectic that followed that of Vico, it
is a concept that regulated historical development and the progress of human knowledge;
183 Benedetto Croce and Angelo A De Gennaro, Essays on Marx and Russia. (New York: F. Ungar Pub. 
Co., 1966), 1.
184 James Martin, Piero Gobetti and the Politics of Liberal Revolution, 1st ed, Italian and Italian American 
Studies (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 25.
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however, unlike Hegel, it does not point to a single u timate goal. It was clear that for
Vico human culture thus represented a kind of sedimntary layering of history acting as
the record of  its  development.  Accessing these layers can provide access to concrete
knowledge about human life. It  is an idea that Gramsci would later borrow when he
referred to humanity as a product of historical  deposits in need of an inventory.185 It
would also contribute significantly to what is perhaps Gramsci's greatest contribution, his
theory  of  hegemony  and  hegemonic  struggle.  For  Vico,  his  novel  interpretation  of
providence represented the dynamic force serving this development and this struggle, but
a force only evidenced in autonomous human action and history, not in that of the State,
Party program, or dominant ideology. Rather than promoting a distinctive subject, Croce
argued for a pluralistic approach that was more open-ended; therefore, politics—to his
understanding—was far more instrumental than essentialist.186 This also explains Croce's
initial support of fascism and consequently his subsequent rejection of it. 
All political ideologies represented a kind of universalism that Croce rejected. Ultimately,
Croce envisioned a politics  defined by autonomy,  self-discipline,  and self-creation;  a
distinctively refined vision of politics—what some have criticized as aristocratic—that
185 Antonio Gramsci, Quintin Hoare, and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks 
of Antonio Gramsci (New York: International Publishers, 1972), 324.
186 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader.
I struggle here to understand the position of Marx on this issue. On the one hand his broad 
philosophical-economic system is fundamentally “essentialist” in that it provides a basis and rationale 
for the necessary development of history along a prescribed path. However, his well known argument 
in the “Theses on Feuerbach” that “The philosophers ave only interpreted the world, in various ways; 
the point, however, is to change it”, is suggestive of an underlying instrumentalist approach to politics. 
Moreover, his essays on “Estranged Labor” and “Wage-Labor and Capital”, focused on labor as “life-
activity” that demands agency, seem to further emphasize this point. The question that plagued both the
Marxist “revisionists” as well as contemporary Marxists appear to hinge on which reading takes 
precedence.
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clashed mightily with the base and often dirty politics of parliamentary government.187
Gramsci recognizes this tension and comes to terms with it when he shatters one of the
great  barriers  to  politics  understood  in  this  manner,  declaring  that  “all  men  are
intellectuals”, but adding the cryptic caveat, “but not all men have in society the function
of intellectuals.”188 Empowered by individual autonomy, this ennobled or 'elite' politics of
Croce is precisely the manner of politics that must be cultivated in order to maintain
freedom even within oppression. Croce represented for Gobetti a message of the rebirth
of an idealist vision of thought and action and set th  revolutionary humanist principle of
self-creation and creativity at the center of Gobetti's politics. “To be ourselves at every
moment, to realize entirely our possibility for action for ourselves and for others in each
instance.”189It is an effort on the part of Gobetti, by way of Croce, to set liberal idealism
against the prevalence of positivism and “replace the last remains of reveal truth with the
truth won day by day through the labor of all, and generic abstractions with patient, open-
minded scrutiny of the little problems and the big ones as they arise. Only in this finding
of  solutions  and  making  them  systematic  are  we  doing  politics.”190 The  American
philosopher Richard Rorty would echo this message in his critique of the American left
which he too believed was no longer engaging in politics proper.191 Gobetti referred to it
187 Martin, Piero Gobetti and the Politics of Liberal Revolution, 42.
Piero Gobetti—a figure greatly inspired by Croce's politics—also fell victim to criticisms of 
“aristocratic snobbery, greatly overestimating the power of ideas without referencing any obvious 
social constituency.”
188 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 9.
189 Martin, Piero Gobetti and the Politics of Liberal Revolution, 36.
190 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 77.
191 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America, The William E. 
Massey, Sr. Lectures in the History of American Civilization 1997 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), 28.
“Instead of seeing progress as a matter of getting closer to something specific in advance we see it as a
matter of solving more problems. Progress is”, he argues, “measured by the extent to which we have 
made ourselves better than we were in the past rather than by our increased proximity to a goal.”
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as the need “to be everywhere oneself”,  much later Vaclav Havel  would express the
concept in terms of “living within the truth” and the “independent life of society”. It is a
vision of politics that is both anti-bourgeois and anti-communist, and seeks to cultivate in
its adherents a mentality that escapes narrow political categories and promotes a kind of
radical cultural and political reformation. If it is aristocratic, it does so in a manner that
attempts to elevate popular culture or 'common sense' to the level of philosophy. It was a
mentality that had great resonance and appeal with those in Italy who found themselves
frustrated by both the failures of their own established “elite” expressed in the dominant
conservative  Italian  liberalism  and  Giolottismo or  Transformismo,  as  well  as  the
emergence of radical nationalism and fascism, and instead sought to create their own
organic intellectual elite.
Giolitti & the “Politics of Compromise”
When Gobetti discussed the “misfortunes of Italian public life” one of his hardest blows
was struck not at the Fascists themselves, but rather gainst the Italians themselves and
the existing liberal  regime of  Giovanni  Giolitti  and the political  practice of  what  he
termed Giolittism.192 Giovanni Giolitti served largely uninterrupted as the Liberal Italian
Prime Minister from 1901-1914 and again from 1920-1921 and was considered a master
of the politics of compromise that came to be known as transformismo. Norberto Bobbio
criticized  the  tranformist  policies  as  a  system  of  “political  compromises  that  had
suffocated  all  initiative  from the  base.”193 It  was  political  style  that  Gobetti  loathed
192 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 63.
193 Norberto Bobbio, Ideological Profile of Twentieth-Century Italy, The Giovanni Agnelli Foundation 
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because he fundamentally rejected the idea that one c uld, or should, trade the conflict
inherent  in the exercise of  democratic  and pluralist  liberty for  the steadying hand of
authority and focused above all  on stability  and orer,  and an at-all-costs  interest  in
preserving the parliamentary system. This was a problem because it amounted to no less
than the domestication and pacification of politics itself. Struggle and conflict, the very
essence of Gobettian politics, would be effectively abolished in the name of harmony and
stability. This was the hallmark of 'old-style liberal politics' and of transformismo and for
Gobetti, such political methods could not be trusted. Furthermore, as long as this form of
politics remained dominant, there could be no effectiv  opposition. Politics of this kind is
the effective negation of struggle and opposition and instead represents a form of political
life with obedience and passive compromise at its center. It is a concern that anticipates
Vaclav Havel's own fears regarding the negation of politics under post-totalitarianism.
Havel,  enlisting Gramsci,  demonstrates that  it  is  a mechanism with implications and
consequences that  run even deeper in  the political  consciousness. They are forms of
politics that seeks only to “defend its clients and its privileges[...]it enters into discussion
only to collaborate.”194 
In practice, opposition is minimized by way of political deals, compromises, or favors, all
in  an  effort  to  win  over  adherents  to  liberal  parliamentary  government  and  diffuse
potential  enemies by absorbing them into the parliamentary system.195 By creating an
“inclusive”, “tolerant” government and political alli nces it was hoped that stability and
Series in Italian History (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1995), 120.
194 Gobetti, as quoted in Ward, p.85
195 A similar critique of parliamentary party politics was proposed by Carl Schmitt, though with decidedly 
different conclusions, in his now famous work on the Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy.
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growth could be achieved. Giovanni Giolitti was a mster of this practice. On its surface
such coalition building would appear not only to be practical, but even wise. The example
of  Italian  inter-war  politics  reflects  this  as  the  people,  fearing  the  volatility  of  the
socialists  and  the  workers'  movement  and  having  confused  social  harmony  for
democracy, welcomed the steadying hand of Giolitti. For Gobetti, this was a commitment
to  the  negation  of  politics  and  as  such  “victories” were  temporary  at  best  as  they
ultimately empowered destructive forces within new government, such as Mussolini’s
fascist  Party,  to  take  control.196 This  was  compounded  by  the  concept  of  historical
materialism, the problem of the political party, and also by a tension observed by Gobetti
in the popular and to his understanding misunderstood c ncept of solidarity. 
For Gobetti, a liberal society is one in which the conditions exist for productive struggle
and this begins with a willingness of the members of that society to engage in struggle.
“His sphere of action”, Bobbio tells us, “was [therefore] not political in the strict sense
but  rather  ethical  and  pedagogical.”197 To  a  large  extent  this  was  at  least  initially
dependent upon vigorous political parties. The party was, for Gobetti, “the essential evil”
because it  promoted what he referred to as an “unnat ral dualism between the state and
the individual.”198 This unnatural dualism emerges as a function of the institutional basis
of the government. For a state to function as a democracy, it must be an expression of the
people; and this can be expressed as either a direct emocracy or a representative one.
196 It is a political method that is still popular for its tendency towards stability, but the risks remain. It can 
be observed in American congressional politics in, for example, the coalition between traditional 
conservative Republicans and so-called Tea Party Republicans, a minority wing of the party that had 
come to dominate the coalition's agenda. 
197 Bobbio, Ideological Profile of Twentieth-Century Italy, 118.
198 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 78.
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Direct democracies have, for various reasons, proved to be impractical in the context of a
modern  state,  and  so  the  tendency has  been  towards  representative  democracy.  The
historical  materialism  of  the  socialists  along  with e  absolute  idealism  of  the
conservative liberals and fascists ultimately led to the party becoming the key political
unit as the expression of a particular unity. However, Gobetti believes that the party acts
to obscure the people rather than elaborate upon them and that this is necessarily so
because, among other problems,  there are no constitutional provisions overseeing this
connection between people and the state. Parties, for the most part, go unregulated. In this
manner the dualism of the state and party, two key components of the modern democratic
state, is unnatural in that the party does not satisfy he demands of the people, rather it
subverts them. Gobetti believes that this problem can be remedied through higher degree
and quality of participation by the people. The key to this is treating the people as a
distinctive  factor  in  public  life  rather  than  as  an bstract  entity  (voter,  constituent,
consumer). Gobetti suggests that what is necessary is getting rid of the parties as they are
currently conceived, what he describes as “random groupings of individuals on the basis
of interests that are by nature too diverse and sometimes dangerous”, in favor of “more
logical groupings” or what he calls “leagues”, which are established “as the occasion
presented itself, on the basis of concrete interests and issues and aiming at clearly defined
results”.   Gobetti  believes  that  this  would make representative  government  far  more
active and likely to work, “with the voters taking sides on the issues and choosing as their
representatives  (representation  in  both  senses:  the choice  of  the  individuals  and  the
delegation of power to them) deputies in favor of protectionism or against protectionism,
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favorable to centralization or favorable to decentralization, and so on.”199 Gobetti is clear
on this point, for him the party stunts the democrati  spirit of the people because parties
act  in the interest  of  their  own ideological  agendas and therefore the people become
increasingly disinterested as the party loses touch with the people and the people (and the
state)  lose  touch  with  each  other.  For  Gobetti,  the unrefined  notion  of  solidarity,
especially with regard to an ideological movement or party, functions in much the same
way.  This  is  revealed  in  the  critical  tension  that  exists  between  the  concepts  of
individualism and solidarity. For Gobetti the politics of solidarity all to often came at the
expense  of  individualism  because  solidarity  did  not promote  struggle  as  Gobetti
understood it. For Gobetti, the solidarity of the socialists and even the fascists was rooted
on the underlying assumption of a positivist conception of politics understood as a “static
concept of social harmony”.200 This promoted a concept of democratic politics that w s
fundamentally utopian, relying on subordination to a particular system and conditions,
but  that  ignored  the  contingency  of  human  life  and  sacrificed  individual  struggle.
Progress,  argued  Gobetti,  does  not  come  from  the  negotiation  of  struggle  between
adversaries,  but  through  their  conflict.  Solidarity represented  forgoing  the  contested
terrain of individuals for the sake of a pacified political life, “social harmony” in the
interest of the ruling class. Recent statements by the presiding Hong Kong government
regarding recent democratic protests reflect this exactly. This, necessarily represents the
exchange of real democracy for some absurd illusion of democracy, manipulation and is a




collaboration, degradation begins. Again, what is necessary, is to reignite the energies of
the people through a higher degree and quality of participation. However, Italy, worn
down by centuries of Catholic paternalism, found themselves reduced to the condition of
servility and deference. 
But already we could see the signs of exhaustion, the longing for peace. It is hard
to grasp that life is tragic, that suicide is more f a day to day practice than an
exceptional  measure.  In  Italy  there  is  no  proletaria  and  no  bourgeoisie,  only
middle classes.  We knew that;  and if  we hadn’t  know it,  Giolitti  would have
taught us. So Mussolini is nothing new; but Mussolini offers us experimental proof
of  that  unanimity;  he  attests  to  the  nonexistence  of  heroic  minorities,  the
provisional end of heresies.201
For Gobetti,  this leaves only the option of withdrawal from a failing political life in
preparation for a future in which a new politics exists.  It is a preparation for that “long,
and no  longer  open,  war  of  resistance”  that  “had  to devote  itself  to  cultivating  and
spreading the values of moral resistance and personal and political integrity.”202 It  is a
concept  central  to  antifascist  politics  and  finds  it elf  most  completely  theorized  in
Gramsci's concepts of hegemonic struggle and the “war of position”, and Havel's later
concept of the “parallel polis” borrowed from Patocka. Intimately connected to this is the
concept  of  intransigence which  Gobetti  represented  as  the  holding  onto  of  one's
principles, principles that may adapt so long as they remain your own, which is not to be
confused with dogmatism. It was a central characteristic of the antifascist and the new
ethical Italian as Gobetti understood it. 




with the old liberals and the liberal antifascists—breaks the critical link in the chain that
might have connected concept of solidarity with social progress even if a dogmatic one.
Solidarity is the means by which the steel of the revolutionary mass was tempered and
historical materialism the means by which they were made to fulfill their revolutionary
task. However, unmoored from historical materialism this revolutionary mass looses it
direction and the State emerges as the solution for the fascists. As Gentile reminds us,
“for  Fascism...the  State  and  the  individual  are  one,  or  better,  perhaps,  “State”  and
“individual” are terms that are inseparable in a necessary synthesis.”203 In this manner
fascism acts a surrogate for wayward socialists for whom the promise of revolutionary
renewal  had been broken.  Yet,  for  both the socialist  nd the fascist,  solidarity is  the
instrument  of  liberty,  but  it  is  an  instrument  understood  in  terms  of  submission  to
authority. “If we do not accept historical materialism, we will have a guardian to assess
the  level of social  solidarity that has been attained.”204 Coupled with this practice of
solidarity  as  obedience,  Giolittismo  contributed  to the  decline  of  political  life,  and
prepared both Italy and Italians themselves for movement into fascism. 
Social solidarity can come only from the exercise of individual rights, which are
naturally  bounded  by  the  similar  rights  of  everyone else.  Those  who  preach
abstract solidarity are ripe to become servants at court. Order does not exist as
though it were some sort of biological given;order exists as autonomy, and the only
possible preparation for it is the exercise of intra sigence, active participation in
political life.205
The Giollitian model of liberal parliamentary politics was unquestionably a political style
born of the positivist spirit of the age and saw political society as an instrument to be
203 Gentile, Origins and Doctrine of Fascism, 25.
204 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 134.
205 Ibid., 137.
96
tuned or an account to be balanced, and in this way the operation of society at large can
be compared to that of any closed system. Once we und rstand the rules or mechanisms
of that system, all  of its component parts can be brought into harmony. Consider the
mechanical operation of an engine, the efficiency of assembly line production, or even
the play of a game, all of which depends on the smooth interaction of parts and some
agreed upon parameters, standards and rules. Giolittism reduced the individual into one
of so many parts and effectively removed active participation from political life. But for
Gobetti, as it was for Vico, human life was not ordered in this manner, though it came to
be governed to the contrary and Giolitti was among its preeminent practitioners. 
In a game, as long as everyone plays by the rules th re is stability and order existing
within the game and it  can be played—provided they are written in this manner—to
mutual benefit.206 One of the key features of such a game is that it is able to include
numerous players and even expand its field of play, such as in tournament play. It also it
expects that once new players are included they will recognize the reward of playing the
game by the rules and in turn conform them. Incidentally, this remains a key feature of
democratic theory regarding elections. It is therefor  an idea that relies first-and-foremost
on the concept of the rational actor. That is, the politically motivated actor whose actions
conform entirely to reason and logic. The rational actor is introduced at the center of the
Cartesian  revolution  with  Descartes'  famous  claim:  cogito  ergo  sum. It  is  further
206 It is for this reason that many, particularly social contractarians, argue that stability and order ar  the 
key components to maintaining a “good” society. Though this has historically been seen as a liberal 
principle, in time it has become a fundamentally conservative force, especially if we consider the how 
and in whose interests the initial rules of the game are implemented. The assumptions of scientific 
idealism obscure this.
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reinforced by the belief that the universe itself is organized according to a rational order
that is discoverable to those who  “direct the mind” accordingly.207 Of course, sometimes
there are potential players who wish to play by different rules, but these players are not
pushed aside as this would lead to the instability that naturally comes with an outsider.
And so there is often compromise as rules change and adapt so as to maintain the stability
and integrity that exists within the game. However, sometimes there is a player who not
only wants to play by different rules, he wants to change the whole game itself. In such a
situation, how does this system respond? Dissent, to the extent that is deviates from the
truth inherent in the system, is understood as anomlous. This is to say that it  exists
outside and external to the system. Such anomalies cannot be tolerated to any great extent
as it threatens the existence of the order itself. This represents the problem that fascism
presented to Italy and to Giolitti's conservative liberal government. From the Giolittian
perspective  one  simply  cannot  exclude  the  player,  especially  this  player,  because
excluding such a radical  opposition player would undoubtedly create instability,  so it
does what it believes is best, it seeks to incorporate them. Again, the only instrument at
hand is a tried and true one, compromise and assimilation. But, the compromise required
to maintain stability is so severe that it is transformed instead into collaboration. Rather
than assimilating the extremist elements, such elemnts are instead sheltered within the
system and given the opportunity to flourish.
Gobetti's  frustration with the Giolitti's  version of liberal  politics  was,  in  many ways
207 Reneé Descartes et al., The philosophical writings of Descartes. Vol.1 Vol.1 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985).
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inspired by two key intellectual  figures  of  Italian life,  the Sicilian socialist  Gaetano
Salvemini and Benedetto Croce.208 Salvemini looked at the liberal parliamentary system
of Giolitti and challenged its very nature on the basis of regional and class prejudices,
attacking  Giolitti's  liberal  parliamentary  government  as  a  haven  of  corruption  and
gangsterism.209 However, where Salvemini was primarily effective as a moral critic of
Giolitti's government along this Marxist class line, Gobetti believed the problem to be
even more profound; a problem connected to methodological assumptions that deny the
inherent contingency of human life. Here he turned to Croce, who provided a clearer path
to unlocking the philosophical problem that Gobetti recognized at the heart of Giolittism
and  that  persisted  beyond  class  struggle  alone.  While  class  struggle  remained  an
important feature of political consciousness it ran the risk of being too reductive. 
208 Ward, Piero Gobetti’s New World, 16.
One of the problems that the antifascists faced was th t while the critiques of the liberal parliamentary 
system provided by Salvemini and Croce—though not iherently anti-liberal in way that Gobetti 
understood them—provided powerful critiques that would help to undermine liberal government, they 
also served the interests of the emerging fascist move ent which was also calling for Italian renewal 
albeit of a decided different variety. Fascism was a result of the same drive for renewal as Gobetti and 
others. What made antifascist renewal different was the antifascist focus on personal and collective 
liberation. Fascism would never and could never lead to the kind of revolution and change that Gobetti 
and others demanded because Fascism was incompatible with liberty and freedom achieved through 
creative agency and autonomy. Positivism denies the masses individual and collective agency, having 
reduced life to “scientific formulas, determinism, evolutionism, and the sense that the future has 
already been mapped out in advance.”
David Ward, Piero Gobetti's New World: Antifascism, Liberalism, Writing. (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2010) p.16
209 Martin, Piero Gobetti and the Politics of Liberal Revolution, 23.
Salvemini argued that Italian politics was dominated by northern interests and that the south, 
particularly the southern peasants, were almost entirely excluded from politics. This division was 
existed in direct contrast with Giolotti's supposedly progressive government. It was on this basis that 
Salvemini provided an opposition, both to the Giolotti's liberal government as well as the Italian 
socialist movement lead by Turati, which concentrated on the interests of the northern proletariat to the 
exclusion of the southern peasants. The centralized lib ral state, he argued, was “obliged to base itself 
on corrupt and fictitious parliamentary majorities, representing only a minimal part of the population, 
who from day to day sell their adhesion to the anti-constitutional policy and, in exchange, obtain duties
on grain, protective tariffs, the rewards of the mercantile navy, immunity for banking crimes, etc.” This
was the sickness of a state that had fallen under the control of a “handful of profiteers and parasites,” 
forced to dish out “bloody repression to defend itself from the malcontents' who could not participate in
the dishonorable trade-offs between executive and prliament.”
99
Let us look for a moment at one of these great problems, a political factor that
everyone is  talking about  these days:  the  class  struggle.  For  most  people  this
expression has a certain fairly clear meaning that has grown by accretion to include
the consciousness of social privilege, the reciprocal hatred that flows from it, and
the need for a resolution in which the hatred and the privileges that cause it will be
extinguished.  But  this  meaning  is  so  elastic  that  many  people  have  become
convinced that a coup d’état, a revolution, will sweep away and resolve everything.
Revolution: there you have a very quick solution. Ad the other is just as facile:
conservatism, reaction.210
For Gobetti, human life reduced to “historical materialism...and the theory of the class
struggle”,  though  “established  forever  as  tools  of  the  social  sciences”,  is  not  itself
sufficient.211 While unquestionably useful, Gobetti understood this as an excessive attack
upon the “concept of social distinction”, which he b lieved must necessarily arise out of
the “concept of equality of chances and variability of outcomes.”212 While class struggle
was a  significant  lens through which to  analyze history,  it  was not  something to be
resolved or finally overcome. It  was in this manner that  Gobetti “extended the liberal
notion of competition to include the phenomenon of class struggle.”213 To do so was to
affect  a return of  liberalism to the political  traditions with  which it  shared common
ancestry (socialism) in its more revolutionary past.214 While Gobetti agreed in principle
with  Salvemini's  socialist  class  critique  of  Giolitti's  method,  he  also  feared  that  a
'revolutionary' program of this manner, one which denies its liberal affinities, would only
result in the emergence of an equally repressive regim . Such an analysis would rest at
the heart of the Italian liberal antifascist critique. Croce represented the assertion of a
pluralistic  conception  of  human  life  and  individual liberty,  stripped  of  Descartes'






scientific idealism or the absolute idealism of Hegel, which he saw as threatening. For
Gobetti, this was the rebirth of Vico's defense of the need for a new science, and he
would similarly call for the renewal of liberalism. 
The Road to Fascism: “Anti-modernism” & Autobiography in Italy
Gobetti  came of age at the end of what socialist  hiorian Eric Hobsbawm famously
called the “long nineteenth century”.215 It was a period of remarkable transformation in
human society, a period of great revolutions driven by the “heroic model of science” that
would emerge from the methods unified by Bacon and especially Descartes that promised
access to the universal foundations of truth and knowledge.216 It was a revolution that
brought with it the promise to deliver man from theobscurity and myth of the past into an
age of  social  and political  'scientific'  progress.  However,  Gobetti  witnessed this long
century collapse in the ruins of the First World War and its aftermath, as modernity gave
rise to increasingly aggressive regimes that demanded total control over society on the
basis  of  their  ideological  conceptions of  truth.  Asa student  journalist  and publisher,
Gobetti both witnessed and testified to these transformations in Italy, but unlike those
who had decided to reject modernity altogether, he remained hopeful of the possibility to
“radically renew liberalism and weld it to mass-based politics.”217 He was relentless in the
pursuit of restoring Italian political life, which e saw as deeply damaged and as not
merely the victim of Fascism but also expressed in Fascism.  As a law student at the
215 E. J Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848. (Cleveland: World Pub. Co., 1962).
216 Joyce Oldham Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret C Jacob, Telling the Truth about History (New York: 
Norton, 1994).
217 Martin, Piero Gobetti and the Politics of Liberal Revolution, 1.
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University of Turin Gobetti set up his own review, Energie Nove ('New Energies'), when
he was only 17. Not unlike the fascists themselves, h  promoted a radical cultural and
political renewal,  but  with a decidedly different  interpretation to that  of  the Fascists.
Gobetti  embraced  and  advanced  a  concept  that  he  referred  to  as   “revolutionary
liberalism”. In this Gobetti drew heavily on the work of Croce, setting the revolutionary
humanist principle of self-creation and creativity a  the center of his politics. It is existed
in dialogue with much of Italy's liberal antifascist theory, especially the liberal socialism
of Carlo Rosselli, and the work of Italian Communist Antonio Gramsci. This would also
contribute to the development of later radical democratic theory expressed, for example,
in the work of  Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio.218 It  is from this that the Italian
antifascists  developed  a  conscious  understanding  of politics  as  not  restricted  to  the
authority and  activity of  the  state  or  an unwavering commitment  to  the  system that
supports that state, the result of which is not merely unanimity or consensus, but a kind of
homogeneity  dependent  upon  a  coercive  use  of  state  power. To  limit  democratic
recognition, representation and political activity to institutional behavior is to limit  or
restrict legitimate political action to the sphere dominated by those who control access to
power and government. Doing so fuses “politics” with acts of official policy and cannot
help but reify the dominant political order. For Gobetti, this was, in fact, the absence of
politics. Consequently, philosophical positivism—embodied in the ideal State—quickly
becomes  the  focus  of  antifascist  attention  as  it  denied  the  masses  individual  and
collective agency, having reduced life to “scientific formulas, determinism, evolutionism,
218 Norberto Bobbio is perhaps best known in American political theory for his influence on the work of 
radical democrats like Chantal Mouffe and Ernest Laclau, as well as his cosmopolitan approach to the 
philosophy of international law. 
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and the sense that the future has already been mapped out in advance.”219 Gobetti drew
from Croce the lesson that the determinism of the positivist era needed to be discarded.
Gobetti  followed  Croce's  lead  in  the  struggle  to  overthrow  the  determinism  of  the
positivist era, and it is from his thought that Gobetti begins to see individual agency as
essential to this renewal; individual agency that hd, until now, been stripped away by
positivism.
As the First World War approached social and economic inequality was achieving new
heights  throughout  Europe.  Critics  of  positivist  and  conservative  interpretations  of
liberalism swelled the ranks of socialist parties and had come to play an increasingly
prominent role in politics. The old guard liberals epitomized by Giolitti were, not without
reason, fearful.  Sorelian syndicalists—radical revoluti nists inspired by the voluntarist
politics of Georges Sorel—tired of “official” socialist party lines which embraced the
very democratic party politics that they blamed for the conditions leading up to the war.220
They came to see the war as a “necessary evil” or rathe  “an ill that was nonetheless an
instrument of good” and entered the war in search of the revolution that the traditional
parties of the left failed to deliver.221 Rosselli makes this transition clear in his chapter on
'Marxism and Revisionism in Italy', concluding that this “new generation was idealistic,
219 Unfortunately, I have lost my note here and am in the process of trying to track down this quotation.
220 Bobbio, Ideological Profile of Twentieth-Century Italy, 57.
Georges Sorel (1847–1922) was a French social philosopher and a critic of Marxism. He is best known 
as the leading theorist of an aggressive strain of syndicalism, that advocated the use of the general 
strike, creative violence, heroic myth and a vanguard of intellectual elites as part of a revolutionary 
program. His criticism of Marxist historical materialism as well as bourgeois liberalism made him 
attractive alternative to reform-minded revolutionaries even including Gobetti; however, as Bobbio 
would later point out his “inextinguishable hatred of democracy” would confirm “the old conservative 




voluntaristic, and pragmatic” and was “destined to offer itself up to the war.”222 A whole
generation, dissatisfied and impatient, returned from the First World War transformed and
politically disoriented. It was an experience that brought with it unparallelled discontent,
especially discontent with a modernity that had promised paradise and instead brought
with it the Armageddon. In the Age of Extremes, Eric Hobsbawm argues that among the
more extreme elements—those dissatisfied returning veterans who made it through the
war,  but  had not  been turned against  it—there was “a sense of  incommunicable and
savage superiority, not least to women and those who had not fought, which was to fill
the  early  ranks  of  the  postwar  ultra-right.”223 Another  product  of  modernity—and
particularly bureaucractization—was the creation of a great many low-level intellectual
jobs and a lower-middle class. This class of people exploded in Italy after the First World
War. Perhaps this is even a greater problem today. As this class of people, equally filled
with a sense of “entitlement” finds itself compressd into the proletariat, this educated
group increasingly “felt unrepresented and misunderstood.”224 In combination, they set
the tone for postwar politics dominated by an intolerant attitude towards prewar attitudes,
especially towards liberalism seen as bourgeois and decadent as well as socialism that
had failed on its revolutionary promise. The classical liberal regimes and their politics
were seen as having brought the world to the brink of total annihilation, and the socialist
parties which had atrophied under parliamentary politics were powerless to affect change.
As Nadia Urbinati notes in her introduction to  On Liberal Revolution, those returning
were “shocked by so much blood and violence” and in such “deep spiritual crisis” that
222 Rosselli, Liberal Socialism, 50.
223 E. J Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991 (London: Abacus, 2001), 
26.
224 Ward, Piero Gobetti’s New World, 12.
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they  “could  have  become  anything.”225 “Anti-liberal”  politics  became  increasingly
popular, but existing socialist alternatives no longer appeared viable. In its place emerged
something new, a kind of 'anti-politics'  which increasingly threatened Italian life as it
professed to preserve and glorify it.226 Piero Gobetti—a politically vigorous student who
had been too young to  fight  in  the  war—believed that  e  “faced the  postwar  crisis
without the prejudices that afflicted  combatants and defeatists.” 227 He believed that the
postwar crisis was at its core a moral problem because in that having been so completely
shattered and disoriented by the war, the hidden forces that had guided the political life of
the nation were now exposed. “The demagogic illusion”, he added, “cast no spell  on
us.”228 The task that  lay before Gobetti  and the rest  of  his  circle of  antifascists  was
primarily forensic and introspective. They were “led to seek the wider and deeper reasons
for...Italy’s  inability  to  achieve  organic  unity...and  to  make  their  own  practical
contribution to the living reality of organized society.”229    
Fascism  was  announced  when  Mussolini  denounced  the  nin teenth-century  as  “the
century  of  socialism,  liberalism,  democracy”  and  declared  enemies  of  them  all.
Unfortunately, conditions were now ripe for him to be heard.  Italian Fascism emerged
successfully only as something of a political chameleon adapting a variety of seemingly
225 Bobbio, Ideological Profile of Twentieth-Century Italy, XVII.
226 Martin, Piero Gobetti and the Politics of Liberal Revolution, 156.
Here I use the difficult concept of 'antipolitics' in the manner that would be understood by Piero 
Gobetti and described in part in James Martin's book on Piero Gobetti and the Politics of Liberal 
Revolution. “The “antipolitics” of party strategy, populist demagoguery, and the forces of reaction.” 
This is to say a form of political life characterized by the absence of politics and particularly liberalism 
as an “ethic of conflict” or in Gramsci's “philosophy of praxis”




incompatible characteristics and exploiting the cracks between the two great ideological
poles  of  modernity  (classical  liberalism  [capitalism]  and  socialism  [communism]) in
developing their  own  program.  Cracks,  incidentally, that  were similarly exploited by
those who were its most successful critics. In his 1927 essay Sobre el Fascismo. Jose
Ortega y Gasset offered one of the most useful  insight  into one of  perhaps the most
significant and telling features of fascism, revealing on the one hand why it has become
so difficult to come to terms with and also  why  it  is  so  critical  to  develop  an
understanding of fascism and combat it. 
Fascism has an enigmatic countenance because in it appears the most
counterpoised contents. It asserts authoritarianism and organizes rebellion. It
fights against contemporary democracy and, on the ot r hand, does not believe in
the restoration of any past rule. It seems to pose itself as the forge of a strong
State, and uses means most conducive to its dissolution, as if it were a destructive
faction or secret society. Whichever way we approach f scism we find that it is
simultaneously one thing and the contrary, it is A and not A…230
However, these paradoxes are owed not to necessary inconsistencies within fascism, but
rather in the attempt to understand fascism outside itself, that is, in the context of another
ideological norm that fails to recognize it as a complete conception of life and instead
sees it as a mere aberration to be reconciled with the dominant ideological narrative.
Fascism,  it  turned out,  could not  be constrained within  the confines of  conventional
politics. “None of the so-called democrats and liberals had realized that Mussolini could
not be shackled with programs, that he would betray any agreement and beat all comers
at the game of shrewdness.”231
230 Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism-Fascism-Populism (London: 
Verso, 1979).
231 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 224.
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While there exists a great number of theories surrounding the rise of Fascism in Italy;
what cannot be denied is that it was in no small part a consequence of the failure of both
a conservative liberalism and a Marxist socialism that were too weak and ill prepared to
contend with the single-mindedness  of fascism. Italian  fascism  was  thus  something
entirely different from previous reactionary and authoritarian movements and its apparent
contradictions  are  unique  features  of  the  development  of  fascism  and  establishing
something like a political theory of fascism. What becomes readily apparent is that the
fascist ideology is not so easily categorized along the traditional left-right spectrum as
many have hoped to do in the past and continue  to do to this day. However,  Italian
intellectual life, exposed as it was to both Vico and its own legacy absent a reformation
and subject to another totalizing way of life in the Church, prepared its most creative
philosophers and political activists to meet with this unique political threat in original and
important  ways.  In  this  sense,  to  try  to  understand fascism  purely  in  terms  of  the
dominant liberal-socialist paradigm of the twentieth (and now twenty-first centuries) is to
misunderstand the threat  that fascism represents,  as well  as the appropriate means to
confront it. Even within Piero Gobetti and Carlo Rosselli’s careful criticism of Fascism as
“reactionary” we will see that they are careful to eave significant space for us to develop
a more nuanced understanding of what appears to be the incoherent nature of fascism as
both reactionary and revolutionary, as coming from both the left and the right.232 To
explain this we have to begin with the understanding that Mussolini champions a theory
that is inspired as much by Sorel and Lenin as it is by De Maistre and Nietzsche.
232 It is Antonio Gramsci's later development of the now well-known concept of hegemony as tied to a 
sedimentary understanding of historical and cultural development that unlocks the real fascist threat. It 
is this unique nature of Italian Fascism coupled with the that provided the fertile ground for the equally 
unique development of Italian Anti-fascism. 
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Regarding both Lenin and Mussolini, Francois Furet declared that:
“Mussolini belonged to the betrayed tradition of the republican Risorgimento. By
marrying national renaissance with the socialist idea returned to its revolutionary
vocation, these two “leaders of peoples” forcibly destroyed the bourgeoisie order
in the name of the higher concept of the community.” 233
Jacob Talmon in his seminal work Myth of the Nation and Vision of the Revolution tells
us that Mussolini considered Sorel an inspiration, declaring that “What I am, I owe to
Sorel.”  To this Sorel responded by calling Mussolini “a man no less extraordinary than
Lenin.”234 This, it should be said is remarkable considering that one of the most enduring
features of fascism has been its obsession with violence (distinctively Sorelian and
Leninist in motivation), but particularly a violent anti-Socialism. And yet, if there is one
thing that Mussolinian fascism abhorred more than socialism, it was the perceived
impotence of conservative liberalism. It was this balancing act of anti-Socialism and anti-
Liberalism that famously placed Italian Fascism as a political “third-way”. But, a third
way unlike that of the liberal socialists, or democratic republicans, etc. It was a third-way
that could have gone in any direction. But for Piero Gobetti and like-minded antifascists,
for Italy, it could only have ending in fascism. It was also a third way that was uniquely
dangerous, rooted in Mussolini’s violent anti-liberalism and in his reactionary nationalist
ideology. In his dialogue with Ernst Nolte, Furet rminds us, however, that fascism is
revolutionary.235 This is critical in understanding Italian fascism as something new and
distinctive.
233 Francçois Furet, The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the Twentieth Century 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 172.
234 J. L Talmon, J. L Talmon, and J. L Talmon, Myth of the Nation and Vision of Revolution: Ideological 
Polarization in the Twentieth Century (New Brunswick, U.S.A.: Transaction Publishers, 199 ), 451.
235 Francçois Furet and Ernst Nolte, Fascism and Communism (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
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The novelty of fascism in History consists in its emancipation of the European
Right from the impasse that is inseparable from the counterrevolutionary idea. In
effect, the nineteenth century counterrevolutionary idea never ceased being
trapped in the contradiction of having to use revoluti nary means to win without
being able to assign itself any goal other than the restoration of a past from which,
however, the revolutionary evil arose. There is nothing like this in fascism. It is no
longer defined by re-action (reversal) against a revolution. It is itself revolution. I
think that by insisting on underscoring the reactive character of fascism, you
underestimate its novelty. After all, what needs to be understood is the formidable
attraction it held for the masses of the twentieth century, whereas the
counterrevolutionary idea had none of this influence in the preceding century.236
We might for the sake of example consider it as  something akin to an  anti-revolution
informed by what Bobbio called a negative or anti-ideology. To this extent Mussolini was
able to harness the confluence of like-minded ideological currents and channel them to
his will, anti-democratic, anti-liberal, anti-communist, anti-socialist, and anti-European.237
It is this seemingly paradoxical “reactionary revolution”  that so confused the efforts of
both the socialists and the old conservative liberals to accurately characterize and meet
the fascist threat. A closer reading of Rosselli suggests this. 
The impotence of Marxist socialism in the face of problems of liberty and
morality is also shown by its relative inability tosee into the phenomenon of
fascism. It sees in fascism only a brutal case of class reaction…they overlook the
whole moral side of the question, everything characteristically Italian that the
Fascist phenomenon reveals. Fascism is not explicable purely in terms of class
interests.238
Rosselli goes on to tell us that battling fascism i then not a simple matter of combating
class reaction, though he does not dismiss it as an inherent component. Fascism is
something far more complex than left politics (namely the Marxists) had until then
contended with and, I would argue, still contends with. Rosselli and many of his
236 Ibid., 89.
237 Bobbio, Ideological Profile of Twentieth-Century Italy, 123.
238 Rosselli, Liberal Socialism, 107.
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contemporaries such as Piero Gobetti argued that whas missing was the ability to
confront a new type of mentality that had its roots in a moral crisis particular to Italian
political and social development.
Fascism in Italy is a sign of infancy because it signals the triumph of the facile, of
trust, of enthusiasm. We could analyze Mussolini’s cabinet as though it were just
another governing ministry. But fascism has been something more: it has been the
autobiography of the nation. 239
Italy has the ignominious distinction of being  one of the first of the fragile inter-war
democracies to fall under authoritarian rule with only Lenin’s rise to power in 1917
predating it. Mussolini’s assumption of complete power in 1922 was a full decade before
we would see Hitler’s successful rise to power. However, the seeds were planted much
earlier.  On  the  surface  it  was  a  gradual  process  by which  the  conservative  liberal
institutions of parliament failed to adequately face down the fascist threat. Piero Gobetti
saw  this  as  the  result  of  “old-style  liberals  and  democrats”  pursuing  a  strategy  of
bourgeois politics in dealing with Mussolini. Gobetti was not alone in this critique as the
decade of the 1920s was marked by a great variety of anti-parliamentarianism and anti-
liberalism. This was largely because the horrors of the First  World War were widely
interpreted  to  be the result  of  a  great  failure  on the part  of  the conservative  liberal
governments that were too heavily invested with capitalist and aristocratic interests. It
was seen as a failure of the promise of the liberal revolutions of the 19th century. Most
notably,  Carl  Schmitt  would later make a similar anti-liberal  and anti-parliamentarian
critique, though where Gobetti and other antifascist  differed from Schmitt was that theirs
was not a complete rejection of liberalism, but only of the failure of the conservative
239 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 213.
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“old-style”  liberal.  Thus Gobetti  became an advocate  of  a  “revolutionary liberalism”
rooted in political conflict and pluralism. Piece by piece Gobetti and later Carlo Rosselli–
whose own “liberal  socialism” contributed greatly to antifascist  theory–witnessed the
erosion of the liberal standards of individual liberty, representative government, and the
steady social progress that accompanied them. 
Though not a complete picture, Antifascists like Gobetti  and Rosselli  saw the rise of
Italian  Fascism as  a  confluence  of  moral  and  political  crisis.  On  the  one  hand,  an
ineffectual  but  vocal  left  (equally  anti-Liberal  as we  understand  it  here)  stood  in
ideological opposition to fascism, but politically became too focused on debating socialist
orthodoxy. This led to a fragmentation of a potentially strong oppositional force that may
have stood in the path of the rise of fascism. On the other, it was argued that the old
conservative liberals, fearing the influence of thelarger radical left as much if not more
than the smaller but more unified fascists, collabor ted with the far right believing that
such a coalition would keep the radical  left  in check.  However,  as Norberto Bobbio
points out, “once the Right had come to power with the help of the old Liberals it turned
against them.”240 What they failed to understand was that Mussolini could not be checked
by such political gamesmanship – at the very least his political shrewdness could not be
discounted  –  because  his  agenda  and  interests  were  not  politically  the  same as  the
parliamentary liberals. He had no interest in maintaining the government, only replacing
it,  his was a  revolutionary program.  Here,  the novelty of  a truly revolutionary right
cannot be understated. The problem as Gobetti would argue is that the liberals never took
240 Bobbio, Ideological Profile of Twentieth-Century Italy, 107.
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seriously their adversarial role, they had lost their capacity to act as a kind of liberal
vanguard and in this manner the old bourgeois liberalism became servile, facilitating the
rise of autocrats protected under the guise of democracy. What was needed to maintain
true liberty was contention in an agonistic pluralism. Gobetti argued that the old liberals...
...were simply disoriented. None of them comprehended the historical situation of
which fascism was the outcome; they persuaded themselves that what they had
here was a passing phenomenon, one they could defeat if they were shrewd, and
that  was  best  handled  by  dealing,  collaborating,  setting  out  precondition  as
bargaining chips.241
Central to this problem was the illusion of a benevol nt “paternal guardianship” that
Mussolini’s dictatorship cultivated, which played on the political immaturity of Italy. It
was an illusion that would become useful in the hands of many future politicians intent
on centralizing their power and authority. It was a paternalism that reduced the ranks of
the democratically enfranchised to that of subjects of the predatory political instincts of
powerful elites. In Italy, these were the fascists and in particular Mussolini; first in Russia
and later in Eastern Europe, they were the Party. Gobetti’s concern for the lack of  a
Protestant reformation, which would have presumably corrected for this weakness, comes
to mind. While it is unlikely that such a reformation alone would be a sufficient vaccine,
it  was this  lack of  an Italian reformation that  led Gobetti  to  make the argument  for
“fascism as autobiography” and lead him to conclude that “at heart the Italians are all
fascists and democrats like him [a liberal writer who advocated ‘dealing’ with fascists].
Fascism exists, so let’s derive some benefit from it, let’s temper its impulsiveness by
electing fascist deputies to parliament. Fascists become democrats: that’s how revolutions
241 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 224.
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are legalized.”242 Gobetti and Rosselli’s concern over the lack of an It lian protestant
reformation, and a historical reliance of the peopl on religious and populist leadership,
habituated Italy to the idea of transferring moral and political authority to others. This
moral failure became the key and it is in this way that fascism infuses a reactionary
element, in that it conjures up and clings to pre-modern conceptions of the individual not
as citizen, but as subject. Gobetti concludes that:
Fascism wants to cure the Italians of the political contest and reach the point at
which  the roll  is  called and all  the citizens declare that  they believe in their
country,  as if  the whole of social praxis could be fulfilled simply by restating
convictions.243
This idea that fascism represented the 'autobiography of the nation' and that it sought to
'cure  the  Italian  people  of  the  political  contest'  spoke  to  a  problem that  the  Italian
antifascists recognized as central to modernity and one that was expressed first by Vico. It
recalls the problems laid out in Croce's critique of Hegelian dualism and expressed in the
belief  in  the  State's  capacity  to  act  as  a  manifest uni y  of  thought  and  action  that
supersedes  or  transcends  the  contingency  of  human  life  and  the  individual.  “For
Fascism...the State and the individual are one.”244 This is fundamentally challenged by the
understanding that there are necessary limits to the capacity of any ideology or method to
create a truly organic and unified conception of truth and knowledge. To do so, is the total
manipulation of society, the conclusion of which is the “ideal state”, the fascist state in
Italy,  the  communist  state  in  Eastern  Europe,  and  the  neoliberal  state  in  the  west.
Mussolini made fascism's intentions clear in the 'Doctrine of Fascism' (1932): “Against
242 Ibid., 132.
243 Ibid., 212.
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individualism, the Fascist conception is for the State; and it is for the individual in so far
as he coincides with the State, which is the conscie ce and universal will of man in his
historical existence.”245 Drawing from Vico, via Croce, the antifascists believed that such
a condition was not an historical anomaly, but rather the anticipated consequence of a
commitment to such a doctrine of truth. “This mistake  was held to be a great fault not
just in the case of private citizens, but also in the case of princes and rulers, and has
sometimes been the cause of great damage and evil.”246 This lesson would become central
to the “revolutionary” liberal critique of modernity and find its way into the antifascist
analysis of Italian social and political life and esp cially their analysis of fascism itself. In
this manner, and taken as a whole, the antifascist interpretation of fascism is less as a
cause of Italy's political problems than as an effect. This understanding of fascism stands
in stark contrast to previous conception of political authoritarianism particularly, but also
political authority in general. Gobetti's liberalism, while notably unrefined, expressed this
full spectrum need for renewal, though gave little in the way of detail on how this would
be done beyond a close connection to the concepts of active participation, struggle and
conflict.  In  this  sense,  Gobetti  is  less of  a  systematic  thinker  in  the tradition of  the
philosopher who develops is prescriptive in their conception of the “good society”, and
more of an 'agitator of ideas' and social antagonist. Perhaps such a notion of philosophy is
even incompatible with Gobetti's politics. However, it is in these attributes that we can
find some of Gobetti's greatest contributions and it would also would form the ethical
core  of  Gobetti's  politics.  Gobetti's  liberalism exists  as  the  underlying  principle  that
245 Stanislao G. Pugliese, ed., Fascism, Anti-Fascism, and the Resistance in Italy: 1919 to the Present 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2004), 88. Mussolini, “Doctrine of Fascism” (1932)
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creates  the  conditions  of  liberty  and  autonomy  that are  at  the  core  of  the  self-
emancipation of individuals and that Gobetti believed existed in conflict with positivism.
Gobetti's Liberalism
Gobetti represents a considerable challenge to reade s who are looking for a hermetic
philosophical system, or even a prescriptive recommendation. Instead, all we are left with
from this tragically short life are a remarkable collection of letters and commentaries of
an incredibly intelligent, politically and socially vigorous thinker whose commitment was
to action: action in the form of political conflict and action in the form of individual
renewal and struggle. Thus far we have examined the singular influence of Benedetto
Croce on him work, especially as it informed his critique of Giovanni Giolitti's failed
politics as it contributed to the rise of Mussolini's Fascism. His work in to this end is, in
many ways, typical for thinkers of his youth and energy. And though he did not leave us
with a complete “philosophy”, it is clear from the publication of his most aggressively
political journal that his political vision would surely contribute to one. It might also be
said that if we are to accept his commitment to Vician and Crocean historicism, such a
rendering  of  his  thought  into  a  system  or  formula  would  only  undermine  that
commitment. Like Vico and Croce, Gobetti  turns to contingent cultural and historical
sources  in  constructing  his  political  theory.  Gobetti  grounds  his  liberalism  on  an
interpretation of history and culture (understood as Vico did) that differs radically from
that of the positivist liberal perspective that was then dominant throughout Europe and
remains largely dominant to this day throughout the west. He challenged a conception of
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politics that was fundamentally systemic or institutional, and dependent on the rationally
organized constitutional apparatus of the state.  This rational constitutionalism remains
integral  to  our  modern  conceptions  of  politics  and especially  government.  Even  the
'radical' left retains a shared belief in this conception of politics and the understanding
that a "politics without the organizational form of the Party is politics without politics."247
Gobetti believed that constitutionalism of this sort can only lead to liberal decline into an
oligarchic state. For Gobetti  it  is the job of the “r volutionary liberal” to advance an
agenda of moral  and political  autonomy,  to even include “class struggle”  in order to
counter the tendency to transform the state into an instrument of an oligarchic minority. It
is a political theory that is aggressive towards conventional interpretations of politics and
measures  itself  against  different  standards.  His  liberalism  does  not  rely  on  “meta-
historical foundations” (such as the historical materi lism of Marx) or other transcendent
foundations that provided measurable tests of “progress”. For Gobetti it is the moral and
political autonomy of the individual and “praxis”248 that is key in constructing a politics
that is free. Furthermore, it is marked with a willingness to remain open to all political
traditions.  He  aggressively  promoted  “pluralism”  and  a  diversity  of  opinion  and
perspective. Pluralism was essential for Gobetti because he believed that politics could
never  be  reduced  to  the  application  of  “pure  reason”  or  reduced  to  a  deterministic
progress of history.  This is  because people do not  develop objective opinions out  of
neutral information. Politics is about shared opinions and experiences, and therefore it
does not exclude the irrational. In fact, the irratonal quite often sits squarely at the center
247 Vladimir Iĺ ich Lenin and Slavoj Žižek, Revolution at the Gates: A Selection of Writings from February
to October 1917 (London; New York: Verso, 2002), 297.
248 Here, praxis refers to a process of putting theoretical knowledge into practice.
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of our politics. For this reason, we must embrace politics as the shared experience of
struggle among differing and often antagonistic opinions. The primary concern of politics
should therefore  not  be  to  prevent  political  seizure  and the  fulfillment  of  a  rational
political program, but rather to prevent the blockage of political conflict and legitimate
“competition” among perspectives. That is, prevent the manipulation of the “rules of the
game” by the state or those who wield sufficient power to influence or control the state to
their advantage. 
In his excellent study of Gobetti, James Martin argues that “Gobetti’s language may seem
somewhat esoteric, but it reflected the pervasive ideal st culture at the time, according to
which spiritual renewal was a vital precondition for wider political transformation.”249
Nowhere was this more evident  than in his earliest  journal which was dominated by
Croce's  idealist  vision  that  challenged  all  modes  of  determinism.  The  journal  was
aggressively critical of all socialist and “old liberal” party doctrines, which were seen as
dogmatic and inflexible. As the politics of the day increasingly become diverted from this
Crocean ideal and the politics of the day turned to an emerging fascism lead by Benito
Mussolini. It was in this climate that Gobetti first took up the antifascist banner directly
and in 1922 he shuttered Energie Nove in order to rethink his politics in the face of this
new threat. Shortly thereafter he began publishing a new, more militant, weekly political
review  called  Rivoluzione  Liberale  ("Liberal  Revolution").  It  was  a  journal  that
conducted a campaign of criticism and resistance against the Fascist government of Italy.
It was in this journal that Gobetti developed his dtinctive interpretation of liberalism
249 Martin, Piero Gobetti and the Politics of Liberal Revolution, 36.
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(“revolutionary liberalism”) that clashed mightily with the politics of compromise and
stability  that  marked  the  conservative  liberal  government  of  Giovanni  Giolitti  that
Gobetti  believed had allowed Mussolini  and the Fascist  to rise to prominence. As a
journal  it  was  a  focal  point  for  the  early  anti-fascist  resistance  movement  and  its
contributors and readers unified in the clarity and power of their analysis of the problems
that affected Italy and their mutual opposition to fascism. In late 1924, under increasing
pressure from the fascists, Gobetti shuttered La Rivoluzione Liberale and began Il Baretti,
a literary journal. This represented a shift in tactics from the militant nature of the  La
Rivoluzione Liberale to what Urbinati  describes as a preparation for a “long, and no
longer open, war of resistance” that “had to devote its lf to cultivating and spreading the
values of moral resistance and personal and political integrity.”250 This concept of the
“long war” is central to anti-fascist politics and finds itself most completely theorized in
Gramsci's concept of the “war of position”. It is an ctualization of Vico's twin theories of
verum factum and corsi e ricorsi one that places Gobetti and the Italian antifascist  (and
the  uniquely  Italian  philosophic  experience)  to  bear  on  the  development  of  global
resistance  movements  in  that  liberal  values  can  be  developed  locally  and  internally
through a dialectical process that need not be externally imposed from another country, or
even another class or top down from the state. The seeds of liberal revolution lie within
the  autonomous  individual.  And,  it  is  conflict,  at  times  open  and  direct,  but  most
importantly conflict rooted in cultivating moral resistance and the personal and political
integrity of the individual.
250 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, xxxiv.
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The Italian antifascists were inspired largely by Piero Gobetti's activism and his particular
form  of  liberalism that  focused  on  liberalism as  a  'liberating'  force;  what  he  called
'revolutionary liberalism'. It was a philosophy that focused on emancipation rather than “a
system of judicial guarantees or...a form of state organization and management.”251The
Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio summarized a Gobettian revolution as:
...a revolution bringing liberation from the traditional ills of Italian society, in the
name of a liberalism understood philosophically as an antagonistic conception of
history, economically as the theory of the free market, and politically as a state
ruled by law, a state that guarantees the exercise of the fundamental civil liberties
and, as such, stands in opposition to any form of autocratic state (of which fascism
was to be the brutal incarnation).252 
Gobetti's  attitude towards bourgeois modernity and capitalism was not  unlike that  of
Vico's towards Cartesianism, which he likewise saw exerting its influence ubiquitously.
Gobetti  was well aware of the incredible contributions that the bourgeois free-market
brought  with  it.  However,  he  was  concerned  by  its  transformation  into  a  reductive
doctrine, effectively negating its liberal function. Gobetti resisted an overemphasis on
economics, though he recognized it as an integral feature of modernity and necessary role
that it played and will continue to play in the development of modernity. We would be
hard pressed to  disregard the achievements  of  the free-market  in  terms of  medicine,
technology, etc. However, this understanding was such that that it was not exclusively
linked to capitalist markets alone. In fact, to speak of the free-market only in terms of the
economy would be especially dangerous. This is  because a serious problem emerges
when  morality  and  politics  are  conditioned  by  laissez-faire  as  a  political/economic





Economists and politicians have always preferred to concentrate on the figure of
the consumer, a mere logical construct, vulgar, parasitic, and apolitical. The efforts
of the free-marketeers to create a consumer consciousness were bound to come to
nothing, because the consumer is not a cipher, not an individual capable as such of
political consciousness.254
Gobetti’s concern here is that under such conditions, the individual becomes incapable of
acting  politically,  incapable  of  political  consciousness.  In  this  manner  he  loathes
consumerist economism as much as perhaps the parties, in both instances individuals are
reduced to abstractions. Gobetti's free market ideal was that laissez-faire should not be
limited to trade (as it often is in Capitalist theory), but also extended to the social and
political spheres: 
“He thought of social conflict between the owners of capital and the owners of
labor as not only unavoidable but even positive, because it helped to protect and
advance  the  realization  of  individual  autonomy  while  forcing  economic
management  to  pursue restless innovation.  Consequently,  to  Gobetti,  liberalism
was the most radical alternative to both socio-economic corporatism (fascism) and
protective state socialism (etatism).”255
As such, the task of recapturing the vitality of liberalism through revolutionary liberalism
was not just a task for the political economism of either liberal free-trade or socialist
historical materialism, it was a moral-political task, that involved among other things the
recognition of  the fact  that  liberty is  not  abstrac ideal  to  be imposed by any given
system, but an ideal that is manifest in the reality of pluralism and the recapturing of
individual autonomy and authenticity. In this respect,  Gobetti's central contributions in
253 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 203–217.
This process is also famously illustrated in Marx's “Wage Labor and Capital” (1849)
254 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 128.
This is an analysis that will be revisited in Vaclav Havel's innovative analysis of what he describes as 
the Post-Totalitarian system as intimately related to a modern global consumerist culture.
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combating fascism are not explicitly that of a philosopher, but rather as a cultural critic
and as an interpreter of ideology, what James Martin, borrowing from Quentin Skinner,
calls  an “innovating ideologist.”256 His principle interest in the face of the collapsing
Italian State and the “march on Rome” of Mussolini's fascism was to cultivate a renewal
of liberalism. For him liberalism was not simply a n rrow doctrine of individual rights,
free trade, and parliamentary institutions; commitments that alone provided no resistance
to rise of fascism and no guarantee of liberty. It  was a liberalism that recognized the
gravity of Italy's moral-political crisis and present d an open ethic of liberation based on
a struggle against transcendent beliefs and imposed, hi rarchical systems. He therefore
saw his liberalism as related to radical and revoluti nary movements of all kinds that
sought  as  its  goal  emancipation  and  non-domination. Through  his  emphasis  on  the
emancipatory element of liberalism he connected liberalism with the political struggle
and conflict  among opposing social  and  political  forces.  In  this  way,  his  critique of
liberalism is one that makes space for the class confli t of Marxian socialism as well as a
competitive  individual  autonomy,  and  points  to  recent  developments  in  radical
democratic or “agonistic” theories of democracy. Gobetti believed that positivism and its
accompanying materialism had contributed to an “eclipse of spirit.”257 A movement to a
version of idealism was necessary, but not one that fell into the Hegelian trap. Gobetti
and Gramsci  both saw in  positivist  liberalism a tend cy towards the domestication,
appeasement and pacification of the masses and it is precisely what Gobetti challenged in
identifying 'the masses' and the proletariat in particular as the new social and political
256 Martin, Piero Gobetti and the Politics of Liberal Revolution, 4.
257 Ward, Piero Gobetti’s New World, 11.
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antagonist  and  liberal revolutionary class.  It  is  what  made his  otherwise “confused”
conception of politics coherent.258
It is also what drove Gobetti to a truly novel interpretation of the Bolshevik Revolution in
Russia as a liberal revolution.259 It was from the perceived success of their movement and
from the example  of  the  workers  movement  in  Turin,  as  well  as  his  admiration for
Antonio Gramsci, that Gobetti came to understand the working class as the revolutionary
subject  of  his  liberalism.260 In  their  efforts  to  occupy  and  manage  the  factories
themselves,  Gobetti  argued  that  the  workers  represent d  a  spontaneous  struggle  for
autonomy and collective freedom that could act as amodel for the revitalization of Italian
politics  and  life.  While  the  workers'  movement  was  eventually  defeated  by  the
government, Gobetti remained inspired by their effort and by the Marxist and communist
argument  that  it  was  the  working  class—the  proletaria —that  constituted  a  new
revolutionary  subject.  This  is  because  the  bourgeoisi  has  lost  their  revolutionary
character,  concerning itself more with the maintenance of order and the preservation of
privilege and power. For Gobetti, they ceased to be liberal or perform the liberal function.
258 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 73.
259 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 209–210.
“The Russian revolution is not just a socialist expriment. They are laying the groundwork for a new 
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Italian political  life  under  their  direction had become politically stagnant,  cultivating
conditions ripe for Fascism, which was able to harness the frustrations of those who felt
alienated from political life. However, Gobetti understood that the complete overthrow of
the bourgeoisie as the socialists contended would not work. What was necessary was a
means  by  which  liberalism—so  intimately  connected  with  the  bourgeoisie,  but
simultaneously so spectacularly failed by them—could be made revolutionary again. This
is because those principles and values which had come t  define the great achievements
of  modernity,  were  principles  and values  of  the  bourgeoisie,  but  they needed  to  be
extended beyond the bourgeoisie themselves. They neded to lose their class character
and instead be carried forward through a new revolutionary subject, as one passed the
baton in a relay race.261 For Gobetti this new revolutionary subject was the proletariat. In
this manner, Gobetti the liberal was brought nearer to the revolutionary left even though
he was “explicitly non-socialist”.262 This is where the political idea of spontaneity and
organic unity becomes so vital. For Gobetti the revolution could only be maintained by
not succumbing to an externally imposed authority—the new elite (insofar as there had to
be one) had to emerge spontaneously and organically. If not, they would lack authenticity
and  fall  into  the  same  ideological  traps.  Revolution  supplanting  revolution,  without
progress.  This  is  why  Gobetti  looked  to  the  proletaria  and  especially  the  workers'
261 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 483.
The use of this metaphor is my own, but it is key, because unlike the socialists and communists who 
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councils, which “arises in correspondence with the real needs and the real aspirations of
modern  civilization,  apart  from  its  dogmatic  postula es.”263 The  workers  councils
represent something different from unions, which for Gobetti engaged in a collaborative
politics not unlike Giolitti. The councils represent d an exercise in free initiative and it
was a “notable example of Laissez-faire” as the proletariat acting “vigorously bourgeois
(as producers)”  in their  struggle and in their  demands for control over the means of
production.264 Unlike the unions which preserved class relations, the councils transcended
them while preserving their functions. For Gobetti then, the workers' councils, though
communist in origin, weren't sowing the seeds for a socialist revolution, but for a liberal
revolution or rather a liberal renewal, returning liberalism to its revolutionary origins.
Spontaneity was seen as essential if such a renewal was to be understood as an authentic
and organic representation of the people. “Our precise task becomes the elaboration of
the ideas of the new ruling class and the organization of every practical effort that will
lead to that end.”265 But this new ‘ruling class’ or body of new intellectuals cannot be
externally  imposed  as  this  would  inevitably  collapse  into  oligarchy,  reflecting  the
immaturity of Italy, and return Italy to tyranny.266 This reliance upon a spontaneous and
organic elite or ruling class represents a particular kind of problem for Gobetti, that does
not  go  entirely  resolved  in  his  work,  though  the  attention  that  he  pays  to  Gramsci




“Where a majority holds power with complete security, you have a veiled oligarchy and nothing else. 
The formation of a government majority through the el ctoral process is always the result of 
negotiations and ambiguities (the Gentiloni pact); blackmail is the tool systematically employed by the
tyrant to make the ranks of the democratically enfra chised the slaves of his instincts.”
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suggests  how  me  might  have  addressed  it.267 If  Gobetti  offers  his  readers  any
prescriptions it is the following:  “A precise technical task awaits us: the preparation of
free spirits capable of abandoning prejudice and joining with the popular initiative at the
decisive moment.”268 What is needed is some program of education to “enlighten the
necessary elements of the life of the future (industrialists, investors, entrepreneurs) and
train  them in  this  new freedom of  vision.”269 Recognizing  those liberal  elements  of
modernity  and  returning  them  to  their  original  revolutionary  task.   Is  such  a  task
possible? If so, how, do we prevent these newly educated elites from succumbing to the
same historical temptations of power and privilege of the bourgeois elites? While Gobetti
never describes such a program in any detail, he does offer a “guiding idea” to “bond us
together politically in this action.” Let the myth of the revolution against the bourgeoisie
[Marx] lead, through the dialectic of history [historicism and Vico], to an antibureaucratic
revolution  [Vico/Croce  contra  Descartes/Hegel].”270 In  each  case  we  have  taken  up
Gobetti's  fragmentary  proposals  in  attempting  to  stitch  together  an  understanding  of
Gobetti's revolutionary interpretation of liberalism. 'Liberal revolution' is a concept that
turns on “the argument that liberalism was an emancip tory ethos immanent to popular
struggles to extend freedom, rather than a doctrine of eternal, transcendental principles or
a  form of  state.”271 To be revolutionary,  “liberalism had to  be grasped as  an active,
267 The problem of 'elites' and the need for a 'ruling class' has been a consistent challenge for democracies 
whose legitimacy rests on popular sovereignty. Consider, for instance, the American Revolution's 
reliance on an elite self-appointed ruling class, or B lshevik Revolution's reliance upon a similarly self-
appointed elite. The key was not establishing the need for a 'ruling class', which is all but self-evident, 
but rather how to establish the legitimacy of those elit s. For Gobetti, so-called parliamentary 
institutions were not sufficient. It could only be achieved where the ruling class was understood as  a
spontaneous and organic 'product' of the class it represents.   
268 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 185.
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combative theoretical outlook, one with political struggle as its fundamental principle,
not consensus or compromise.”272 For such a revolutionary project to succeed, a newand
enlightened elite capable of self-education was necessary to guide it. From our “post-
colonial”  and “post-modern”  perspectives this  emphasis  on  elites  cannot  possibly be
understood as liberal, and more to the point may even be perceived anti-liberal. However,
Gobetti was not unaware of this criticism. It was precisely his shared concerns that lead
to  his  interest  in  Gramsci's  workers'  councils  as  being  uniquely  up  to  the  task  of
establishing an intellectual elite that it not imposed upon the masses, but rises up from the
masses organically.  Understood in this way, leadership evolves through the course of
collective struggle, but as individuals, rather than as mass-men, and emerges like cream
rising to the top. In this way, the elite leadership emerges from within society and on its
own terms. 
Having recognized the systemic threat of Fascism as rooted in a moral crisis the problem
then  became  how  to  understand  the  motivations  and  the  roots  of  this  crisis. What
elements of society are to blame for the ascent of Fascism? The leaders of industry and
finance? The large landowners and other assorted supplicants to the ruling elite who seek
to protect their power and privilege? For Gobetti all of these played their part to be sure,
however,  it  was  the political  immaturity and the susceptible  nature  of  the  people  in
general  who  allow  it  to  occur.  It  is  a  critique  that  shifts  the  emphasis  away from
Mussolini, and places it squarely on the Italian peopl  themselves and, I would argue, of
the potential that exists within the nature of peopl s in general. It is we (they) the people,
272 Ibid.
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not any man, who represent the real problem. In his time, Gobetti's understanding of
fascism was unique and pointed to the fascist movement as something considerably more
than just a radical fringe movement. Instead Gobetti understood that it represented an
ethical  crisis.  Consequently,  fascism was destined to gain ground among a people in
crisis, upon which it it sustained itself. And it would endure until this ethical crisis was
finally addressed. 
Like  Gobetti,  Rosselli  argues  that  confronting  fascism  is  not  a  simple  matter  of
combating class reaction. Fascism, they realized, was something far more complex than
either traditional left politics or the conservative liberals had faced before. Gobetti argued
that what was missing was the means to confront this new type of mentality that sprung
from the moral crisis that had its roots in both Italian social and political development.273
As a problem rooted in Italy's social and political development Gobetti saw Fascism in
Italy as  “a  sign  of  infancy”,  that  it  had  not  yet  produced the antibodies  capable  of
resisting the fascist mentality that he believed exist d in the rest of Europe.274 Having
died  a  victim  of  fascism  in  1926  and  without  the  exp rience  of  having  seen
totalitarianism unfold across Europe and threaten th  world, one cannot help but wonder
if Gobetti would have come to think of this development as more than merely Italy's
“autobiography” and a sign of its own infancy, but rather the autobiography of modernity
itself. Gramsci, who survived to see Hitler's rise to the Chancellorship in Germany in
273 It is not controversial to maintain that we have not evolved past the political problem of preserving 
liberal democratic ideals in the face of anti-liberal and antidemocratic threats. However, perhaps the 
most controversial argument that is advanced in this dissertation is that this “moral crisis,” identified as
wholly unique to the Italian experience, can in many ways be extrapolated to include aspects of both 
the Anticommunist struggle and perhaps even our contemporary context.
274 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 213.
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1933 and the Moscow show trials of 1936 and 1938, would come to suggest as much
with his ideas of hegemony and of hegemonic struggle. Later still, Havel, from under the
lived experience of life under post-totalitarianism and the capitalist west, would confirm
the diagnosis, declaring that all societies face the same task in resisting the “irrational
momentum of  anonymous,  impersonal,  and  inhuman power-the  power  of  ideologies,
systems, apparat, bureaucracy, artificial languages, and political slogans.”275
One of  the most  difficult  aspects  of  politics  to  come to  terms with  is  the idea that
government, even under the best of circumstances, is rooted in collaboration. If Gobetti
achieved nothing else, he has painfully exposed this wound, often plastered over, and
proposed a means by which we may come to recognize a d perhaps cauterize the wound.
The key is the reformation of the democratic citizen. Gobetti's interpretation of liberalism
was shared by a number of contemporary antifascists, among them Antonio Gramsci.
They both elaborated a theory of emancipation and liberation that depended on political
conflict  or  class antagonism. It  is  from the friction between classes that  real  change
emerges. Gobetti and Gramsci saw change as coming at the hands of a committed elite
dedicated to the task of cultivating in a fertile workers movement a new world. It was a
revolutionary theory that relied on an intellectual elite whose role significantly deviated
from that  of  Lenin's  vanguard even as it  paid homage to it.  Gobetti  was a “militant
intellectual”  and he viewed the intellectual  classes  as  a  kind  of  vanguard.  And like
Trotsky and Lenin their  task would be the creation of  'new moral  types'  that  would
become  the  leading  actors  in  a  political  and  cultura  revolution,  but  he  cautioned
275 Havel, Open Letters, 267.
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vigilance regarding such new intellectual leaders, demanding a policy of intransigence
and active citizenship as an inoculation against declin . And he has little patience for
those who would do otherwise, those he called the “apolitical ones”.  
If you are in politics, you are a combatant. Either you pay court to the new bosses,
or  you  are  in  opposition.  Those  in  the  middle  are  neither  independent  nor
disinterested. The regime welcomes skeptics. All it asks of citizens is to surrender
their dignity and their political rights: there is a man in Italy who is taking care of
things, so let everyone else admire him and get on with their work, or have fun at
the festivals, or hide themselves away in the library.276
276 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 129.
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Chapter 3: Italian Anti-fascism: Antonio Gramsci's “Surprising” Marxism  277
As we have seen, Piero Gobetti was a political thinker of great energy who developed a
critique  of  fascism that  was  both  critical  of  Marxism,  as  well  as  the  parliamentary
liberalism  of  Giolitti's  government.  Freedom,  as  Gobetti  understood  it,  was  not
achievable  through institutional  mechanisms alone.  Fr edom could  only  be achieved
through the lived experience of history and political life, and the state and apparatus of
government—even the institutions of democracy such as parties and elections—are not
guarantor of the political. Under the influence of dogmatic ideology, the state and its
institutions, even liberal democratic institutions, can become the negation of politics and
a barrier to liberty. Systems and formulas cannot create a moral or ethical state. For this
reason, Gobetti understood politics as inherently pluralistic and therefore believed that it
was not the proprietary task of any single historical class, but the persistent, open-ended
struggle of  conflicting social  and historical  forces that  give rise  to  the  ethical  state.
Neither  the  bourgeoisie  nor  the  proletariat  are  revolutionary by virtue  of  their  class
character, but rather as historical outcomes. In this respect, human individuals become the
makers of history and the founders of philosophical and political truth, which cannot exist
prior to lived human experience. Antonio Gramsci—the Italian Marxist political theorist
and politician—extends this theory of political action that we observe in Gobetti's work
and the antifascist narrative generally, so much so that to Gobetti, Gramsci was “more
than a [political] tactician or a combatant,” he was a prophet.278 However, while a prophet
277 Hobsbawm, How to Change the World, 316; Antonio Gramsci and Carl Marzani, The Open Marxism of
Antonio Gramsci (New York: Cameron Associates, 1957).
278 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 22.
130
receives their wisdom from a divine source, the sources of Gramsci's wisdom can be
traced elsewhere, namely the intellectual heritage of Italy itself. Gramsci was imprisoned
in 1926 by Mussolini's fascist regime and is perhaps best know for his Prison Notebooks,
written between 1929 and 1935.279 This period resulted in nearly 3,000 handwritten pages
of  notes  and  commentaries  in  addition  to  his  pre-prison  works,  much  of  which  he
dedicated  to  working  through  the  though  of  his  own  Italian  intellectual  heritage.
Gramsci's  Marxism  developed  under  the  influence  of  Italian  thinkers  as  diverse  as
Machiavelli, Vico, Benedetto Croce, and Antonio Labriola to name a few. In many way
this is perhaps the most exciting aspect of Gramsci's work and it is also for this reason
that we can join Eric Hobsbawm when he says that Grmsci is “the most original thinker
produced in the West since 1917” or at least one of its most gifted; pushing to develop a
decidedly 'non-Marxist' Marxism that  readily draws on the influence of revolutionary
conceptions of liberalism and humanist historicism—where Marx and Engels themselves
had avoided it.280 And it is an investigation of this heritage, particularly the influence of
Vico and Croce on Gramsci as part of a wider elaborti n of critical liberal democratic
theory, that will be the focus of this chapter. 
Born and raised in Sardinia, Gramsci had a heightened sensitivity to the tensions that
existed between the various formal  institutions that  were set up as a result  of  Italian
unification and the reality of regional social, economic, and class divisions, and the so-
called problem of two Italys. This, he believed, contributed to the durability of capitalism
279 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ix,xvii–
xviii.
280 Hobsbawm, How to Change the World, 316.
131
and the uneven development of socialism across nations. In the introduction to a slim
volume of Gramsci's essays (one of the first in the English language), Italian-American
Socialist Carl Marzani cites a lengthy passage written by Gramsci, we are told, in 1920,
just before the Fascist take over of Italy. In this e describes Italy as resting at a crossroad
of history in which Italy was faced with one of two alternatives:
...either the working class conquers political power...or an enormous reactionary
victory of the propertied class will take place. Novi lence will be overlooked to
subdue the industrial  and agricultural  workers  and to  subject  them to servile
labor: they will try to smash inexorably and irretri vably the organs of political
struggle of  the working class and they will  seek to incorporate the organs of
economic  struggle,  the  unions  and  the  cooperatives, in  the  machine  of  the
bourgeois state.281
The west and especially America, it was believed, had avoided such a crossroad in which
social  and  economic  divisions  became  so  stark  as  to obscure  authentic  politics  all
together. In Gramsci's  review of Sinclair Lewis'  Babbitt, though critical of  its artistic
merit,  he recognized the novel  as being important  jus the same.  He believed that  it
represents  “an increase in self-criticism, that a new American civilization is being born
that is aware of its strengths and its weaknesses”, which is to say that it was perhaps
immune to the kind of degradation that Gramsci feltEurope was quickly succumbing
to.282  In his mind America had become critical and conscious of itself in a way that Old
Europe was not. Marzani remained unconvinced of this prognosis, arguing in 1957 that
this review was already some 25 years old (today nerly 80 years old) and that “in the last
few years leading American writers have been shying away from critical appraisal of
281 Gramsci and Marzani, The Open Marxism of Antonio Gramsci, 12.
282 Antonio Gramsci and David Forgacs, The Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings, 1916-1935 (New York: 
New York University Press, 2000), 296.
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American mores.”283 We should be fearful, it was argued, if such a trend were to continue.
And should it, America might also come to find itself as such a crossroad.284 In publishing
The Open Marxism of  Antonio  Gramsci,  Carl  Marzani  encouraged us to  learn  from
Gramsci's example. It is a lesson that begins with his very characterization of Gramsci as
an “open Marxist”. Unlike those who have seen Gramsci a  a precursor to post-Marxism,
Marzani notes that Gramsci “is a Marxist in the great tradition of Marx himself, a thinker
with an open mind, disciplined in the search for truth.”285 This idea of the “openness” of
Gramsci's Marxism is key. It is an openness with rega d to Marxism built on a foundation
set by Benedetto Croce and echoed by other Italian Antifascists like Gobetti and Carlo
Rosselli. In this manner the anti-Marxist Croce sat at the center of Gramsci's “surprising”
and “open” Marxism, one that would find him praising “a certain strata of  left-wing
intellectuals” like Gobetti.286 In light of those critics that inextricably set Marx on the
unavoidable trajectory to Lenin and Stalin, this “open-Marxism” looks increasingly like
another liberalism. And it is one that would later find its way into the political theory of
East European dissidents like Vaclav Havel's own surprising liberalism, though critical of
the communist  regimes under  which they suffered, remained cautious of  the western
consumerist hegemony as well.
283 Gramsci and Marzani, The Open Marxism of Antonio Gramsci, 10.
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Since the late 1970s the social  sciences have been roadly influenced—and at  times
dominated—by what can only be called Gramscianism, a political theory shaped by the
refined  concepts  of  hegemony and  the  philosophy of  praxis that  have contributed to
Gramsci's  widespread influence.  However,  he  is  often  cast  as  the  prototypical  post-
Marxist, however, Peter Thomas argues in his recent book The Gramscian Moment, that
Gramsci is uniquely positioned to rescue a suddenly revived Marxism. However, this
full-throated defense of 'Gramsci  as Marxist  standard-bearer'  is  also something of an
overreach. Instead, with his emphasis on a lived or “open” Marxism, Gramsci follows the
Italian philosophic tradition in which an authentic politics is understood in terms of a
unity of  philosophy and politics,  but  one that  avoids the idealist/determinist  traps of
Hegel and Marx. These traps were most clearly identfi d by Benedetto Croce, and would
later find their way into Gramsci's own political theory. This represents the truly unique
evolution of a liberal political theory more sensitive to the social nature of historical and
political development. Gramscianism is connected to a kind of overcoming of the Marxist
system, in favor of “the real, undying Marxist thought, which continues the heritage of
German and Italian idealism, but which, in Marx, was contaminated by positivist and
naturalist incrustations.”287 A critique of the Marxist system also sat at the heart the well
known “liberal socialist” Carlo Rosselli.288 Gramsci's approach to Marx was as something
of a theoretical toolbox and draws in large part from Croce's earlier search for what was
living  and  dead  in  Hegel's  thought;  setting  aside  what  was  no  longer  useful,  while
287 Antonio Gramsci and Richard, Cox, Virginia Bellamy, Antonio Gramsci: Pre-Prison Writings 
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retaining its formidable strengths. Thus, Gramsci a “anti-Croce” is something of an echo
of Croce's own “anti-Hegel”.289 Thomas criticizes those readings that look to Gramsci “as
a  forerunner  of  contemporary  rhetorics  of  post-communism  and  post-Marxism”  as
instrumental,  “rhizomatic,”  and  “over-determined.”290 However,  while  it  is  true  that
Gramsci remains committed to the Marxist ideal,  it  is clear that he is also somehow
moving past  Marx, while still  recognizing his central  role in the development of  the
modern consciousness in a way that “everyone is a bit of a Marxist, without knowing
it.” 291 This is, in effect,  our point of departure. Without question, the specter of Marx
cannot be excised from Modernity, but we can disentangle ourselves from the “vulgar
materialist” aspects of him.292 In 'The Revolution against Capital' Gramsci makes it clear
that the time for Marxism—at least a particular conception of Marxism—has passed as
evidenced by the Bolshevik  Revolution,  which he saw as “a  revolution against  Karl
Marx's  Capital”.293 “Events”,  he  continues,  “have  overtaken  ideology.  Events  have
exploded the critical schemas whereby Russian history was meant to develop according
to the canons of historical materialism...the canons f historical materialism are not as
iron-clad as it might be thought, as it has been thoug t”.294 With that added emphasis on
the  receding  relevance  of  historical  materialism  Gramsci  resigns  to  the  past  any
'Marxism'  which  would  subject  man  to  “categorical  imperatives  and  absolute,
unchallengeable norms, lying outside the categories of time and space”.295 Gobetti, the
289 Gramsci's “anti-Croce” will be taken up further later in this chapter.
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liberal  activist,  similarly  concluded  that  “the  Marxist  experiment  in  Russia  has
undoubtedly failed.”296 Instead, it was a triumph of liberty and Lenin and Trotsky weren't
just building a new Marxist state, more importantly they “have awakened a people” and
were “busy re-creating its soul.”297 This shift in perspective and emphasis saw the real
success of the revolution in it having “awakened a people” and was “busy re-creating its
soul”.298 Gramsci too noted that “the revolution is not simply a matter of power – it must
be  a  revolution  in  people's  behavior,  a  moral  revoluti n.”299 This  idea  of  character
formation and of 'soul  making' can be seen as drawn from the deep cultural well  of
Giambattista Vico.300 Gobetti instead saw in the revolution “the negation of socialism and
an affirmation and exaltation of liberalism”.301 He saw in the Russian Revolution the
defeat of the 'tsarist mentality' and the existence of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia
led Gobetti and Gramsci to a similar conclusion; that Marx—particularly the Marx of
Capital;  of  economism  and  historical  materialism—had  been  r futed  in  theory  and
increasingly  so  in  practice.  Gramsci  rejected  the  doctrinaire  Marxist  system as  had
Gobetti  and  Carlo  Rosselli.  Rosselli  would later  conclude that  “Marx  the  socialist...
belongs to a phase [of development] that was certainly essential but that is now outmoded
in the history of the socialist movement.”302 This rejection of the materialist conception of
296 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 209.
297 Ibid.
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history  in  combination  with  a  commitment  to  the  socialist  thought  that  underlies
Marxism, without being “Marxist”, is central to realizing a particular theory of political
action that sees the 'crisis of fascism' and the 'crisis of communism' as well as the 'crisis
of capitalism' as cut from a similar cloth and as a fundamentally moral or ethical crisis. It
is one that recognizes at its core the need to negate an ideological system that has become
ossified socially and politically, and has created the conditions of a servile mentality.
...if the Bolsheviks renounce certain of Marx's assertions in Capital, that does not
mean that they renounce the deeper message which is ts l feblood. All that it
means is that they are not "Marxists", they have not used the works of the Master
to compile a rigid doctrine, of dogmatic and unquestionable claims. They are
living  out  Marxist  thought—the  real,  underlying  Marxist  thought,  which
continues the heritage of German and Italian idealism, but which, in Marx, was
contaminated by positivist and naturalist encrustations.303
This idea of living out Marxist thought—instead of being subjected to a doctrine in its
name and its immutable laws—is central to realizing a politics of action that is centered
on a respect for the autonomous individual.304 Gramsci conceived of the individual as
fully  realized  within  civil  society and as  the  determinate  component  of  history,  and
therefore human life, society and government. It isa perspective that has its roots in an
Italian intellectual experience that is decidedly Vician.
303 Gramsci and Bellamy, Antonio Gramsci, 40.
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“New Science”, New Marxism? 
Vico  is  best  known for  his  formulation  of  a  'new science'  in  reaction  to  Descartes’
Cartesian rationalism and its method. Vico called into question the Cartesian claims that
knowledge  and  truth  could  only  be  found  through  a  process  of  observation  and
verification,  particularly  in  the  realm  of  humanistic  fields.  He  questioned  what  had
become the  dominant  belief  that  Cartesian  ‘science’ was  the  only  path  to  truth.  He
believed that we can only really know as true, particularly where human thought and
action is concerned, that which we have created. This, in contradistinction to Descartes'
belief  that  we  might  develop  and  arrive  at  distinct truths  independent  of  a  highly
contingent human nature and history.  Vico embraced th  idea that  truth is  plural  and
varies between perspectives and that a rational and geometric understanding of the human
world  is  necessarily  a  distortion  that  contributes  o  an  imperialist  perspective.  This
understanding of humanity as messy, unpredictable, and resistant to empirical  thinking
has resonated throughout the post-modern world, but in his time Vico was largely without
an audience save in his native Italy. 
While Vico recognized the successes of Cartesian positivism in the natural sciences he
remained critical of its potential when applied to human life. For Vico, human life was
subject to the contingency of individual and social experience and, therefore, could not be
the subject of Cartesian laws. This understanding of the historical development of human
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life  revealed  a  tension  between Cartesian  science ad  human agency.  It  is  true  that
Cartesian science had contributed to a scientific revolution that allowed man to rationally
understand the world in ways that were never before p ssible; however, it also led to a
world  guided  entirely by mechanical  laws  of  nature  under  the  effects  of  which  the
individual  was  left  largely  powerless  to  influence his  existence.  Just  as  the  laws  of
physics guide the motion of the stars, so too the laws of nature guide the behavior and
movements of human life. Vico turned this view on its head presenting an understanding
of human life and history as rooted in the idea that re l knowledge cannot come from
'objective'  observation  alone,  but  only  through  the study  of  that  which  we  made
ourselves.  Therefore,  we  can  gain  knowledge  of  human  life  not  through  abstractly
observing it, dissecting it, and divining from that observation the transcendental laws that
underlie it, but rather through the study of the individuals and the culture that inhabits
that society. The principle that underlies Vico's thought is the idea that “verum [the true]
and factum [what is made] are interchangeable”, that is, “the criterion and rule of the true
is to have made it”.305 Quinton Hoare summarizes in a footnote to Gramsci's  Prison
Notebooks that for Vico “doing is a means of knowing” and “tha  only the object of
human action could be truly known”.306 Italian intellectuals and activists like Gramsci
incorporated  this  philosophy  of  history  into  their  political  thought,  accepting  as
fundamental  the  capacity  of  human  beings  for  self-knowledge  and  the  role  of  self-
knowledge in making their world, not abstract economic laws. This led Italian thinkers—
and Gramsci in particular—to develop political theori s that centered on the critical role
305 Vico, Vico, 51,55.
306 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 364.
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of agency and individual action—rather than historical  imperative—in the revolution.
That  is  to  say people  are  not  fated,  at  such,  to  any particular  destiny be  it  fascist,
communist, or capitalist.307 Any outcome was only possible so far as it was made possible
through the action or inaction of individuals and society. 
Though  wholly  committed  to  “living  out Marxist  thought”,  socialist  historian  Eric
Hobsbawm described  Gramsci  as  something of  a  “surpri ing Marxist”.308 Surprising,
perhaps, because his Marxism owes more to his libera  Italian heritage and the unique
Italian experience than to  any commitment  to  a doctrinaire Marxism tied to  “vulgar
materialism”.309 This is particularly evidenced by Gramsci's extensive commitment to the
study of the works of Benedetto Croce, in part owed to the restrictions of censorship, but
also owing to his recognition of Croce's own critique of Marx and the need to resuscitate
Marxism “on Croce's own grounds”.310 The last  chapter also took up a discussion of
Croce's struggle with Hegelian “dualism” as identified by Jacobitti. This was a critique
that  drew  from  a  deep  Vician  philosophical  well  that  offered  a  unique  dialectical
approach to understanding knowledge and history. Gramsci similarly draws on Croce's
“speculative idealism” in offering his own critique of “Marxism as a closed system of
unalterable  scientific  laws  and  immutable  truths.”311 Gramscian  Marxism  as  a
307 Popular philosopher and culture critic Slavoj Zizek alluded to this idea in his speech to occupy 
protestors in Zucotti Park during the Occupy Wall Street movement in October 2011: “It is easy to 
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reformulation of Crocean philosophy reads in contrast to Gramsci understood in terms of
an “anti-Croce” perspective. While Gramsci himself does refer to his work—especially
that of the Prison Notebooks—as something of an “anti-Croce”, it was fundamentally 
project of reworking of Croce's historicism.
It is particularly worth re-examining and criticising all historicist theories of a
speculative character.  A new Anti-Duhring could be written,  which from this
point of view would be an "Anti-Croce"...312
Gramsci was convinced that Marxism was failing to achieve its promises because it was
relying too heavily on a deterministic materialism in part owed to the kind of Cartesian
scientific thinking just described, but also to Hegel's absolute idealism and that Hegel's
transcendent and positivistic tendencies have weighed down and disoriented Marxism.
Such thinking had led politics and the revolution astr y; instead, what was needed was to
make politics more 'concrete'. Gramsci achieves thi by substituting Vico's own unique
philosophy—via  Croce's  critique—for  the  Hegelian  variant,  thereby  resuscitating
Marxism and the Marxist promise, Marx is “preserved” as its orientation is reversed.
While Marx had already claimed to “stand Hegel on his head”, Gramsci in agreement
with Marx, merely trusted that he keep his word. The critical turn here is to reinsert
human  autonomy  and  creative  agency  into  Marxism,  something  that  Marx  himself
claimed to achieve with his dialectical materialism. Materialism, reduced to economic
laws fell back into the same Hegelian trap. This is a position more fully analyzed by
Carlo  Rosselli  in  his  book  Liberal  Socialism.313 Vico's  critique of  the  boundaries  of
Idealistic Studies 15 (January 1985): 18.
312 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 371.
313 Rosselli, Liberal Socialism.
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Cartesianism, and the need for a “new science” would make its way into Gramsci who
similarly held that there is no “truth” or “fact” of human life that exists external or prior
to, humanity itself. As such, human life is historic in that it is a human creation. This
contributes significantly to the development of both Gramsci's “surprising” revival of the
philosophy of praxis—an understanding of the unity of thought and action hat is far more
Crocean  and  liberal—and  the  idea  of  hegemony,  not  as  the  realization  of  an  ideal
(Leninist) proletarian State, but rather as contested ideological terrain that remains an
open-ended and unresolved project.
How it is that Gramsci can be both Vician/Crocean, as I argue, as well as an ti-Croce as
Gramsci himself claims?314 Naturally this requires some clarification especially if  this
anti-Croceanism is to be understood as part of a wider effort to re-energize Marxism.
Much like the “antipolitics” that would come to be the hallmark of Havel and the East
European  dissident  movement  decades  later,  it  is  a  critique  that  both  exposes  the
limitations of a narrowly defined politics, as well as makes use of the concept's' most
revolutionary tendencies. For Havel, anti-political politics was understood as politics “as
service to the truth”.315 In this manner Havel's antipolitics is not a rejection of politics as
such, but a movement beyond politics “as the technology of power and manipulation”.316
Gramsci's anti-Croceanism strikes a similar tone. Maurice Finocchiaro argues that in all
of Gramsci’s critiques of Croce's analysis of Marx, he fails to recognize his own basic
314 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 371; 
Evan Watkins, “Gramsci’s Anti-Croce,” Boundary 2 14, no. 3 (April 1, 1986): 121–135, 
doi:10.2307/303237.
315 Havel, Open Letters, 269.
316 Ibid.
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dependency on Croce himself. “Gramsci, although aware that he is specifically indebted
to Croce, does not seem to be aware of his methodological dependence, this is another
reason for  elaborating  the  critical  dimension  of  Croce's  work.”317 Despite  Gramsci’s
claims to the contrary, he fails to transcend Croce’s method. He has “the self-image and
pretension of an anti-Croce, accompanied by very real Crocean commitments.”318 In this
manner Gramsci believes that he can re-imagine Marxism by re-imagining Croce. His
anti-Croceanism  is  a  movement  beyond  Croce  while  still  retaining  elements  of  his
philosophy. Gramsci's relationship to Croce is clarified when he noted: 
In February 1917 … I wrote that just as Hegelianism had been the premise of the
philosophy of praxis [Marxism] in the nineteenth century, and one of the origins
of contemporary civilization, so the Crocean philosophy could be the premise of
a revival of the philosophy of praxis in our time, for our generation.319
This revival brought Gramsci far closer to the liberal individualist perspective than many
in the radical left are willing to concede, yet his relationship with Gobetti remains our
clearest reminder. Vico and Croce emerge as key bricks in the foundation upon which
Gramsci built his famous interpretation of the concept of  hegemony as pervasive and
constructive, influencing the development of indiviual and cultural personality and as a
process that is never finally established, but always contested and open. It is this contest
that  represents  the  critical  terrain  for  political  ctivity.  What  were  the  contours  of
Gramsci's theory that would form the foundations of this conceptual understanding of
human life as historic and intimately tied to autonomy and dignity? Here we talk about
317 Finocchiaro, Gramsci and the History of Dialectical Thought, 234.
318 Ibid., 239.
319 Marcus E Green, Rethinking Gramsci (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon [England]; New York: Routledge,
2011), 219.
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the related concepts of 'praxis' and of 'hegemony' a d the recognition of the State as
'hegemonic' insofar that its power rests in its ability to maintain the balance between the
violent use of coercive power and a 'manufactured' consent derived from the influence of
hegemony. The concept of hegemony referred to a deep combination of the cultural and
political power of one class over others. It was something more than merely the coalition
or  alliance  of  if  separate  interests,  but  the  real  assimilation,  through  ideological
domination,  of  ideas  and  interests  of  the  power  elites  and  it  compelled  belief  and
especially obedience. The concept of hegemony itself is borrowed from Lenin who first
used it  to theorize the necessary class alliance lead by the revolutionary vanguard in
establishing the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'.320For Lenin, the idea of hegemony helped
to theorize the narrow process by which an elite vangu rd tempered the steel  of  the
masses, proletariat and peasant alike.321 That Giolitti forged alliances in a similar manner
did  not  escape  Gramsci's  attention  or  that  of  the  rest of  the  antifascists.  However,
Gramsci  would  develop  the  concept  further  pushing  it  well  beyond  that  of  Lenin's
coercive  tactical  interpretation,  instead  developing the  concept  into  a  comprehensive
social and political theory that would help provide an answer to that persistent critique of
Marxism that asks why it is that the communist revoluti ns predicted so boldly by Marx
never quite unfolded as he had predicted. The Gramsci n concept of 'hegemony' offered
an explanation for the particular challenges posed by advanced capitalism and bourgeois
hegemony and made it clear that traditional Marxism severely underestimated the ability
of the bourgeois state to defend itself and the powerful role that ideology plays in that
320 Vladimir Iĺ ich Lenin, Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 17 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974), 54–59.
321 Borrowed from the title of Nikolai Ostrovsky's novel How the Steel Was Tempered, published serially 
from 1932-1934.
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defense. In a recent book by sociologist Zygmunt Baum n, he asks why it is, despite the
mounting  evidence  of  gross  social  and  economic  inequality  and  our  near  universal
condemnation of it, we continue to tolerate the abuses of the capitalist system.322 After all,
our participation is not compelled at the barrel of a gun or point of a bayonet.  The answer
has much to do with the ideological resources availble to the dominant hegemonic order.
The focus would be on what military commanders today refer to as “winning hearts and
minds”, without which any revolutionary change in regime cannot be made stable. “To
fix one's mind on the military model is the mark of a fool... only politics creates the
possibility  for  manoeuvre  and movement.”323 This  represents  a  dramatic  shift  in  the
revolutionary emphasis on strategies incorporating a rapid and overwhelming “war of
manoeuvre and movement” to that of a “passive revolution/war of position” (political
action) by which the supporting superstructure—the institutions, culture, and civil society
—might  be transformed piece by piece.324 Gobetti  echoes this  when he argues for  a
reorientation of politics: “as we tear down a world of prejudices and shortcomings... Let
us replace the last remains of revealed truth with the truth won day by day through the
labor  of  all,  and generic  abstractions with patient,  open-minded scrutiny of  the little
problems and the big ones as they arise. Only in this finding of solutions and making
them systematic are we really doing politics.”325 Carlo Rosselli would follow, cautioning
against a politics that  leans to heavily on “the imposition of view by an enlightened
minority,”  in favor of  “people coming around to a belief...out  of  a  long sequence of
322 Zygmunt Bauman, Does the Richness of the Few Benefit Us All?(Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: 
Polity Press, 2013).
323 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 232.
324 Ibid., 106–114, 238–239.
325 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 77.
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positive experiences.”326 Lived historical experience, the “marginal” action f individuals,
and the influence of culture and civil  society all  became central  to the revolutionary
process. In this manner, Gramsci and the antifascists would prefigure the anticommunist
dissident  struggles  a  generation  later.  Like  Gramsci  they  would  promote  a  “passive
revolution” focusing on a different kind of war to be fought on the terrain of ideology,
self-examination,  and  the  cultivation  of  'civil  society',  rather  than  the  centralized
revolution preferred by old Marxists.
Critical understanding of self takes place therefor through a struggle of political
"hegemonies"and of opposing directions, first in the ethical field and then in that
of politics proper, in order to arrive at the working out at a higher level of one's
own conception of reality. Consciousness of being part of a particular hegemonic
force (that is to say, political consciousness) is the first stage towards a further
progressive self-consciousness in which theory and practice will finally be one.
Thus the unity of theory and practice is not just a matter of mechanical fact, but a
part of  the historical process, whose elementary and primitive phase is to be
found in the sense of being "different"and "apart", in an instinctive feeling of
independence, and which progresses to the level of real possession of a single
and coherent conception of the world. This is why it must be stressed that the
political  development  of  the  concept  of  hegemony  represents  a  great
philosophical  advance  as  well  as  a  politico-practicl  one.  For  it  necessarily
supposes an intellectual unity and an ethic in conformity with a conception of
reality that  has gone beyond common sense and has become,  if  only within
narrow limits, a critical conception.327
The problem that was basic to Gramsci and a primary concern of his fellow antifascists,
as well as Havel and the East-European dissidents, wa  how to get a 'subaltern class' to
'come to know itself' in Rosselli's terms and how t position itself to develop and rise “to
the phase of ethical-political hegemony in civil society, and of domination in the State.”328
That is, how is it that the the proletariat are to become conscious of itself and “of its
326 Rosselli, Liberal Socialism, 101 [emphasis my own].
327 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 333.
328 Ibid., 160.
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strength, its possibilities, of how it is to develop” to such an extent that they are able to
seize State power for themselves?329 This becomes a very critical question as it represents
a crossroads of sorts in which the 'antipolitical' position held by significant segments of
the dissident  movement  argued against  the  formal  seizure of  state  power,  fearing its
corrupting  influence.  Hungarian  writer  and  activist George  Konrad  addressed  this
concern in his 1984 volume Antipolitics when he asks: “Is there, can there be, a political
philosophy—a set of proposals for winning and holding power—that renounces a priori
any physical guarantees of power?”330 The focus on internal emancipation and the force
of moral resistance displays a reticence shared by those who actively resist domination by
the  state  since  Socrates,  to  take  up  the  reigns  of  power  themselves,  fearful  of  its
corrupting  influence.  Gramsci  is  no  less  concerned  about  the  infectious  potential  of
power, which is why he is so concerned with with the role of intellectuals in society and
revolution, particularly the need for them to emerge as a spontaneous and organic leaders.
“A social  group can,  and  indeed must,  already exercis  "leadership"  before  winning
governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the winning of
such power) ; it subsequently becomes dominant when it xercises power, but even if it
holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to "lead" as well.”331 This expression of the
dialectical relationship between a subaltern social group and it subsequent exercise of
power through the transitional function of 'leadership' suggests that Gramsci has a far
more dynamic understanding of  leadership  than that  of  a  Giolittian  styled politician,
general, or bureaucratic apparatchik. It is intimately bound with his understanding of the
329 Ibid., 159.
330 Konraád, Antipolitics, 92.
331 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 57–58.
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role 'intellectuals' must play in achieving class, hegemonic and subsequently State power.
The Struggle For Organic Unity In Gramsci & Gobetti
Gramsci saw in Gobetti, a liberal with proletariat sympathies, the embodiment of the new
conception of liberalism captured in his “liberal revolutionary” position. A position that
emerged in reaction to the historical climate of Italy and the rise of fascism. While many
within the party argued to fight against the influenc  of bourgeois liberal intellectuals like
Gobetti, Gramsci argued that “Gobetti served us as a link,”332 capable of modifying the
old mental orientations and helping to establish a new “inclusive national project.”333As
we have seen this new inclusive national project, one that employed a “system of class
alliances” was central  to Gramsci's  revolutionary strategy.334 “Why ought  we to have
fought  against  the  “Liberal  Revolution”  movement?  Perhaps  because  it  was  not
composed of  pure Communists.”335 This was a position that  Gramsci,  in light  of  his
hegemony thesis, could not defend. The concept of hegemony reflects an understanding
of the revolutionary process in which a diversity of s cial, political, and cultural demands
are  woven  into  a  framework  of  beliefs  and  values  by intellectuals  and  'the  party'.
However, for Gramsci and liberals like Gobetti, this cannot be a top-down effort a la
Lenin. It must be organic in that it must emerge from within the new revolutionary class
(as identified by Gobetti, Rosselli, and Gramsci), the proletariat or the workers. It is the
role of intellectuals to bring coherence to already known experiential knowledge.
332 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 50.
333 Martin, Piero Gobetti and the Politics of Liberal Revolution, 113.
334 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 30.
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My study on intellectuals is a vast project...Moreov r,  I  extend the notion of
intellectual considerably, and do not limit myself to the habitual meaning, which
refers only to great intellectuals. This study also leads to certain determinations
of  the  concept  of  State,  which  is  usually understood as  political  society  (or
dictatorship;  or  coercive  apparatus  to  bring  the  mass  of  the  people  into
conformity with the specific type of production and the specific economy at a
given moment)  and not  as an equilibrium between political  society and civil
society (or hegemony of a social group over the entire ational society exercised
through the so-called private organizations, like th  Church, the trade unions, the
schools, etc.); it is precisely in civil society tha  intellectuals operate especially
(Benedetto Croce, for example, is a kind of lay pope and an extremely efficient
instrument of hegemony even if at times he may findhimself in disagreement
with one government or another, etc.).”336
Gobetti believed in a 'democratic revolution' that was comprised of an alliance between
the workers, peasants, and intellectuals. This is a message shared by Gramsci as well,
who pressed revolutionaries to infuse their  political  activity with a sense of spiritual
renewal, rejecting positivism and simple political formulas that remove individual agency
from the equation. Genuine moral, political, and cultural change is dependent upon the
preservation of this agency. Gramsci's understanding of politics and political action and
especially his re-conceptualization of hegemony and the radical potential of intellectuals
clarifies the otherwise unexpected relationship he has with the liberal Piero Gobetti, upon
whom he represented a formidable influence, contributing heavily to the development of
Gobetti's  understanding of  radical  politics.  It  was Gramsci  that  motivated Gobetti  to
transform his liberal theory into a revolutionary project, namely revolutionary liberalism.
Liberalism understood first  and  foremost  as ethical,  emancipatory  and revolutionary.
Gramsci also gave shape to the subjects of this revolutionary liberalism in the proletariat,
whom Gobetti came to see as central to the development of a new political order. For
336 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 56.
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Gobetti,  the proletariat  represented the new liberal  base for  political  change as their
revolution was not to be created on the basis of some external influence or design, but
created organically from within. He saw in them theroots of the new ruling class that was
to revitalize and replenish the stores of liberty in Italy. 
It was Gobetti's exposure to the factory council movement through Gramsci that inspired
Gobetti  in  this  direction.  At  their  core  the  factory  councils  were  understood  as  an
organizational  means  of  asserting worker  control  over  the  means  of  production,  and
Gramsci was their most prominent advocate and theorist. The attraction of these workers
councils existed in their capacity to facilitate th integration of the various economic and
political aspects of the workers' daily lives and to organize them democratically in a way
they unable to do before. To this extent, distinctions between public life (factory life) and
private life (life outside the factory) were broken down, allowing workers to organize and
manage production on the basis of collective interest. The construction of socialism was
significant—and particularly the role of production in society—not merely because it was
a necessary step on the path to a classless society, but that it was precisely control of the
means of production (as demonstrated in the Workers Movement in Turin) that created
the proper level of political consciousness under capitalism. It was the unique experience
of  the  workers  councils  that  provided the  proper  education  necessary to  modify the
behavior and form the habits of those who fell under th  considerable sway of capitalist
hegemony.  Therefore,  the  basis  of  socialism for  Gramsci  is  not  a  process  rooted  in
economics as such—the planned economy and collective ownership of  the means of
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production advanced by Marxism-Leninism—but the political and social education that it
affords. For Gobetti, this represented genuine revolutionary political activity in that it
actively pushed the workers,  the proletariat,  in  the direction of  new political  forms;
furthermore,  it  was  generated  not  through  externally  driven  party,  which  would  be
contrary  to  the  autonomous  liberal  ideal,  but  was  a product  of  self-creation  by  the
workers. 
Integral to the success of a Gobettian liberal revolution or a Gramscian passive revolution
was a “cross-class strategy” that Gobetti observed in Gramsci's councils and that we see
emphasized in his analysis of what came to be known in Italy at the time as “the southern
question”.  In  his  essay of  the  same name Gramsci  offers  a glimpse of  many of  the
fundamental issues that were to occupy his thought for years to come; the means by
which  the  industrial  proletariat  and  peasants  can  be  brought  together  in  common
opposition to capitalism and fascism. For Gramsci, the 'southern question' represented the
key challenge standing in the way of a genuine socialist revolution in Italy, and spoke to
the problem of two Italys.337 While representative of much larger historical divisions, the
problem of two Italy’s was drawn in sharp relief with the “unification” of Italy at the end
of the Risorgimento. Quite simply, this so-called unification did not reflect the reality of
the entirely fragmented nature of Italy at that time—socially, culturally and economically.
And this could not have been more clearly articulated than through the stark division of
Italy into an industrial north and an agrarian south. Since the Italian Republic was largely
337 The problem of two Italys represents an excellent co cise treatment of the powerful role that hegemony
plays in obscuring power. Gramsci analyzes what he beli ves are the unique historical features of 
Italian life that have contributed to uneven development within Italy. 
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a product of the north, and particularly that northe n industrial city of Turin characterized
by the Fiat  Plant,  it  drew attention to the tension that  existed between what Richard
Bellamy  called  a  'legal'  Italy  and  a  'real'  Italy.  Gramsci  believed  that  this  tension
represented the key obstacle to the socialist efforts t  build class alliances. It is through
his analysis of the southern question that Gramsci sketches out his understanding of the
contours of power that lie behind these divisions ad that maintain bourgeois capitalism.  
To illustrate this point Gramsci engages with one of the dominant social and political
issues of his day—one that persists even in today's Italy—that of the great division of
between the industrial north of Italy and the agrarian south. These divisions have been
recognized in Italy as perhaps beginning with the different political roots of the regions,
namely the long republican tradition that was preval nt in the north versus the status of
the south under the Kingdoms of Naples and the Two Sicilies, who were variously under
the imperial  influence of  the French and Spanish.  However,  this  division was  made
starkly clear  in the time following Italian unification and especially during the rapid
industrialization of the north following World War I. This industrialization process was
limited largely to the north, and particularly the great industrial city of Turin. For most of
Italy, and particularly in the south, there was little change and life remained heavily rural,
agrarian, and decidedly “servile” in its mentality. This is a term with which Gobetti and
later  Rosselli  both  refer  to  the  Italian  masses.  It was  only  owing  to  the  workers'
movement, a spontaneous movement in the Turin, thatin the words of Gobetti,  they
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unleashed their “free, revolutionary wills”.338
For Gramsci,  the bourgeoisie of  the industrial  north was not  only subjugating Italy's
industrial proletariat, but the peasants of the south as well. “The bourgeoisie of the North
has subjected southern Italy and the Islands and reduced them to the status of exploited
colonies.”339 Like Gobetti and Rosselli, Gramsci saw in the workers' movement in Turin
the only viable solution to this problem. Only the industrial  proletariat  were seen as
capable of providing leadership in the name of “the general revolutionary action of the
two allied classes.”340 This was essential because it would not be possible to sustain a
revolution without a workers majority, this much was known to Marx as well. Therefore,
it was the job of the Italian communists to build a “political alliance between the workers
of  the  North  and  the  peasants  of  the  South  to  overthrow  the  state  power  of  the
bourgeoisie.”341 For Gramsci, Lenin represented the “most recent great theoretician” of
the philosophy of praxis, moving away from economism and toward a theory of action.342
Leninist revolutionary theory argues that the industrial proletariat—led by a vanguard
party—was to lead the masses to the dictatorship of the proletariat. Gramsci expected the
proletariat to play a similarly revolutionary role; however, where he differs from Lenin is
in the means by which this vanguard led. For Lenin the role of the vanguard was to
educate the workers and peasants from outside; however, this was an entirely different
338 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 126.
339 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 28.
340 Ibid., 30.
341 Ibid., 29.
342 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 
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understanding of  education  than  that  which  Gramsci  advocated.  For  Gramsci  it  was
important that this educative process was not in itself manipulative. This is not to say that
Gramsci  rejected  the  old  Marxist-Leninist  goal  of  building  a  revolution  through  the
achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but rather that the success of such a
revolution relied heavily on a recognition of the maningful historically produced cultural
and regional particularities. He advocated a contingent understanding of the 'truth'  of
Marxism such that it was only 'true' insofar as it constituted the best expression of its
historical context. Marxism without determinism. In this sense, Gramsci did not seek to
transcend Marxism so much as he sought to extend Marxism, pushing it into areas on the
periphery of  the advanced capitalist  state, making it  more adaptive.  Richard Bellamy
argued  in  favor  of  this  historicist  perspective  in  1994,  shortly  after  the  collapse  of
Communism in  the east  and the subsequent  loss of  the 'allure'  of  Euro-communism.
“There was always a certain incongruity about the fact  that a certain champion of a
revised Marxism suited to the advanced economies and political systems of the West
came from a peripheral region of one of the West's lea t industrialized nations and most
fragile  liberal  democracies.”343 Bellamy argued,  and I  agree, that  the great  benefit  of
reading Gramsci’s early works—such as the Southern Question—is that “the frame of
reference of his ideas are harder to avoid.”344 Gramsci was not content to speak generally
of  “the revolution”,  but  rather  of  the how the revolution must  manifest  itself  in  the
particular context of Italy. There was no general formula, history and context mattered.
He was not content to speak of the agrarian question in general, or of combined and
343 Gramsci and Bellamy, Antonio Gramsci, x.
344 Ibid.
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uneven development in general—it was a problem of the Italian national political context.
Thus, Gramsci's answers to this question focused on national specificity, and offered a
way of theorizing such specificity in the context of hegemonic struggle. And his response
was, as much as the problem itself, a product of Italian context.
Where earlier socialist movements were content to focus on the industrial proletariat, or
the southern peasants alone, it  was Gramsci who first theorized the necessity of their
solidarity. It required Gramsci to completely rethink—as has the other 'reformists' and
activists like Gobetti and particularly Rosselli—the relationship of Marx and all of the so-
called subaltern classes. Gramsci argued that it was not the industrial proletariat alone
that ought to be enlisted in the struggle, but the peasants as well who had shared interest
with the workers in dismantling what Gramsci perceived as parasitic system of bourgeois
banks and industry. And it was the task of the workers to guide them in this effort. This
was outlined in the journal L'Ordine Nuovo, in January 1920:
In imposing workers' control over industry,  the proletariat will  direct industry
towards the production of agricultural machinery for the peasants, of textiles and
shoes for the peasants, and of electrical energy for the peasants; it will prevent
industry and the banks carrying out any further exploitation of the peasants and
chaining them like slaves to their strongboxes. In breaking up the autocracy in
the factories,  destroying  the  oppressive  apparatus  of  the  capitalist  State,  and
installing the workers' State, which will subject capitalists to the laws of useful
work, the workers will break all the chains which bind the peasant to poverty and
despair; in installing the workers' dictatorship, having in its hands industry and
the banks, the proletariat will direct the enormous power of state organization
towards  helping  the  peasants  in  the  struggle  against  the  landowners,  against
nature  and  against  poverty;  it  will  give  credit  to  the  peasants,  institute  co-
operatives, guarantee personal security and property against plunderers, and carry
out  public  expenditure  for  development  and  irrigation.  It  will  do  all  of  this
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because it is in its own interest to direct industrial production towards the useful
aim of peace and brotherhood between town and country,  between North and
South.345
In presenting an argument favoring the creation of “a system of class alliances”—one that
is capable of mobilizing “the majority of the working population against capitalism and
the bourgeois State”—Gramsci  is  presenting an argument  about  hegemony and more
particularly and argument for developing a “hegemony f the proletariat.”346 But what is
it exactly that Gramsci means by hegemony? Owing in part to his place in the unique
cultural environment of Italy, Gramsci understood in a way that was entirely novel to the
communist  movement  at  the  time,  that  power  is  not  maintained  through  the  strict
domination of one group by another group through the use of violence and political and
economic coercion alone. The existing bourgeois hegemony relied on the manufacture of
“consent”  in  the  form of  a  “common culture”  maintained  by the  coercive  power  of
dominant economic and political power of a particular class. Gramsci maintained that it is
through the effective use of ideological weapons and the power inherent to a hegemonic
culture that power is quite often maintained through a good deal of 'consent' on the part
of the oppressed. That is, it is often the oppressed who are the greatest defenders of the
status quo. However, consent in this sense is highly contingent and relies heavily on
careful cultivation and maintenance through the consta t manipulation and tuning of the
relationship between those who govern and the governed. In western democracies, whole
industries are build on this task.347
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347 Jeffrey A. Winters, Oligarchy (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 21.
One such example is the wealth defense industry as outlined by Jeffrey Winters in his recent book 
Oligarchy. “Ideological dominance thus plays an important role f r oligarchs in defending their 
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In this case the class in question is that of the bourgeoisie. This power was supplemented
by the support of the masses who—to varying extents—reinforce bourgeois hegemony
through their adoption and support of, among other ings, the bourgeois narrative. The
fundamental  difference  between  the  hegemony  of  the  proletariat  and  that  of  the
bourgeoisie is that a proletarian hegemony, as conceived by Gramsci, is necessarily one
that  is  spontaneous  and  organic  to  the  masses,  and  is  therefore  absent  the  coercive
influence present in ideological narrative of bourgeois hegemony, which is fundamentally
maintained through manufactured consent. One of the concerns expressed by Gramsci—
as well as the other Italian antifascists—is that te old determinist Marxist system rested
on similar footing and so was also often relied on the use of physical violence. During the
early period of  capitalism it  appeared  clear  that  the use of  violence might  alone be
responsible  for  bourgeois  domination.  However,  Gramsci  prefigures  “post-Marxist”
analysis and demonstrates through his analysis of hegemony and the arrival of advanced
capitalism, and that domination is not achieved through physical violence alone. It  is
secured through a more complex inter-relationship of cultural,  economic and political
forces. Gramsci saw the embodiment of this complex structure in fascism, particularly in
fascism's ability to adapt itself and to incorporate disparate ideologies into itself. Gramsci
realized that it was not enough for a proletariat vanguard party to lead the masses. Havel
would idenitfy the same mechanism under the communist “post-totalitarianism”. What
was  necessary to  combat  this  was  for  the  revolutionary party  to  adopt  an  inclusive
material dominance,” says Winters, “there should be no illusions. All such theories, ideologies, and 
norms serving to secure property claims...are erectd ultimately on coercive capacities.”
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national strategy of solidarity in the effort to unite northern workers and southern farmers
against fascism and capitalism. 
Gramsci articulates the challenges faced in such ideological struggle when he describes
the interaction between a Sardinian peasant and soldier sent to Turin as part of a regiment
called  to  put  down a workers’ strike.  For  the Sardinian,  all  the strikers  are,  to  him,
members of the 'gentry' earning wages that far exceed that of the poor 'country-folk' in
Sardinia. Ideology is therefore embedded in the uncons ious minds of the masses through
the effective use of propaganda and the manipulation of culture, and in the process they
begin to incorporate the values and interests of those who are in a position of authority. In
this manner, authority is maintained by the ruling power remaining sufficiently flexible;
able to adapt to changing conditions and modify it tac ics. The politics of resistance must,
therefore, remain similarly adaptive if it is to besuccessful. Gobetti recognized this as a
problem as well, pointing out that Fascism was successful in part because of its ability to
improvise  and adapt  to  fit  circumstances.348 It  was  this  quality  that  made bourgeois
capitalism such a formidable enemy. Through the state, bourgeois capitalism was able to
maintain its control by influencing and shaping them ntality of the masses through a
highly efficient use of propaganda that is constantly shifting over the uneven terrain of
political life. Such is the effectiveness of these fforts that often what can appear on first
glance  to  be  the  free  expression  of  one’s  interests and  desires  can,  on  further
investigation, reveal itself to be the unconscious influence of state power, as was the case
348 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 215.
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with the Sassari brigade. However, this process isn't entirely one way and often it is the
case that some values of the masses are absorbed into the dominant culture. The nature of
power is in this sense reflexive and fluid and Gramsci argues, therefore, that power is
never something that  is  secure or finally achieved, rather is  it  a perpetual  process.349
Because of this incessant activity, Gramsci rejects the notion that power is ever secured
or fixed;  moreover,  that there is  even any finally achievable political  end. Politics is
therefore best understood as the process whereby thory is put in the service of practice,
and constantly reshaped by the reflexive experience of history and hegemonic struggle. 
But then the northern worker—also from Sardinia—argues that he too is poor, and though
he may earn far more than the Sardinian peasant, they both share a mutual enemy in the
capitalists.
Were these events without consequences? No, they had results which still persist
today and continue to operate in the heart of the masses. In a flash they lit up
brains  which  has  never  thought  in  such  a  way  before and  which  remained
impressed and radically changed.350
In this sense the struggle that is to be undertaken by the proletariat, if they are to mobilize
the majority of the working population, is one of education. Here, it is important to make
349 Consider for example the example of something as pre umably benign as the notion of “American 
food”. What American food is, is not something absolute and definitive, rather it represents the tastes 
and cultural traditions of the majority, and yet these tastes are preserved through the process of 
acculturation, both passive in the manner of family cooking, etc. as well as more aggressive forms of 
marketing and exercise of state power. However, such is the case that what we call American food is 
changing. Inasmuch as the producers and advertisers of foodstuffs have an interest in selling their 
“American” food products, they recognize the existence and demands of non-traditional palettes. It is 
in this manner that we get for instance Jalapeno Ketchup; standing as example of both the hegemonic 
capacity of Ketchup, but also its vulnerability to the reflexive flow of power. 
350 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 35.
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the distinction between Gramscian and Leninist approaches, in which the educative task
is  does  not  come in  the  form of  an  ideological  pedagogy,  but  rather  to  stimulate  a
“process of inner liberation” and provide for “the working class's own expression of
itself.”351 For  Gramsci,  “the  first  problem  to  be  solved...was that  of  modifying  the
political orientation and general ideology of the proletariat itself, as a national element
which lives inside the complex of the life of the State and undergoes unconsciously the
influence of  the  schools,  of  the  newspapers,  of  the bourgeois  tradition.”352 This  was
fundamentally a process of self-examination and ultimately ideological  struggle.  This
amounted to nothing less than a theoretical coup, as it was simultaneously critical of the
bourgeois liberals as well as the socialists; thoug nlike Gobetti and Rosselli, Gramsci
sought  to preserve the centrality of  Marx through the creative reinterpretation of  the
dialectic Marx borrows from Hegel. It was a demonstration of Gramsci's understanding
of revolution as an act of moral will, not the result of deterministic economic laws. It was
a rejection of the positivist reading of Marx that championed self-emancipation on the
basis of individual will  and moral dedication, a distinctly humanist interpretation. For
Gobetti,  this  represented  a  significant  break  with  the  brand  of  socialism  that  had
dominated in Italy and had failed so completely in dealing with the old-style liberals and
their  eventual  capitulation to  the  fascists.  It  was a  program that  clearly rejected  the
bureaucratic model of Italian politics that favored the old political order (including the
socialists)  and demonstrated  the  need for  a  new political  order  in  Italy.  Despite  the




interest  in  socialism,  communism and  Marxism exists not  so  much  in  their  various
political doctrines, but only insofar as they contribute to advancing his principle of a
politics  characterized by creative autonomy,  which he understood as a fundamentally
liberal task. ‘‘The outcome doesn’t concern me because I accept it as the measure of my
action... The goal: to be everywhere oneself.”353
For Gramsci, Gobetti represented just the kind of left leaning liberal intellectual that the
left  movement required,  as his program to reform Italian society and political culture
dovetailed well with his theory of hegemony. For Gramsci, hegemony was something
more that merely the guiding leadership of a movement, or even the domination of a
particular  ideological  conception.  It  was  a  combination  of  cultural  and  political
domination, wholesale, of one class over the others. This came in the form of politics and
morality  it  was  not  through  force  alone.  In  a  significant  sense,  it  was  through  the
cultivated  “consent”  of  the  masses,  and  the  careful cultivation  of  culture,  etc.,  that
hegemony was reinforced at the hands of the coercive use of economic, cultural, and
political power of the bourgeoisie. Gobetti recognized that a new class of intellectuals
was  necessary in  order  to  establish  a  new Italy,  that is  break  the  hegemony of  the
bourgeoisie and establish a counter-hegemony rooted in the masses.  Central to Gobetti's
liberalism—as  it  is  to  Gramsci  political  theory—is  the  need  for  a  revolutionary
movement “from below” and for an elite to emerge from below to become the leadership
for the revolution. This established a strong mutual impression that would endure and
353 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution.
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find itself reflected in both Gramsci and Gobetti's analysis into the crisis of the liberal
state. While there are evidently considerable similarities in the analysis' of both of these
thinkers,  it  is  not  a  point  that  should  be  overstated  as  there  remains  considerable
differences between the two as well. While Gobetti's liberalism is a radical deviation
from traditional Italian liberalism, his analysis remains one that is firmly ensconced in
liberalism. The same cannot be said for Gramsci, who through all is critiques remains a
committed—at least in principle—Marxist.
Philosophy As “Soul-Making”
Marx's famous passage from his Theses on Feuerbach on interpreting the world versus
changing it runs deep through Gramsci's own interpretation of the 'philosophy of praxis',
in which understanding the world properly and transforming it is a unified task.354 For
Gramsci, these have become fused in political action, in the “passive war” that marks
hegemonic  struggle  until  “one  system of  social  relations  disintegrates  and  falls  and
another arises and asserts itself”.355 This historical conception of human life and politics
led  Gramsci  to  develop  an  understanding  of  the  'lifblood  of  Marx'  as  being  the
'philosophy of praxis' and his recognition of the ned for a “new type of man and of
citizen” with “the will to construct within the husk of political Society a complex and
well-articulated civil society, in which the individual can govern himself without his self-
government thereby entering into conflict with political society, but rather becoming its
354 Marx and Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 145.
355 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 119.
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normal  continuation,  its  organic  complement.”356 While  Gramsci  was  committed  to
understanding his 'philosophy of praxis' in the context of a reinterpretation of Marx, we
can observe in the shared resolve of his fellow antifascists that Gramsci's position relied
less on the necessity of a Marx 'well-understood', but in an active and vital commitment
to liberal autonomy well-understood, as Rosselli would argue, as a 'method' in service to
a socialist end.357 It is a thoroughly modern re-articulation of a profoundly revolutionary
position first articulated in the liberal-humanist oration of Pico della Mirandola on the
dignity of man.358 Interestingly, this idea of 'dignity' so clearly aligned with the liberal-
humanist  departure from a more doctrinaire Church and so clearly asserted with  the
Reformation was only revisited openly in an Italy that was never able to complete the
break owing to its unique relationship with a powerful and influential Catholic Church.359
It would take centuries under the isolating collective experience of Catholic paternalism,
the demoralizing experience of failed revolutions, the First World War and the rise of
Fascism for them to rediscover this essential element of human life.360
356 Ibid., 268.
357 Rosselli, Liberal Socialism, xlii.
In her introduction to Rosselli's Liberal Socialism, Nadia Urbinati notes that “both Gramsci and 
Rosselli felt the need to overcome the abstract universalism of class theory. It is for this reason that 
they abandon a doctrinaire Marxism in favor of the “m thod of class struggle” he first theorized. 
However where Rosselli was happy to “overcome Marxism”, Gramsci was resolved to resuscitate it.
358 Here I only mean to suggest that we can draw a connection between the 'emancipatory' liberal-
humanist position of the early Italian Renaissance and its attempt to insert human autonomy into 
history as a break from the doctrinaire Catholic Churc . Mirandola's 'Oration on the Dignity of Man' 
would assert the greatness of human achievement as function of free-will and man's capacity for self-
determination. 
359 Gramsci's reading of Machiavelli clearly sees in the Florentine clerk the glowing embers of this 
revolutionary task, that was otherwise suppressed. 
360 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution; Havel, Open Letters, 147.
It led Gobetti to what he understood as his ultimate “goal: to be everywhere oneself.” Havel—under 
the pressure of similar forces—would later punctuate his analysis of 'post-totalitarian' society declaring 
that the only way to successfully combat it was to 'live within the truth'. And which echos in the claims 
of protestors who today when challenged on the nature of their demands respond: “For you to join us!” 
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One  of  the  central  contributions  of  Gramsci  and  the Italian  Antifascists  is  the
reintroduction of the idea that man is capable of becoming a transformative force in his
own life, capable of shaping both his own character as well as the material conditions of
the world around him, an understanding of 'philosophy' that is inseparable from political
action.361 It  is an historical task  “undertaken by a specific class of  people to change,
correct or perfect the conceptions of the world that exist in any particular age and thus to
change the norms of conduct  that  go with them; in other words,  to change practical
activity as a whole.”362 And the task of  cultivating 'conceptions of the world'  is  best
understood as  a  'practice'  centered  on  “developing  the  element  of  independent
responsibility  in  each  individual.”363 Gramsci's  call  for  a  personal  and  independent
responsibility informs the vital role of intellectuals in contributing to the awakening of
the political consciousness of the proletariat and by extension society as a whole. As
Walter Adamson argues in his book  Hegemony and Revolution,  this leads to a much
broader definition of intellectual than what we mean in our everyday use.364 This suggests
that Gramsci's greatest contribution exists in his realization that the dominance of the
bourgeoisie is not nearly so inevitable as Marx or others might have imagined to begin
361 It is a concept that is notable as least as far back as Socractes and the Apology. Socrates suggests the 
existence of a perpetual struggle exists between power, authority and the interested defense—without 
reflection—of the status quo, with that of wisdom and reason. For Socrates as well as Gramsci the 
prefered weapon of that struggle is 'philosophy'. Interestingly, there is no suggestion on Socrates' part 
that philosophy—as he practices and advocates it—will ever 'win' insofar that it will bring to power a 
single definitive regime. Socrates eludes to this in an earlier dialogue with Euthyphro in which the 
conversation suggests that perhaps there is no essential nature or unrivaled ideology, only the 
continuing task of resistance against any ideology that would claim such complete power. This 
perspective differs considerably from Plato's account of politics in The Republic.
362 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 344.
363 Ibid., 32.
364 Walter L. Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci’s Political and Cultural 
Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 143.
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with,  it  was neither determined or permanent. The hegemony of the bourgeoisie was
rather the result of substantial organization and cons ious effort; and that while pervasive
and resilient, can be contested through philosophy understood as practice. Gramsci points
to the inability of the Risorgimento in Italy to unite the people around the bourgeois class
as “the cause of its defeats and the interruptions in it  development.”365 For Gramsci, this
is proof that bourgeois hegemony is not assured. In the attending note Gramsci argues
that in order to become truly hegemonic one must transcend the 'economic-corporate
phase'  and create  a state,  which necessarily requires the  'consent  of  the governed'  a
process that requires an extended notion of the intellec ual or philosopher as politician, or
“as  a  transmitter  of  ideas  within  civil  society  and between  government  and  civil
society.”366 Gramsci sought to snap the masses, and particularly individuals, out of their
social,  moral  and  political  passivity  and  submissiveness.  Italy's  unique  historical
conditions had made them susceptible to paternalism and dogmatism that did more to
reinforce rather than relieve the Italian people of their chains, but it also gave them a
unique insight into the influence of ideology and hegemony (vis-à-vis the Church). The
failures of socialism, which had promised transformation but failed to halt the progress
fascism, had to be accounted for if it was to remain attractive and relevant even as Italy's
young intellectuals began to abandon it. Gramsci sought out a method or strategy for
overcoming a Marxism that had ossified and ceased to be revolutionary in character. The
problem begins with  ideology, what Gramsci would closely connect to philosophy and
the creation of a world-view and the development of “c mmon-sense”, particularly the
365 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 53.
366 Ibid.; Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution, 143.
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ideology associated with the ruling class. It is emb dded in the unconscious minds of the
masses through the use of propaganda and the manipulation of culture, and that through
this process the masses incorporate the values and interests of those who are in a position
of authority. However, as discussed earlier, this process isn't entirely one way and often it
is the case that some values of the masses bleed into the dominant culture. The nature of
power is in this sense, even if only marginally so,is reflexive and fluid and Gramsci
argues, therefore, that power is never something that is secure or finally achieved, rather
is it a perpetual process and it is something that needs to be maintained. 
In  The Southern Question Gramsci  illustrates his  point  with  several  examples of  the
power of ideology in the service of bourgeois hegemony. First, among the masses of the
North, is the myth of southern inferiority characteriz d by a kind of colonial ideology
known as southernism, which characterizes the South as a “lead weight which impedes a
more rapid civil development of Italy; the southerners are biologically inferior beings,
semi-barbarians or complete barbarians by natural destiny; if the South is backward, the
fault is not in the capitalist system or in any other historical cause, but is the fault of
nature which has made the southerner lazy, incapable, criminal,  barbarous.”367 To this
end,  Gramsci  accused  the  Socialist  Party  of  itself  “being  the  vehicle  of  bourgeois
propaganda” in that they had not rejected these values.368 Second, is the use of blocs to
establish social, cultural, and political alignments that favor bourgeois hegemony. Among
the peasants of the South, there is an effort to establi h a prevailing sense of regionalism
367 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 31.
368 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 31.
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as  an  alternative  to  any  system of  class  alliance  that might  advantage  the  peasants
themselves. Gramsci describes the situation in which the “Young Sardinia” movement, a
Southern socialist group, sought to unite the peasants and the gentry in the name of their
local grievances against the State into a regional bloc, selling in part the illusion of the
unified interests of the southern peasants with that of the landowners and gentry. This was
maintained in the name of regionalism, a petty natio list ideology that peddles among
the peasants  “inflammatory  and rhetorical  discourse...with  all  the  frills  of  provincial
oratory,” conjuring up “the memory of past sufferings” and “the idea of a compact bloc of
the noble sons.”369All  this in the hope of returning to a “more prosperous and richer
country which offered prospects of livelihood, even though of a modest kind.”370 It is not
the landowners and local capitalists who are to blame, or so the argument goes, but the
unfamiliar  outsiders.371 Thus,  the  peasants  are  actually  kept  in  service  to the  local
landlords, who are in turn in league with the Northe n capitalists, all the while dividing
the subjugated masses against each other. The masses of peasants were hammered to
ideological conformity through the concession of political ground to intellectual elites.
However, this also works against those few organic intellectuals that would try to emerge
and challenge the power of these blocs. Gramsci points ut that while “there exist great
accumulations of culture and intelligence in single individuals or in restricted groups of
369 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 34.
370 Ibid., 33.
371 This kind of effort to establish a regional bloc was also a familiar tactic taken in the attempt to preserve
the ideological hegemony of institutional racism as the United States faced its own “Southern question”
during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s. I am reminded in part of the Bob Dylan 
song “Only a Pawn in Their Game”(1964) recounting the assassination of Medgar Evers, in which 
Dylan speaks of creation of a regional bloc comprised of southern political elites and poor southern 
whites on the basis of ideological racism. However, Dylan suggests in his description of these poor 
whites as pawns in a wider political game, that their authentic interests perhaps lie closer to the blacks 
with whom they share an impoverished, if only marginally better, existence. 
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top intellectuals, there exists no organization of average culture.”372 This means that the
most prominent southern alternative intellectuals were compelled to abandon the south
for the north in order to find work. But even where th y could find themselves welcomed
into circles outside of the southern bloc, they were compelled to do so in an environment
tainted by “southernism” in which the “presentation f the southern problem should not
exceed certain limits”, that is it should “not become revolutionary.”373
Another similar challenge facing the working classes is something Gramsci refers to as
“bourgeois democracy” which he argues characterizes th  “bourgeois state system.”374
Primary among the tactics used to stunt mass action by the working class is the use of
political blocs to exploit perceived or even cultivated divisions. The successful creation
of these political blocs results in what Gramsci describes as a kind of domestication of
the workers or working classes. The greatest example of which was the defeat of the
workers movement at Fiat factory in Turin. 
Giolitti wants to domesticate the workers of Turin. He has defeated them twice…
both times with the help of  the General Confederation of Labour,  that  is,  of
corporative reformism. He now thinks that he can bri g them into the framework
of the bourgeois state system.375
Here Gramsci is alluding to not just the class alliances fostered through a state union (the
General Confederation of Labor) but it also points to the vital role that intellectuals play
in  guarding  against  this  dangerous  variety  of  “class  co-operation”  in  which  the





“proletariat will no longer exist as an independent class but only as an appendage of the
bourgeois State.”376 This is further exacerbated by efforts on the part of he dominant
national industrial bloc of the capitalists and theindustrial workers who, through the use
of propaganda and the careful manipulation of culture, both divide the industrial workers
internally through distinctions between trades, crafts, and professions and simultaneously
bind them to the framework of the bourgeois state system through collaboration in the
form of state controlled trade-unions. Divisions between northern and southern workers
are also reinforced through similar means of social m nipulation. Therefore, managing or
controlling  the means  of  social  manipulation  by which  power  is  preserved becomes
central to the revolutionary task and it is a process that requires constant vigilance and
maintenance. While this critique was readily observed in the case of capitalist attempts to
subvert the workers, Gramsci also saw this as a fundamental limitation within the existing
Italian socialist movement as well. This kind of laying of the blame squarely at the feet of
both the 'liberals' and the 'socialists' invokes the likes of Gobetti and Rosselli, but also
recalls Vico who declared in his  New Science that “the civil world itself has certainly
been  made  by  men,  and  that  its  principles  therefore can,  because  they  must,  be
rediscovered within the modification of our own human mind.”377 In this manner he is
confirming the definite connection that can and must exist between philosophy, that act of
rediscovering the modifications of the human mind a politics and the making of our
civil world. It is not enough therefore to point to the bourgeoisie of the north and call out:
“Oppressor!”  It  was  also  necessary  to  look  inward  and  engage  in  process  of  self-
376 Ibid.
377 Vico, Vico, 198.
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examination. And education plays a key role in, “developing the element of independent
responsibility  in  each  individual.”378 The role  of  the  proletariat  then  is  to  engage  in
hegemonic struggle,  the proletarian intellectual  is a vehicle for class elaboration,  and
philosophy as the practice of that elaboration. 
The proletariat,  in  order  to  be able  to  rule  as  a  class,  must  rid  itself  of  all
corporative hangovers, of all syndicalist prejudices and incrustations. What does
this mean? That not only must the distinctions which exist between trades and
crafts be overcome, but that it is necessary, in order to win the trust and consent
of the peasants and of the semi-proletarian categories in the cities, to overcome
prejudices and conquer certain egoist traits which can exist and do exist in the
working  class as such,  even when craft  particularism has disappear  from its
midst. The metalworkers, the joiners, the builders, tc., must not only think as
proletarians and no longer as metalworkers, joiners or builders, but they must
take a step forward: they must think as members of a class which aims at leading
the peasants and the intellectuals, of a class which can conquer and can build
socialism only if aided and followed by the great majority of these social strata.
If it does not do this, the proletariat does not become a leading class, and these
strata,  who  in  Italy  represent  the  majority  of  the  population,  remain  under
bourgeois  leadership,  and  give  the  State  the  possibility  of  resisting  and
weakening the proletarian attack.379
Simply put,  the  workers  much come to  recognize their  status  as  the  product  of  the
manipulation of the historically dominant hegemony. As such, the accepted world-view is
neither natural, nor determined by external laws; but rather the product of specific actions
informed by ideological  class interests. This leads Gramsci to develop an analysis of
intellectuals as specific, or organic, to each class nd a category that is central to the
organization of society and especially to the entrenchment of their own specific class. It is
378 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 32.
379 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 36.
170
through their efforts that the ideological dominance of a single “philosophy” or world-
view is  maintained.  In  this  manner  we are  all  subject  to  the influence of  this  well-
provisioned agent of ideological domination.  
The task of the revolutionary is, therefore, that of breaking the hold of ideology over the
masses  as  propagated  by  the  hegemonic  order,  but  how  is  it  that  we  can  come to
recognize  “truth”  and  step  out  from  under  the  influence  of  ideology.  This  political
problem was most notably elaborated upon by Plato in his famous “Allegory of  the
Cave”, but also taken up by the antifascists who themselves recognized the dangerous
influence of ideology. For Plato, the task of a philosopher—one who pursues wisdom and
knowledge through reflection—was extremely difficult and a job that not anyone was
capable of doing. Only a particular class of indiviuals were understood to be capable. It
is philosopher king who will lead the others out from the cave under the guidance of their
special  access  to  truth.  For  Plato  this  did  not  represent  a  political  problem because
intellectual activity and philosophy itself was understood to be an objective activity; that
is, an activity as we as a class that is independent and exists outside the traditionally
recognized class structure. Cartesian scientism assumed a similarly objective position,
ignoring its role as a component of the class-structu e. Gramsci argues that philosophy
and  intellectuals—Platonic,  Cartesian,  or  otherwise—are  not  independent  and  are
elemental components of the class into which they ar  born and sustained.380 Gramsci
describes these intellectuals as “organic”, describing a very intimate relationship between
380 Ibid., 118.
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the intellectuals and the class of which they are part.  A critical point to make here is that
Gramsci is clear to point out that intellectuals that emerge in this manner, regardless of
their class affiliations, come to “see themselves as autonomous and independent of the
ruling social group.”381 That is, they see themselves as possessing access to knowledge
and  truth  independent  of  the  interests  of  ruling  class  to  which  they are  organically
connected to. Gramsci connects this to the idea of “social utopia”, which is, at is base, a
kind of illusion.  These kinds of intellectuals,  he argues,  are always connected to the
interests of the class itself, by definition. And this presents a critical problem for any
conception of life that sees individual autonomy a key component to securing freedom.
Central to the political theory of antifascists like Gramsci was that the path from the
metaphorical cave, though perhaps aided by an elite or ruling-class, could not simply
become a function of an externally imposed ideology r elite.382 In principle “direction”
had to  be “spontaneous”  and “organic”  and  emerge  int rnally  from within  the class
themselves.  The  problem  is  that  most  people  have  been  conditioned  to  understand
philosophy as “something which is very difficult because it is the intellectual activity of a
specific category of specialist scholars or of professional and systematic philosophers.”383
It  is something that stands out of reach of the great masses of people and ultimately
makes subjects out of citizens. This understanding of philosophy represents a political
problem  for  Gramsci,  who  responds  with  the  famous  claim  that  all  men  are
“philosophers” and “intellectuals”, posing the following question:384
381 Ibid., 120.
382 Jacobitti, Revolutionary Humanism and Historicism in Modern Italy, 145.
383 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 58.
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Is it preferable to “think” without having critical awareness, in a disjointed and
irregular  way,  in  other  words  to  “participate”  in  a conception  of  the  world
“imposed” mechanically by external environment, that is, by one of the many
social  groups in  which everyone is  automatically involved  from the time he
enters the conscious world; or is it preferable to work out one's own conception
of the world consciously and critically, and so out f  this work of one's own
sphere of activity, to participate actively in making the history of the world, and
not  simply  to  accept  passively  and  without  care  theimprint  of  one's  own
personality from outside?385 
The choice  for  Gramsci  is  clear.  He first  argues  that  everyone  always  belongs  to  a
particular group that shapes one's way of thinking a d working. First and foremost, man
is a conformist, what he refers to as a “man-mass”.386 And, in fact, most belong to several
different “man-masses” and this is what leads to the incoherence of peoples' personalities
and personal conceptions of the world. And, to a great extent, this cannot be avoided.
What is important is that individuals must come to recognize this, so it then becomes
ones  task to  “know thyself”  and  come to  recognize  yourself  “as  the product  of  the
historical process which has left on you an infinity of traces gathered together without the
advantage of an inventory”.387 Taking this inventory is the most essential step in realizing
an organic conception of the world. This entails rigo ous self-examination and criticism
of ones own conceptions of the world and the attemp to “make it coherent and unified.”
Because “philosophy can't be separated from the history of philosophy nor culture from
the history of culture,” for one to properly be a philosopher, that is have a “critically
coherent conception of the world” one much have an awareness of the role that culture






in language. Gramsci adds, “if  it  is true that any language contains the elements of a
conception of the world and of a culture, it will aso be true that the greater or lesser
complexities of a person's conception of the world can be judged from his language.”389
Philosophy is thus connected with the process by which one comes to think about and
conduct  oneself  in  social  life.  Consequently,  it  constitutes  a  polemic  with  "common
sense" and is linked to the effort to change the conception of the world expressed in
"common sense". Or, does it remain "the intellectual activity of a specific category", a
matter reserved for “specialist scholars or of professional and systematic philosophers."390
"The relation between common sense and the upper lev l of philosophy is assured by
'politics'."391
Gramsci  then  stresses  that  “all  men are  intellectuals,..  but  all  men  do  not  have the
function of intellectuals in society.” What Gramsci is pointing to is the existence of an
artificial divide between what we call “intellectual” nd “non-intellectual.” When we say
“intellectual” Gramsci says what we really mean is “professional intellectual”, that is, we
are referring to  those individuals  in  a  society or  particular  “system”  [Capitalism for
instance]  that  perform the “immediate social  function of the category of  professional
intellectuals.” In this case we might refer back to the clergy or even military specialists as
the professional intellectuals of the feudal system. In the capitalist system, the organic





we now associate with the “culture industry”.392 Conceding the authenticity of intellectual
activity  and  philosophy to  this  category of  “professionals”  represents  a  considerable
victory for the dominant hegemony.393 While other members of society not involved in
this  professional  intellectual  activity  engage  in  “muscular  nervous  effort”  or  labor,
Gramsci argues that even these categories still require some degree of intellectual effort.
And so, it is not right to say that there are “non-intellectuals” as such, but rather that they
are engaging in “different levels of specific intellectual activity.” For Gramsci, “there is
no human activity from which all intellectual interv ntion can be excluded—homo faber
cannot  be  separated  from  homo  sapiens.”  Every  man,  therefore,  “develops  some
intellectual activity; he is, in other words, a ‘philosopher,’ an artist, a man of taste, he
shares a conception of  the world,  he has a conscious l ne of  moral  conduct,  and so
contributes towards maintaining or changing a conception of the world.” Gramsci argues
that  what  is  necessary—in  the  case  of  the  proletariat  at  least—is  to  change  the
relationship of that intellectual activity with the “muscular-nervous effort” and move it
towards a “new equilibrium”. Because it is this “musc lar-nervous effort” that is actually
“perpetually  changing  the  physical  and  social  world”  it  is  important  to  break  its
connection  with  the  ‘professional  intellectuals’ [of  the  old  class  order]  in  order  to
“become the foundation of a new and integral conception of the world,” that is, create a
new alternative  or  counter-hegemony.394 Religion  and common sense are  resistant  to
392 Adamson, Hegemony and Revolution, 143.
393 A. J Liebling, The Most of A.J. Liebling. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), 158.
Here I am reminded of a brief essay by the journalist nd media critic A.J. Liebling who on the matter 
of “experts” in the press cautioned against conceding their ground. “One the position is conceded, the 
expert can put on a better show than the reporter. All is manifest to him, since his conclusions are not 
limited by his powers of observation.” A similar concession of ground to professional intellectuals 
invites the same disadvantage made all the more dangerous given the stakes at hand.
394 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 121–122.
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philosophy precisely because philosophy seeks to establish unity or coherence in our
conception of the world, what Gramsci calls “critical self-consciousness.”395He argues
that  where  it  is  impossible  to  establish  such  unity 'freely'  it  can  be  imposed
'authoritatively',  which is  to  say imposed top down u der  the  protection  of  law and
exercise of violence and coercion. This is the problem that Gramsci, Gobetti, Rosselli and
Croce observed in  the  legacy of  the  Church  and that t ey see in  the  emergence of
Fascism. It is also the problem that Havel would later identify under post-totalitarianism.
This points to what Gramsci identifies as “the fundamental problem of every conception
of  the  world  view,  of  every  philosophy which  has  become a  cultural  movement,  a
“religion”, a “faith”,  in other words, which has led to practical  practical  activity and
volition,  in which it  appears as an implied theoretical  “premise””.396 This  theoretical
premise,  says Gramsci, is what we call  ideology.  The problem that every world view
faces when it is reduced to such theoretical premiss  the preservation of ideological
unity, especially as expressed within a given social bloc and it is for this reason that we
cannot separate philosophy from politics. It is also the reason why Gramsci turns to self-
examination and civil society as the proper terrain for resistance and revolution.  
Closing Gramsci
Gramsci makes a transformative break with the traditional concept of the philosopher and
intellectual and theorizes two distinct categories of intellectual that exist in opposition




their own ideological terrains—presided over by a particular 'common sense'—as well as
the 'superstructures' of both civil  society and political society. On the one hand is the
'traditional'  intellectual,  which  was  once  'spontaneous'  to  its  own  class  and  is,  by
definition, set against the newly emerging 'spontaneous' intellectual. This has also been
understood as an 'organic' intellectual in other translations. The organic intellectuals is
that  category of  intellectual  that  emerges with  and from the revolutionary class.  For
Gramsci this new intellectual class must emerge from the workers, the proletariat. While
he recognizes that all people are in practice intellectuals, Gramsci further explains that
only some people can perform the functions and exercise the status of intellectuals in
society. This leads to a struggle between these competing categories for control. This is
most  visibly  recognized  in  the  struggle  between  theintellectuals  that  support  the
institutions  of  the  state  and  its  attendant  lines  of  power—those  'experts'  and
'professionals'  of  bourgeois capitalism—and the 'intellectuals'  of the subaltern classes,
which are often not recognized as such.  It becomes the task of the newly formed organic
intellectual to push against countervailing forces and work to develop the progressive
aspects of their given classes' 'common sense' therby creating new spheres of competing
power, the object of which is the complete restructuring of that given society. It becomes
a tactical  expression of the role of the intellectual in hegemonic struggle.  The result,
while  perhaps  not  explicit,  is  a  constantly  contested  boundary  between  the  classes
whereby the contours of the hegemony are shaped. 
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I  believe that  such a reading, which would be familiar  to  those acquainted with the
broader Vician inspired Italian Antifascist movement, is vital to understanding Gramsci's
contributions to a conversation that came to dominate much of modern political thought
regarding man's role in the construction of human life, especially what Gramsci called
'everyday life' and the role of men and women as indiv duals and members of societies in
the making of that life. It is a conversation that in this particular context took place in
Italy under conditions unique at the time in Europe, and had begun, as we have seen, at
least with Vico in the eighteenth century who challenged the assumption of the Cartesian
position as illustrated in the first  chapter makes it  clear that man is empowered only
insofar as he might  be shown his  chains,  the narrative of  which—when accepted as
natural  law—becomes  the  stuff  of  ideology.  Political  action  under  such  terms  are
accepted  only where they recognize the accepted order.  In  the fields of  physics  and
chemistry such an approach has yielded profound results that have expanded dramatically
our understanding of the natural world. In politics and human life they have only yielded
the domination of one class or group over another. However, it reached its most dramatic
and  consequential  heights  during  the  Italian  antifasc st  movement  of  the  1920s  and
1930s, in the work of Benedetto Croce, Piero Gobetti, and Carlo Rosselli, and perhaps
especially Antonio Gramsci who provided the most developed analysis of the politics of
ideology. Furthermore, it was Gramsci who was best po itioned to serve as the vehicle
carrying these ideas beyond the confines of Italy. Gramsci refocuses attention on a wider
more fundamental  challenge to  the  dominant  theories of  history and knowledge that
underwrite  our  contemporary  politics,  completing  the  transition  from  Vico  and  the
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perception  of  Italian  anti-fascism  as  a  regional/national  theory  of  revolution  and
resistance  captured  in  the  work  of  Gobetti  and  Rosselli,  to  a  wider  international
perspective that includes figures like Vaclav Havel, Adam Michnik and George Konrad.
They would enter this conversation in their own right and where they could, contribute to
furthering a theory of  political  action that  could not  help but  reflect  a liberal  Italian
inheritance. This legacy is now being handed off to revolutionary movements across the
world as an alternative liberal tradition.
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Chapter 4: The Open (Liberal) Politics of East-European Dissent
Antonio Gramsci made it clear to intellectuals and ctivists alike what was first argued by
Vico some centuries before, that knowledge, and particularly our methods of acquiring
that knowledge has limits and so it is not possible for the many facets of human life and
the  natural  world  to  be  captured  under  a  single  unifying  principle.  Furthermore,  it
represented “the fundamental problem of every conception of the world view, of every
philosophy which  has become a  cultural  movement,  a “religion”,  a  “faith”,  in  other
words, which has led to practical activity and voliti n, in which it appears as an implied
theoretical  “premise”.”397 And the “problem of  conserving the ideological  unity of  a
whole social bloc which is held together and unified precisely by that ideology.”398 In this
sense, all ideologies seek to reinforce themselves through an imposition upon the masses
of  people  for  the  purposes  of  unifying  the  social  bloc  under  their  own  preferred
theoretical  premise.  The existence of  these competing ideologies  are  revealed in  the
“conflict between thought and actions, that is, the co-existence of two conceptions of the
world”.399 Such conflict or incoherence does not always represent ‘bad faith’ on the part
of the individual, but they do represent the degree to which that individual has passively
accepted or passively submitted in an unreflected manner to an imposed conception of
the world, which may in fact differ significantly from other assumed conceptions of the




400 Thomas Frank, What’s the Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the Heart of America (New 
York: Henry Holt, 2004), 67–68.
Consider the following example from the 2004 book What’s the Matter with Kansas? in which the 
author looks to Kansas, a state with a historical legacy of left-wing populism that  movement that might
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Gramsci outlined this process when he argued that the manner in which we all think,
work and live is shaped in large part through a reflexive relationship with the society in
which one lives. This isn't to say that we lack autonomy, only that we do not exist in the
world without context. Most importantly, our development is deeply influence by this
context. This leads Gramsci to the conclusion that most individuals belong to and are
shaped by several different—and even at times confli ti g—contexts. Gramsci focused
on the importance of recognizing this layered aspect of our nature and engaging in the
kind of work necessary to unpack those layers. The task is to “know thyself” and come to
recognize yourself “as the product  of the historical  process which has left  on you an
infinity  of  traces  gathered  together  without  the  advantage  of  an  inventory”.401 This
have been expected considering its rural and agrarian history. However, in recent decades Kansas has 
has become overwhelmingly conservative.
“Not long ago, Kansas would have responded to the current situation by making the bastards pay. This 
would have been a political certainty, as predictable s what happens when you touch a match to a 
puddle of gasoline. When business screwed the farmers and the workers – when it implemented 
monopoly strategies invasive beyond the Populists' furthest imaginings – when it ripped off 
shareholders and casually tossed thousands out of work – you could be damned sure about what would 
follow. Not these days. Out here the gravity of discontent pulls in only one direction: to the right, to the
right, further to the right. Strip today's Kansans of their job security, and they head out to become 
registered Republicans. Push them off their land, a next thing you know they're protesting in front f 
abortion clinics. Squander their life savings on manicures for the CEO, and there's a good chance 
they'll join the John Birch Society. But ask them about the remedies their ancestors proposed (unions, 
antitrust, public ownership), and you might as well b  referring to the days when knighthood was in 
flower.”
Why is this the case? Well, the author gives a rather elaborate explanation that goes into some detail 
about the machinations surrounding what he calls the ‘conservative coalition’. That is the bloc that is 
established between economic conservatives and social conservatives. Essentially, it describes a kind of
bait-and-switch tactic in which social conservatives appeal to voters on the basis of social issues—gay 
marriage, abortion, etc—then, when elected, they shift to more traditional economically conservative 
policy making. However, what this book doesn’t, or rather can’t, take into account is the dramatic way
in which this coalition or bloc has gone so far as to unify the positions openly. It is for this reason that 
we can see poor farmers who lose their farms to unscr pulous banking practices vote against stronger 
banking regulations. It is the successful practice of ideological manipulation and domination.
401 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 59.
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demands  rigorous  self-examination  and  self-criticism  and  ultimately  an  ethic  of
responsibility that was perhaps best captured by Havel whose particular liberalism called
for an “existential revolution” that he saw as “a responsibility of ours, although it looks a
little  different  in  different  places.  But  in  the  end,  it's  about  standing  up  for  your
principles, and vouching for your own truth.”402 Like the antifascists the anticommunist
dissidents understood their struggle to have been pr cipitated by deep moral crisis which
resulted  in  a  demoralized  humanity  that  needed  to  reclaim  its  dignity.  In  Liberal
Socialism Carlo  Rosselli  remarked  that  the  struggle  against  fa cism began  with  the
personal  project  of  restoring “dignity and responsibility,  the first  steps on the ladder
leading from slavery to liberty.”403 Piero Gobetti similarly argued that the rise of fascism
represented a “crisis of conscience” or a “crisis of inertia” that had deep roots in Italian
history.404 It  was  for  this  reason  that  the  Italian  antifascists,  especially  Gramsci,
understood that “philosophy can't be separated fromthe history of philosophy nor culture
from the history of culture.”405
The Italian Antifascists drew heavily from their Vician heritage, focusing on politics and
philosophy as a practice of self-examination and character formation. Their commitment
to human autonomy pushed them to focus their attention on what it was about Italian life
itself—what it was about themselves as a society—that contributed to the Italy's decline
into the oppressive totalitarian regime that was to define Italy for two decades. What they
understood immediately, in a way that others facing similarly oppressive regimes had not,
402 Havel, Michnik, and Matynia, An Uncanny Era, 157.
403 Rosselli, Liberal Socialism, 86.
404 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 11,109.
405 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 59.
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was the active role that Italian life itself, and their own historical “hand in history” had
played in creating the conditions that allowed fascism to take hold. fascism was not a
parenthesis, an anomaly, or an external force imposed upon Italy. It was, as Gobetti had
famously  asserted,  the  autobiography  of  the  nation. A d  it  was  only  after  the
demoralizing experience of an incomplete revolution in the Risorgimento, the suffering
of  the First  World  War and the rise of  fascism that the antifascists  rediscovered the
essential  tools  laid  out  by  Vico  to  aid  in  their  defense.  It  led  Gobetti  to  what  he
understood  as  his  ultimate  goal:  “to  be  everywhere  oneself.”406 Eastern-European
dissidents,  under  the  pressure  of  similar  forces  in their  struggle  against  communism
echoed this refrain.  Vaclav Havel  in particular would punctuate his analysis of  'post-
totalitarian' society declaring that the only way to successfully combat it was to  'live
within the truth'.407 This formed the core of Vaclav Havel politics, who wrote in 1991
shortly after assuming the first presidency of recently liberated Czechoslovakia:
As ridiculous or quixotic as it may sound these days, one thing seems certain to me:
that it is my responsibility to emphasize, again and gain, the moral origin of all
genuine  politics,  to  stress  the  significance  of  moral  values  and  standards  in  all
spheres of social life, including economics, and to explain that if we don't try, within
ourselves, to discover or rediscover or cultivate what I call “higher responsibility”,
things will turn out very badly indeed for our country.408
When Havel stresses the significance of morality he is not making a theological claim,
but rather a human one. It is a perspective that deeply connects a healthy political life
with an equally healthy spiritual life. This is because spiritual or even religious life plays
a significant role in grounding and shaping the world-view of a people. For Gramsci,
406 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, xi.
407 Havel, Open Letters, 147.
408 Vaáclav Havel, Summer Meditations (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1992), 1.
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language, “common sense” and “popular religion” all played a similar role in shaping
people's conception of the world.409 Polish philosopher Leszek Kolakowski argued that
since people are, in this sense historical, it is is the content of this this past that gives form
and content to their world-view.410 In an inventive retelling of the story of Lot and his
wife, written by Kolakowski in 1957, he reminds us that “we belong to the past, for we
are unable to change it, while it fills the whole of our existence.”411 It was for this reason
that Gramsci argued that philosophy and politics—and we might add history—could not
be separated.412 For Havel  and Kolakowski—as it  was for Vico and Gramsci—myth,
spirit, and even divine presence or popular religion represent key features of not just
identity, but of humanity itself. Such a relationship exposes an underlying tension that
permeates the secular modernity ushered in by Descart . While unwilling to forgo the
contributions of  Cartesian sciences  to  modernity Vico  observed within its  advance a
terrifying potential and cautioned its limits. By Gramsci and especially Havel's time this
threat had transformed into crisis, one that Havel observes as both social and ecological,
as well  as  political.  It  was this  perspective that  found its  way more widely into the
political  though  and  action  of  the  East  European  dissi ents  struggling  against  the
Communist system, seen in this light as ever bit a part of a modern world dominated by
science, technology and its rational and geometrical methods. For Havel, this “single,
common crisis” was nothing less than a “juggernaut of power”. This contributed to a
feeling  of  powerlessness  and  especially  hopelessnes among  those  living  under  the
communist  regimes  of  Poland and Czechoslovakia.  However,  it  was  was  the  Polish
409 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 58.
410 Kołakowski, Is God Happy?, 265.
411 Ibid., 311–312.
412 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 61.
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philosopher Leszek Kolakowski, in the influential essay 'Hope and Hopelessness' (1971),
who first argued that change in society was possible, ut only to “the extent to which
society believes that it is possible” and that as such, a society is “dependent in part on its
own self-image.”413
Developing an understanding of history free from ideological distortion became central to
cultivating this authentic self-image,  as it  was to the Italian antifascists before them.
History,  culture,  and an abiding respect  for  myth  and popular  religion—all  elements
rejected  by the  revolution  led  by Descartes—became vital to  preserving dignity and
humanity in the face of oppression.414 In his 1986 Jefferson Lecture Kolokowski added
that ''we learn history not to know how to behave or how to succeed, but to know who we
are.''  History is  therefore not to be dismissed in the pursuit  of  truth,  in lieu of  more
rational  methods,  as  Descartes and scientific  positivists  would assert,  but  is  rather  a
political task central to empowering an opposition and expressed “by living in dignity”.415
The Polish journalist and dissident Michnik further emphasized this in conjunction with
the social  and political  need for  a “new consciousnes  [to]  be  developed”,  in  effect
restoring the responsibility and dignity that had been stripped away by the experience of
communism.416 The Hungarian writer Gyorgy Konrad introduced an antipolitical program
the idea of which was “to encourage the internal emancipation of all those whom we
413 Leszek Kolakowski, “Hope and Hopelessness,” Survey 17, no. 3 (1971): 51.
414 Respect for myth and popular religion did not necessarily mean belief, rather an understanding of deep 
connection between this and popular culture, which along with language, contribute to the development
of a particular conception of life. Identification with such a conception of life is central to ones identity 
and “self”.  




meet.”417 That is, we ought to resist self-censorship. We should, in Piero Gobetti's words,
“to be everywhere oneself.”418 “The greatest act on behalf of freedom is to behav toward
everyone as though we were free men – even toward those whom we fear.”419 What is
essential in each understanding is the balance of a deep respect for individual autonomy
and social conscience. This chapter will present the East-European dissident movement
including Leszek Kolakowski, Adam Michnik, and Vaclv Havel and Gyorgy Konrad as
theoretical heirs of the antifascists who present a form of antipolitics as a “rejection of
the power monopoly of the political class” as well as a rejection of the “idea” or “truth”
monopoly of the very same class.420
Leszek Kolakowski, “Hope And Hopelessness”
Leszek Kolakowski was philosopher and political exil  from Poland, but he remained a
key inspiration and in many ways a mentor to Adam Michnik and other Polish dissidents.
And it is his idea of national autonomy as achieved through a historical understanding of
self-examination and self-creation that sits at the heart of their various political theories
of action, as well as that of the Solidarity movement in general. In no small way we
might consider the impact of Kolakowski—one of the ''creators of contemporary Polish
culture''421—as somewhat  akin  to  that  of  Italy's  Croce.  In  what is  perhaps  his  most
influential essay, 1968's “Hope and Hopelessness”, Leszek Kolakowski made what was
417 Konraád, Antipolitics, 82.
418 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, xi.
419 Konraád, Antipolitics, 82.
420 Ibid., 231.
421 Michnik, Letters from Prison and Other Essays, 89.
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(at  the  time)  a  startling  claim  about  Poland's  communist  regime.  The  former  party
member broke with the revisionist position he had preciously advanced and argued that
revision from inside of the communist system was no longer possible. The claim itself
was nothing new and was widely felt by a population who shared the opinion and were
thus resigned to the experience of hopelessness in face of an impenetrable communist
state. However, where the influential philosopher differed significantly from the others
was in his rejection of the idea that the apparently impenetrable character of the state
justified “hopelessness”. The “principle of unreformability” was, for him, little more than
a comfortable excuse and acted as an “absolution in advance for every act of cowardice,
passivity  and  cooperation  with  evil.”422 Instead,  he  argued  that  some  measure  of
improvement was in fact possible; moreover, it was precisely the belief in this possibility
that began to make it realizable. Small but meaningful gains could be achieved, outside of
the  system  and  this  was  cause  enough  for  hope.  To  clarify  this  point  Kolakowski
comments on what was then—in a historically Catholic country—one of Stalin's most
notorious “historical quips” in which Stalin responds to the moral authority of the Pope
by defiantly asking how many divisions of troops he has. The implication is clear, the
perceived moral strength of the Pope is no match for the military strength of the Red
Army, a point that appeared to be confirmed in the ey s of all who were familiar with the
brutal defeat of oppositionists in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and later in the period
of  liberalization  and  ultimately  defeat  of  the  Prague  Spring  of  1968.  However,
Kolakowski points to “the poverty” of the conclusive “hopelessness” that flows from this
story. To him it represented a kind of selective memory, one which “does not know how
422 Kolakowski, “Hope and Hopelessness,” 51.
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to  believe in  anything  apart  from divisions.”423 He  then  remarks  that  this  telling  of
Russia's  revolution  forgets  that  the  Soviets  emerged  victorious,  “not  by  virtue  of
possessing many divisions, but as a result of the moral collapse of the Tsar's empire and
army.”424 This evokes Piero Gobetti's own assessment of the Russian Revolution in July
1919, shortly after its success, in which he argued that the Bolsheviks had created a state
“in which the people believe because they have made it th mselves—is essentially, in its
inner dialectic, an affirmation of liberalism.”425 In this manner, it was not just the moral
collapse of the Tsarist Regime, but also a positive act of awakening or soul-making.426 It
is in the possibility of such an awakening that hope exists. Christopher Beem extends this
“conceptual  connection”  to  Gramsci  as well  in his book  The Necessity  of  Politics.427
Ironically, this “liberal” Bolshevik revolution was quickly overtaken by an ideology—
driven  by  iron  laws  of  historical  necessity—that  quickly  reduced  individuals  to
extensions  of  the  state.  What  had  begun  as  an  assertion  of  independent  will  and
responsibility, quickly descended into ideological purges as early as 1921.  
If  we consider the principles that underlie Marxist science we can see how this came
about.  It begins with the compelling economic claim that humans have needs and that
chief  among  them  are  economic  needs.  In  order  to  meet  these  needs,  humans  are
compelled to engage in behaviors and relationships that they would never choose for
themselves.  Looking  around  at  our  society  and  others— specially  those  marked  by
423 Ibid., 46.
424 Ibid.
425 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 1.
426 Ibid., 209.
427 Beem, The Necessity of Politics, 113.
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extreme  poverty—this  becomes  readily  apparent.  The  forces  of  production  and
mechanisms that make up our economic relations and actions are the determining factor
in history. Marx is therefore arguing that the nature of every aspect of our life is a factor
of these compelled economic needs. The historical process is, therefore, the result of the
mechanical  movement  through  history  from  one  stage  to  the  next,  or  “dialectical
materialism”. This passage through time is, therefore, not the result of independent will,
but rather the operation of historical necessity dictated by “scientific” historical laws.
According to Marx, this historical process will eventually lead to the overthrow of the
bourgeoisie by the proletariat and the abolition of the bourgeois mode of appropriation,
and the socialization of the means of production and exchange as they conform better to
the economic needs of collectivized production. Marx calls this society without  class
distinctions Communism. While it is easy to see how such a theory would attract the
interest of the oppressed classes, it is also thoroughly deterministic; history progresses in
accord with economic laws that operate as a functio of iron necessity and, therefore, can
only advance along a prescribed path. It is a thoroughly Cartesian view of history; man as
subject  to knowable and discoverable scientific laws. In the hands of a revolutionary
party that claimed special access to these laws, it quickly transformed itself into a rigid
dogma,  one  that  was  entirely  inflexible.  It  replaced  philosophy  with  catechism,
responsibility with apathy, autonomy with subjugation, and humanity with automatism.
In his 1989 essay on “The Demise of Historical Man”, Kolakowski tells us that it was
“the victorious march of Enlightenment rationalism” that had “robbed mankind of his
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historical consciousness.”428 That rationalism, which had emerged as an an “objective”
criteria for testing the truth of ideas, had no need for history. Rationalism demanded that
truth could only be established by applying “clear and absolutely binding mathematical
and empirical criteria elaborated by science.”429 And by the twentieth-century we were
left  with  two  equally  ambitious  'universal'  projects  struggling  to  lay  claim  to  the
rationalist 'truth' of modernity: the 'invisible hand' of market capitalism, and those “iron
laws” of history that drove communism. For both positi ns, history was little more than
an inconvenience that had to be tolerated in the pursuit of a forgone conclusion, be it the
profit  maximizing utility of unobstructed global markets or a classless society.  In the
same essay, Kolakowski remarks in passing that Vicoanticipated the “widespread feeling
that we shape history.” Though Kolakowski credits Marx with this idea, the capacity for
Marxian man to “shape history” owes less to his own will than to his ability to act as an
organ of the state. Rosselli had been clear in his analysis: “In the Marxist system we are
dealing with a human species that is sui generis composed of men who are by definition
not  free.”430    Rather  than  anticipating  Marx,  Vico  appears  to  have  anticipated
Kolakowski himself who cautioned against an enlightenment ideal that “pronounced a
death sentence on divine providence and then on God himself [and]... soon went on to kill
Nature.”431However, both men were unwilling to forgo the gains of secular modernity.
Kolakowski  cautioning  that  such  gains  at  the  expense  of  rooted  historical  self-
understanding leads to  a  dangerous “spiritual  fragility”  that  threatens the individuals
428 Kołakowski, Is God Happy?, 262–265.
429 Ibid., 266.
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ability to “withstand possible trials of the future.”432 This fragility was revealed as much
in 1920s Italy, where a ubiquitous Catholic dogmatism groomed the Italian people for the
paternalist fascist state, as it was in the cultivated obedience central to the experience of
life  under  the  Communist  state.  Havel  called it  “living within  the  lie.”  Kolakowski,
drawing on the spirit of Vico, defended the value of an “imperative force tying people
together” that gave a people a sense of self-understanding.433 Fundamental to the task of
recovering our humanity and freedom, was recovering “our old religious roots – so that
we can survive.”434 Havel put a name to this strategy of rediscovery and survival and
called it “living in truth.” 
In an essay asking whether or not there was “a future for Truth”, Kolakowski examined
some popular conceptions of truth. One he called th correspondence theory of truth,
which argues quite simply that the truth must correspond t  reality. This is the kind of
meaning that we ascribe truth in our daily usage. For example, when we say “the sky is
blue” we understand that this description is true if it corresponds to the reality that the sky
is,  in  fact,  blue.  However,  Kolakowski  points  out  tha  while  this  might  satisfy  our
everyday “non-philosophical” use of truth, it  quickly succumbs to closer scrutiny, for
what we really mean, it is argued, when we say that truth corresponds to “reality” is that
it  remains coherent  within a particular  “internally coherent  system”.  The sky is  only
432 Leszek Kołakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 158–
159.
433 Ibid., 159; Vico, Vico, para. 310.
For Vico, this was captured in his very original dialectical conception of divine providence that did not
dominate human will, but was rather understood as the means by which divine guided a humanity that 
possessed free will.
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“blue” insofar as there is a systemic understanding or agreement upon what “blue” is. He
calls this conception of truth the coherence theory of truth. Where this understanding of
truth breaks down for Kolakowski is that it does not satisfy what he perceives as the need
of the rational human animal to know the Truth. This is because truth in this respect
cannot be understood without reference to the system itself. It is not truth as such, there is
no  “unmediated  perception  of  facts.”435 Which  is  to  say  that  “the  system”  itself
determines truth. In  Gramsci's  terms it  represents that moment when a “world view”
shifts and becomes an “implied theoretical premise” by which the “whole social bloc...is
held together and unified.”436 This is what he calls “ideology”. In the case of Pland and
the eastern  bloc,  it  was being held  together  and unified  under  the ideology of  state
communism. Kolakowski's  fear,  was  that  like  any rationalist  system laying claim to
absolute truth it  had no need for history in the concrete sense that  was so central  to
Croce's critique of Marxism. This is to say that it was not history itself that gave shape to
the future, or even the present under the Communist paradigm, but rather the “iron laws”
of  history,  laws that  existed external  to  history itself.  History in  this  sense becomes
irrelevant as it finds itself subject to the laws rather than their source. Kolakowski puts a
finer  point  on this  critique when he argues that  under  such conditions history “in  a
perverse way... acquires its meaning from the future – i.e. from something that does not
exist.”437 Here the historical forces are directed from outside of lived history. It was for
this reason that Croce concluded that: “Communism does not even succeed in creating
the historical manifestations of this Utopia in theworld of fancy unless it reduces men to
435 Ibid., 290.
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puppets, devoid of nerves and blood, imagination, thought, and will.”438 This is precisely
the  trap  that  Kolakowski  believed  that  Poland  had  fllen  into  and  that  Vico  had
anticipated. Under the domination of a pervasive “scientific” communist state, history
had been all but eradicated and with it all elements of the sacred as they do not, and in
fact  cannot,  conform to  “mathematical  and empirical riteria  elaborated by science”.
Consequently, those living under communism had becom  ill-equipped to resist. 
“Hope and Hopelessness” represents one of the first significant assertions of a strategy
and theory of political action and resistance first expressed by the Italian Antifascists. It
represented a strategy that focused on preserving responsibility and dignity in human life
and  positioned  them  as  key  elements  in  resisting  and  opposing  an  ideological  and
oppressive state. It was argued that political freedom could not be achieved internal to a
system that so ardently demanded that the state and civil society fall under the control of
a unitary state. In our own time, it has been argued that a similarly unified power bloc is
emerging, but not under the control of the state as such, rather under the control of an
oligarchic minority that exercises its economic power in conquering the state as well as
civil  society,  itself  contributing  to  the  development  of  a  new  form  of  oligarchic
totalitarianism.439 The idea as outlined by Kolakowski became to locate an alternative
source of power and to separate civil society from the social control of state power. In
438 Croce and De Gennaro, Essays on Marx and Russia., 104.
439 Winters, Oligarchy, 10.
Among the many works addressing this suddenly pressing i sue, perhaps the best is Jeffrey Winters' 
recent book Oligarchy in which he argues that such a process is resistant to traditional democratic 
checks. “Oligarchs and oligarchy will cease to exist not through democratic procedures, but rather 
when extremely unequal distributions of material resources are undone, and thus no longer confer 
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doing so, it was believed that an independent source of revolutionary power could be
found that was not connected to established power. Gobetti had linked this to “creative
individualism”. In his celebrated essay Power of the Powerless, Havel drew on the work
of Czech philosopher Jan Patocka in identifying the ne d to establish “parallel structures'
or independent social structures that could, over time, develop and act as a check against
ideological  domination  of  the  state.  In  the  case  of the  Polish  Solidarity  movement
Christopher Beem argues that “this Gramscian revolutionary theory actually worked; it
achieved the overthrow of the state.”440 But, how was it that “Polish dissidents developed
a revolutionary strategy that bears so many remarkable similarities to Gramsci's without
any sign that the former was influenced by or even aware of the latter?”441 Beem cites
David Ost, suggesting that it was somehow “in the air”, which leads him to conclude that
“the answer lies in the similar circumstances that faced both groups.”442 However, there is
something  deeper  going  on  than  similar  circumstances  alone.  In  a  passage  in  R.G.
Collingwood's posthumous classic  The Idea of History he recounts one of Giambattista
Vico's powerful observations regarding the historical diffusion of ideas. “Ideas,” he says,
“are propagated not by 'diffusion',  like articles of  commerce, but  by the independent
discovery by each nation of what it needs at any given stage in its own development.”443
While this is not a rejection of a cultural or intellectual diffusion thesis as such, it does
call into question the proper relationship and especially the polarity of the relationship
between 'idea' and 'nation'. Vico—through Collingwood—argued that the 'originality' of
an idea is unique to the historical conditions of each nation irrespective of the degree to
440 Beem, The Necessity of Politics, 115.
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which any actual 'diffusion' may have occurred. This means that though similarities may,
and  I  would  argue  do,  exist  between  the  historical  onditions  of  fascist  Italy  and
communist Eastern-Europe this doesn't point to any universal laws independent of their
respective histories. The point Collingwood is making s that ideas—facts and truths—
don't exist independent of historical experience and the spontaneous discovery of ideas
and knowledge is possible. It is a consequence of the lived historical experience of that
society. The fact that they arrive at similar “truths” is only indicative of their function as
rational beings to ask about meaning, to pursue their own humanity.444 In this sense, it is
possible not only for a class or a people to discover or recover themselves as Gramsci's
factory councils sought to achieve, but for them to do so in a manner that does not rely on
external authority for direction. Gramsci's essay on 'The Organization of Education and
Culture', which in no small way was influenced by the guiding hand of Vico's theory of
knowledge,  clarifies  this  point  further.  “Learning  takes  place  mainly  through  a
spontaneous and independent effort by the student, in which the teacher only acts as a
friendly guide... Discovery of a truth by oneself without suggestion or outside help is
creation,  even  though  the  truth  is  an  old  one.”445 Whether  or  not  it  is  possible  to
demonstrate a single clear and unassailable line of thought from Vico to Kolakowski and
the Anticommunists via Gramsci and the Antifascists , therefore, less important than
establishing the 'discovery of truth by oneself'';  an idea that is organic to a particular
society, but, exists in 'spiritual' if not actual dialogue with other similar movements. “The
learner,” argues Collingwood, “invariably learns not what the other has to teach but only
444 Kołakowski, Is God Happy?, 295.
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the lessons for which its previous historical development has prepared it.”446 To this end,
the path that led to the two broad movements that form the core of this study—the Italian
antifascist  movement  of  the  1920s  and  1930s,  and  the  East-European  dissident
movements particularly in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary—were prepared by
the pattern of life experienced under their own uniq e historical conditions. And they
resulted in similarly shaped movements of resistance which could neither be considered
provoked  nor  imposed  by  external  influences,  but  instead  recognized  as  organically
“discovered” and it was this recognition that contributed to the success of the movements.
It is also what allowed for the “hope” that Kolakowski encouraged. This is because even
under the pervasive conditions of communism in which all facets of society have been
infiltrated and a ubiquitous “surveillance state” established,  the potential  for  creative
autonomy exists.  The development  of  social  and political  movements  in this manner
clarifies and makes possible an understanding of a political theory of action as both a
'universal', mobile and strategic on one hand, and as 'organic' and historically contingent
on the other. “It shows mastery of the method; it indicated that one had entered a phase of
intellectual  maturity where it  is  possible to  discover  new truths.”447 It  is  the kind of
'mastery'  that  leads  to  political  consciousness  and understanding  of  history  and
knowledge that underwrites Gramsci's political theory. One of the central contributions of
Gramsci—by way of Vico and Croce—is the idea that mn is capable of becoming a
transformative force in his own life, capable of both shaping both his own character as
well  as  the  material  conditions  of  the  world  around him.  And  this  remains  a  key
446 Collingwood, “The Idea of History,” 69.
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component  of  Kolakowski's  own  discovery  in  'Hope  and  Hopelessness'  and can  be
observed in the East European Anticommunist dissident movement most noticeably in the
work  of  Vaclav  Havel,  Adam Michnik  and  Gyorgy  Konrad.  Living  under  similarly
'unique' conditions a familiar pattern of thought emerged to inform a theory of politics
that  is  both  liberal  and  socialist.  Rather  than  representing  localized  and  regional
manifestations of democratic resistance—a movement that is entirely particular to their
time and place—these movements represent a distinctve theoretical perspective and a
coherent political theory or political program of resistance that can be readily translated
—as  it  was  in  their  respective  times—to  inform  current  debates  regarding  active
democratic movements throughout the world. Moreover, where it is possible to establish
a  commonalities  between  these  two  movements  it  can  the be  said  to  represent  an
effective  alternative  political  theory  of  democratic  resistance  and  even  democratic
revolution that is discoverable where “historical development has prepared it.” The task
that is therefore assigned is to prepare the way. As a “program” this is made clear in
Adam Michnik's “New Evolutionism” (1976) and later xpanded in clutch of letters from
Bialoleka Prison in 1982.448
Adam Michnik
Adam Michnik is  former anticommunist  dissident and currently the editor-in-chief  of
Poland's first post-communist newspaper—and now its largest newspaper—the 'Gazeta
Wyborcza'. He was one the most visible opponents of he communist regime and perhaps
448 Michnik, Letters from Prison and Other Essays, 135–148.
197
the most prominent member of the Polish Solidarity movement of the 1980s and helped
negotiate  Poland's  transition  to  democracy in  1989. Michnik's  position  as  a  popular
dissident and his role in the transition culminated in his participation in Poland's first
non-communist parliament. He has since become an influential  public intellectual and
author.  Like many of  his fellow dissidents—Havel  esp cially—Michnik believed that
communism represented something distinct from other forms of totalitarianism. Rather
than seeking the domination of society through the exploitation of social bonds in the
manner of petty nationalism, etc., it set about “systematically destroying all social ties,
political  and  cultural  organizations,  sports  associations,  and  professional  guilds,  and
abrogated civil rights and confiscated properties.”449 And in so doing “broke the moral
backbone” of the people by preserving them in a state of perpetual anxiety.450 It was an
effort—and a largely successful one that that—to break the moral center of the nation and
reduce society to a state of disoriented powerlessness. Consider Havel’s greengrocer, the
entirety of his social existence was replaced by life within the lie, which rendered him
powerless  and  ultimately  cultivated  a  psychology  of captivity—captivity  within  the
system,  within  the  lie.451 This  psychology was  understood  to  be  characteristic  of
communities under communist authority and an experience he described as marked by:
Long periods  of  apathy and depolitization [that]  were  interrupted  by sudden
political earthquakes. These, however, were not followed by programs of reform
or by alternative political plans. They were only protests, not reform movements.
Supposed programs of reform were drawn up in governm nt offices but they
never reached the factory floors. Independent politica  thought did not exist in
communist states; instead, the only choices left open to an oppositionist were
either futile maneuvering or blind violence.452
449 Ibid., 43–44.
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Much like the Italians who concentrated on the central problem of the 'servile mentality'
of  the  Italian  people  contributing  to  the  rise  and  maintenance  of  fascism,  Michnik
observed that  the Poles existed under  conditions wherein  they perpetuated their  own
servitude through “mechanisms of social  apathy” established by the regime.453 In this
manner  Michnik  also  builds  on  Kolakowski's  analysis in  “Hope  and  Hopelessness”,
rejecting the possibility of reform within the regime as well as the use of radical violence
which he felt could only lead to a “blind alley”.454 This diminished political activity and
was further aggravated by a “new social accord” established between the people and the
regime—if the people do not make life difficult for the regime, the regime will not make
life difficult  for the people.455 Gobetti  had been deeply critical of those he called the
“apolitical ones” or those who, like the greengrocer, paid court to the regime through
inactivity. “The regime welcomes skeptics. All it asks of citizens is to surrender their
dignity and their political rights.”456 Michnik argued that this psychology did much more
than merely create a kind of domesticated “hopelessness” it also created a kind of severe
disorientation of individual identity. 
Rationalist modernity—captured here in the communist sy tem—eliminated the need for
history as the basis of society and thus systematically destroyed all social and cultural
ties, in favor of the new rationalist criteria. Consequently, the people themselves became
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dissidents, Michnik possessed a sensitivity to religion and spiritual life on the grounds
that it provided not just a moral base, but also an essential foundation for civilization
itself. “As long as civilization exists, the need for metaphysics will endure.”457 Detached
from society and himself, the individual then seeks a reintroduction to civilization one
that,  in  Havel's  terms,  “guarantee  him  a  relatively tranquil  life  “in  harmony  with
society”.”  And  the  regime  provides  the  mechanism by which  this  can  be  achieved:
obedience. However, as Havel points out this is just an illusion of identity because it was
achieved not through the confirmation of ones humanity and autonomy, but rather by its
complete destruction.458 Even among the more politically motivated revolutionaries, this
slave psychology distorted their own consciousness and the very idea of freedom itself
became a misunderstood concept. Resistance and dissent came to be seen as synonymous
with futile maneuvering and blind violence as they were seen to be the only avenues open
to struggle. However, the state welcomed this kind of piecemeal violent resistance since it
played to its strengths, and invited the kind of military intervention seen in Hungary and
Czechoslovakia. It  became a kind of ideological  quicksand. The more your struggled
against the regime,  the deeper you appeared to sink within it.  Hopelessness, did not
merely compel  servitude,  but  acted  as  a  kind  of  shunt  directing and controlling the
physical and psychological efforts of the Polish peopl . This is because the individual
trapped within this mentality is “incapable of discovering his own subjectivity, for he has
been deprived of his community, his ideals, and his language. He is left alone with his
hate, which spells hopelessness.”459 Even where the regime did expose itself to resistance
457 Havel, Michnik, and Matynia, An Uncanny Era, 130.
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it invited the “slave revolt” because as Michnik points out. it had “little in common with a
movement for social or political change.”460 The fundamental problem is that even if “the
rebellious slave does free himself for a moment...his main desire is revenge, which is
rarely constructive.  The rebellious slave will  at  best look for a better tsar.”461 In  this
manner, revolutionary action fails to correct or even recognize the servile nature of the
movements and so it is condemned to repeat the pattrn of servitude. This was because
despite undergoing regime change “the political structure...remains unchanged” and this
is a natural consequence of “the absence of an authentic political culture or any standards
of democratic collective life.”462 Putinism in Russia and the regime of Lukashenko in
Belarus remain stark and persistent reminders of this tendency.463 Given these conditions,
the only other option that reveals itself to the peopl  is passive obedience. It was in this
manner  that  a  kind  of  ideological  blindness  was  established  through  a  carefully
maintained social and political illusion.464 
While  Michnik  argues  that  this  experience  is  exclusive  to  communism,  the  fascist
experience in Italy—layered upon the smothering presence of the Church—is described
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to break free from this servile state. Gramsci observed something similar in his analysis
of “The Southern Question” when he criticized the socialist party itself of having itself
become the vehicle of “bourgeois ideology' and spoke f the need for the proletariat to
“rid itself  of  corporative hangovers”,  prejudices and “incrustations”.465 Much like the
antifascists and perhaps even more-so like the Catholic philosopher Vico, Michnik leans
on the Catholic  Church as a  “key source of  encouragement”  for  those struggling to
preserve their autonomy and find their freedom and dignity.466 He understood the church
as providing the kind of rootedness necessary to the social and moral formation of the
individual as a human. It was in this manner that Michnik tells us that Havel similarly
“connected  his  religious  outlook  with  his  politics.” 467 Michnik's  attitude towards  the
revolutionary  role  of  the  Church  is  clarified  in  his  essay  “Conversation  in  the
Citadel”(1982). 
We need the Catholic Church – a church that will teach us moral values, defend
national and human dignity, provide and asylum for trampled hopes. But we do
not  expect  the  Church  to  become  the  nation's  political  representative,  to
formulate political programs and to sign political pacts. Whoever wants such a
Church, whoever expects these things from Catholic priests, is—whether he likes
it or not—asking for the political reduction of the Christian religion. For we do
not need a Church that is locked up, that is hidden behind the walls of a particular
political ideology. We need an open Church.468
This ought to remind us of Vico's distinctive interpretation of divine providence. In his
case the  struggle  was  two-fold.  In  the  first  place, Italy  itself  was  largely  under  the
dominant influence of a 'politically reductive' Church (to borrow Michnik's term) and in
the  second  place,  Vico  identified  in  Cartesianism  the  emergence  of  a  similarly
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deterministic  ideology.  In  both  the  institutions  ofhis  faith  as  well  as  those  of  the
emerging scientific order Vico recognized achievements that he was unwilling to forgo,
however, he also recognized the potential for great danger. What Vico hoped to achieve
through his re-imagining of providence was the prese vation of human agency against a
Church that has become too deterministic, but did not u dermine the need for “a divinity
who  sees  into  the  depths  of  their  [humanity's]  hearts.”469 For  Vico,  as  it  was  for
Kolakowski and consequently Michnik and Havel, “a society of men can neither come
into  being,  nor  sustain  itself,  without  a  means  whereby some should  rely  upon the
promises  of  others  and be quietened by their  assurances  concerning  secret  matters.”
These matters, argues Vico, “can be nothing other than he idea of God in the attribute of
providence.”470
It is in this manner that society is founded and grows. Much as Kolakowski does in his
essay “Is There a Future for Truth?”(2001), Vico rejects pragmatic claims to truth. This is
not because he believes them incapable of establishing civil society, but rather that such a
society would “presuppose an idea of the true such that the revelation of something true
is enough to oblige people to believe it without [requiring] any human evidence.”471 The
famous American journalist A.J. Liebling clarifies the danger of such a conception of
truth in his essay on “experts”. 
To combat an old human prejudice in favor of eyewitness testimony... the expert
must intimate that he has access to some occult source r science not available to




either  reporter  or  reader.  He  is  the  Priest  of  Eleusis,  the  man  with  the  big
picture...  All  is  manifest  to him, since his conclusions are not  limited by his
powers of observation. Logistics... favor him, since it is possible to not see many
things at the same time. For example, a correspondent cannot cover a front and
the Pentagon simultaneously. An expert can, and from an office in New York, at
that.472
In Vico's terms, the pragmatic conception of truth advanced by Locke was just such a
concession of position, and the antifascist and communist experience confirms this. Both
instances amounted to a concession to “[men] with the big picture” that no longer needed
history to confirm the legitimacy of their  'truths',  which are guided instead by party
'consensus' or revealed Truth.  Vico believed that a concept of providence that  placed
human autonomy at the center of the divine order would both shield mankind from the
terrors of dogmatic faith as well as the worst excesses of rationalist modernity. As much
as Vico was concerned about the potential  excesses of Cartesianism he was certainly
familiar with the terror associated with a dogmatic Church. In a note to his classic work
on Vico and Herder, Isaiah Berlin tells us that Vico “may have feared charges of heresy”
and that “the Inquisition, in the last years of theseventeenth century, had inflicted terrible
punishment  on  some  of  his  Neapolitan  friends  and  contemporaries.”473 The  shared
experience of persecution and terror under the fascist and communist regime's lead both
the antifascists and the anticommunist dissidents discussed in this paper to turn back to
their history and to excavate their language, popular religion, and 'common sense' in an
effort to recover their history, their identity, and consequently political life. Central to this
dissertation  has  been  a  discussion  of  the  role  of  history  in  our  understanding  of
knowledge and truth; particularly the role of history as it  differs from those utopian,
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transcendental, and determinist views of truth and k owledge—most notably associated
with fascism and communism. It is humanist historicism that sees human action within a
contingent  view  of  history  as  fundamental  to  character  formation  and  national
development, and ultimately human freedom.
One of the key concepts that was introduced by the dissidents discussed in this chapter
was the political idea of 'dignity'. The concept of ''living in dignity'' formed the core of
Kolakowski's  program  for  the  participation  of  intellectuals  in  the  anti-communist
opposition and therefore greatly informs the work of  Michnik.  In  the essay “A New
Evolutionism” Michnik argues that:
In  searching for  truth,  or,  to  quote Leszek Kolakowski,  “by living in dignity,”
opposition intellectuals are striving not so much for a better tomorrow as for a
better today. Every act of defiance helps us build the framework of  democratic
socialism, which should not be merely or primarily a legal institutional structure
but a real, day-to-day community of free people.474
This illustrates Michnik's commitment to both the socialism which he was born into and
raised  in,  as  well  as  a  liberal  humanism  that  respected  individualism,  personal
responsibility, and 'human dignity'. In fact, for Michnik as well as a whole generation of
dissident  writers liberal  humanist  values and socialist  values were seen as “not  self-
contradictory”,  but  rather  as  complementary,  or  even  necessarily  associated.475
Kolakowski's  famous  'conservative-liberal-socialist'  position  captures  vividly  the
dimensions  of  a  perspective  shared  with  the  Italian antifascist  tradition  of  Gobetti,
Rosselli, and Gramsci. Like these Italian thinkers, Michnik was able to locate in Marxism
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and all other forms of totalitarian ideology a vision of collective emancipation that allows
for  the  sacrifice  of  individual  dignity  in  the  name of  achieving  universal  human
emancipation. This is tied to the concept of historcal materialism, which articulates this
idea in terms of a grand narrative of class struggle. Kolakowski criticized this Leninist
formulation of class struggle by connecting socialism not to a messianic universalism, but
to humanism. In his 1968 book  Towards a Marxist Humanism, Kolakowski looked to
move  the Left  away from class  antagonism alone  towards  a  struggle  for  the  moral
convictions of the individual. Furthermore, Kolakowski thought that by shifting attention
from class to the individual he was making the agenda of the left more universal. This
also placed the individual  squarely at  the center  of  the struggle for  socialism,  but  a
socialism understood in terms of the autonomous 'responsible' individual rather than the
individual subject to deterministic forces of history.  This recasting of socialism on the
grounds of an ethical individualism rather than as an 'egalitarian collectivism' was key in
shaping Michnik's views. It is a perspective that replicates Croce's critique of Marx, and
characterized an open-ended liberalism that rejected th  universalism associated with the
ideological state. In his prison letters, Michnik demonstrates his determination to find a
political  theory  of  action  that  is  best  attuned  to  this  struggle  against  ideological
totalitarian power and one in which “a new political onsciousness be developed,” one
that remains faithful to the central role of the working classes as the prime vehicle for
change.476
476 Michnik, Letters from Prison and Other Essays, 144.
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Michnik points to the Polish Solidarity movement,  aided by an independent Catholic
Church,  as  the  means  by  which  the  powerful  psychology  f  captivity  was  broken.
Solidarity was the first non-communist independent self-governing trade union founded
in 1980 in Gdansk Shipyard. At its peak its membership totaled just over a quarter of the
total population. Michnik argues that the Solidarity movement gave its membership a
taste  for  freedom  because  it  was  through  their  own  efforts  that  “they  forged  their
solidarity and discovered their strength” and that “they felt themselves to be a civic and
national  community.”477 In  a 2003 interview titled “An Account  of  Our Victories,  an
Accounting of Our Freedom”, Michnik argued that all the Marxist training that he had
been compelled to participate in only taught him that “there are no historical necessitates”
and that “history will be what we make of it with our hands.”478 This decidedly Vician
statement  is  a  clear  rejection  of  the  determinism  associated  with  Marxist  historical
materialism. Taken together with his support of Solidarity it is a position that clearly
recalls Gramsci and Gobetti's own commitment to the Turin factory councils and it not
hard to imagine that it is Michnik rather than Gobetti who argued that, “the important
thing is for them [the workers] to feel that political action is necessary and for them to
believe that  their  salvation will  come from taking action,  not from living in hope or
cultivating abstract justice.”479 Gobetti had argued that the state-sanctioned unions “te ds
to promote the consciousness of being wage earners i  the workers, not the dignity of
being producers; that accepts their status as slaves nd seeks to improve it in reformist
and utilitarian terms rather than change it.”480 While Michnik admits that as a movement
477 Ibid., 51.
478 Havel, Michnik, and Matynia, An Uncanny Era, 126.
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Solidarity was not without its inevitable problems, it ultimately had the effect of cracking
the veneer of the Havelian lie and like Solidarity, the Gramscian factory council  was
something more than another union. “In the council  the worker would sense his full
dignity as an indispensable element of  modern life...thus he would reinforce his own
aptitudes, seeking to create a practical organization through which his class might come
to  power.”481 When  faced  with  an  awakening  within  the  workers—whether  through
Solidarity or Gramscian factory councils—the establishment often redoubled it efforts
and  reverted  to  defending  ideologies  of  the  state,  declaring  that  such  activities  are
contrary to state or national interests and “will lead to national catastrophe, that all the
people should unite their efforts to support the state.”482 In the case of the Gramscian
factory councils,  they were  quickly crushed before th y had a chance to  succeed as
Solidarity would decades later.483
These redoubled efforts played heavily on the institutionalized anxieties of the people.
Michnik was concerned that any defense of the ideology of the state became dangerous
when “when a state’s power has been confiscated by a and of gangsters who impose
their ways on the people.” Under these conditions “the attitude “loyalty to the state” is
simple  complicity  in  crime.”484 This  was  particularly  the  case  during  the  period  of
“normalization” during which martial law was declared in the effort to deal with the so-
called “anarchy” that resulted from Solidarity. During this period there was a crackdown
481 Ibid.
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on dissidents and thousands were arrested, Michnik among them. Normalization in this
sense “meant the total destruction of all independent institutions.”485 Much like the Polish
experience of communism, Gobetti had voiced concern over fascism's efforts to “dictate
the future and keep Italy a political minor, servile and deferent toward its guardians.”486 In
this case the 'guardians' that Italy surrendered to were gangsters in the form of the fascist
state, and like in Poland “all it asks of the citizens is to surrender their dignity and their
political rights.”487
The “fundamental issue” that has faced all dissidents a d all persons who struggle in the
face of this political atrophy was not only developing a general strategy of resistance, but
also developing an understanding of the role of the individual. By determining how to
participate  and  who  is  considered  a  participant,  power  can  actively  manipulate  the
democratic nature of a movement. It was for this reason that understanding the nature of
participation became key for Michnik, particularly how it is that individuals could best
participate in their own governance and the struggle for democratic non-domination. On
the ground, this question is first addressed in the decision of whether to collaborate or to
resist,  whether  to  stay or  go.  When the  Fascists  rose t  power  in  Italy,  these were
decisions  that  immediately  faced  every  would-be  defender  of  liberal  freedoms  and
democracy.  Fifty  years  later,  Adam Michnik  took  up  these  questions  himself  in  the
context  of  Polish  anti-communist  resistance.  As  he  contemplated  the  “forms  of  the
underground” he concluded that “resistance against such a “state” is natural, and civil
485 Ibid., 81.
486 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 24.
487 Ibid., 129.
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disobedience is the only attitude worthy of respect.”488 Central to any such program of
resistance is “participation in authentic civic and i tellectual life”,  a central  aspect of
which was “a pinch of dignity,  a  pinch of fraternity.  And a daily breath of  truth.”489
Intransigence and an unwillingness to surrender his dignity and political rights remained
at  the  forefront  of  Michnik's  theory  of  action.  After  his  first  arrest  following  the
imposition of martial law in December 1981, Michnik was asked to sign a 'confession'
stating that he would “desist from activities “contrary to the law””, after which he would
be released. Michnik refused to sign arguing that: “Ostracism would play into the hands
of  the  people  in  power,  since  this  is  precisely  what  they  want—to  break  society's
resistance  and  the  solidarity  of  the  people  by  creating  divisions.”490 The  'loyalty
declarations' that the regime had people sign, had to be “voluntary” if they were to have
any  effect.  Michnik  resisted  and  opted  to  remain  in detention  because  dignity  and
common sense “does not allow it [signing]” and that “to sign this declaration would be to
negate  yourself,  to  wipe  out  the  meaning  of  your  life.”491 Here  again  we  see  the
positioning of human dignity at the core of politics and perhaps no man of letters is is
better know for his intimate exploration of human dignity, politics, and conscience as
Vaclav Havel.





Vaclav Havel, Ideology As The “Juggernaut Of Power”492
I
Vaclav  Havel  was  a  playwright,  poet,  dissident  and  the  first  president  of  the
Czechoslovakia after the fall of communism (1989-192). He was also the first president
of the Czech Republic (1992-2004) after the break-up of Czechoslovakia. Not unlike
Gobetti and especially Carlo Rosselli, Havel was born into an upper-middle class family.
Prior to communist rule his family had been relatively wealthy, with strong intellectual
ties and it was this experience that steeped him in the humanistic and humanitarian values
that were to become the hallmark of his political thought. However, the life that Havel led
came to an abrupt end when the communists came to power. His “bourgeois” family
ancestry meant that he was restricted in his career path. Unable to pursue traditionally
“intellectual” careers Havel eventually found work as a stage hand. This would be his
introduction to the world of theater where he would eventually gain prominence as a
playwright. It was Havel's dramatic works—highly political in their content and speaking
to the conditions of life under Czechoslovak communism—that were a key influence in
shaping the unconventional aspects of what would becom  Havel’s political theory of
“living in truth” and his critique of post-totalitari nism made famous in the essay Power
of  the  Powerless (1978).  For  Havel  the  claim  that  politics  could  survive  under  the
conditions of ideological domination was absurd andbsurdist theater held a mirror up to
the lies that Czech society and post-totalitarianism in general was built upon. The very act
492 Havel, Disturbing the Peace, 10.
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of making this visible through his plays allowed for Havel—and those participating—to
begin to carve out a space of truth. 
In her recent book on political action in Havel's thought Delia Popescu points to this
space  of  truth  amidst  the  lies  of  post-totalitarianism as  the  center  that  gave  rise  to
‘antipolitical’ politics.493 It was antipolitical because it refused to engage with the state
and official ‘political life’ on ‘their’ terms, and instead turned its focus on the individual
and civil  society as the center of true politics. This resulted in an effort  to indirectly
challenge the “reality” established by the system and create a parallel reality rooted in
individual responsibility and an open civil society. Were this exercise to remain at the
level of absurdist theater Havel might have remained the idealist that many of his critics
saw him as; however, such was not to be the case. Through his dramatic work and his
later  political  writings Havel  helped individuals  to  rediscover  their  own identity and
humanity, and therefore rediscover politics itself. Popescu focuses in on this as an act of
applied political theory and it is hard to argue otherwise. Though Havel’s writings aren’t
in themselves instructive in the sense of teaching lessons, or telling us how to construct
an ideal society in the vein of traditional political philosophy, they do follow in the Italian
tradition  in  which  the  work  of  philosophy  begins  with  historical  analysis,  an
interpretation that began at least with Machiavelli (a playwright himself incidentally) and
certainly Vico.494 It represented a deep understanding of the practical nature of philosophy
and would find its greatest modern expression in Gramsci's analysis of hegemony, which
493 Delia Popescu, Political Action in Václav Havel’s Thought: The Responsibility of Resistance (Lanham, 
Md: Lexington Books, 2012).
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relied  heavily  on  developing  the  connection  between an  historical  understanding  of
culture and society, and successful political action. Gramsci some forty years prior to
Havel  revived  the  concept  of  ‘philosophy  as  praxis’ a  a  concept  of  philosophy
understood  as  a  “critico-practical  activity”  that  is central  to  moral  and  political
awakening; a concept that Gramsci promotes among a class of new intellectuals who
must be actively involved in practical life and whose job it is politically to help develop
independent responsibility in  each individual.  This conclusion,  clearly felt  across the
work of Vico, the Italian Antifascists and Havel emphasizes the necessity to focus not just
on society, but also on the individual and the importance of understanding philosophy as
a practical work, as politics. For Havel the true dissident embodied this figure.
Havel described the struggle of life under post-totalitarianism as marked by a “profound
crisis of  human identity”  and as “a deep moral  crisis in society”  and refers to post-
totalitarianism as “a record of the people’s own failure as individuals.”495 It is a language
that we should find immediately familiar as Gobetti and Rosselli both spoke in similar
terms  about  totalitarianism  amounting  to  a  moral  crisis  and  especially  as  the
“autobiography of the nation”. This recognition of the problems of totalitarianism and
even post-totalitarianism as a moral crisis and a failure of the people collectively and
especially as individuals profoundly shifts the role f the individual as a political actor?
Havel explains that:
A person who has been seduced by the consumer value syst m, whose identity is
dissolved in an amalgam of the accoutrements of mass civilization, and who has
no roots in the order of being, no sense of responsibility for anything higher than
495 Havel, Open Letters, 153,145.
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his own personal survival, is a demoralized person. The system depends on this
demoralization, deepens it, is in fact a projection of it into society.496
Havel,  like Vico and the antifascists  before him, was interested in the rootedness of
human life and ultimately the political significance of this. Kolakowski puts a fine point
on this concern regarding rootedness when he argues in 'The Idolatry of Politics' that one
of the fundamental conclusion stemming from the Cartesian Enlightenment is the belief
that “historical knowledge would be useful only if it provided us with technical guidance
we could subsequently apply in governing, in vying for power, or in warfare, as if we
were  consulting  a  manual  to  repair  a  broken  vacuum  cleaner.”497 He  laments  this
instrumental  and  technical  approach  to  history  as  fundamental  to  the  rationalist
perspective  and  also  terribly  pernicious.  Havel  agrees  and like  Kolakowski  sees  the
communist or post-totalitarian system as contributing o the demoralization of human life
and  positions  the  demoralized  person  as  a  central  figure  in  propagating  the  post-
totalitarian system. This contributes to the destruction of political life understood in the
traditional sense and politics is replaced with ideological ritual. 
People have no opportunity to express themselves politically in public, let alone
to organize politically. The gap that results is filled by ideological ritual. In such a
situation, peoples interest in political matters natur lly dwindles and independent
political thought, insofar as it exists at all, is seen by the majority as unrealistic,
far-fetched, a kind of self indulgent game, hopelessly distant from their everyday
concerns; something admirable, perhaps, but quite pointless, because it is on the
one hand entirely utopian and on the other hand extraordinarily dangerous, in
view of the unusual vigor with which any move in that direction is persecuted by
the regime.498
496 Ibid., 153.
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Gramsci illustrates this point clearly in 'The Southern Question' when we he laments the
lack  of  local  publishing  houses  from  which  to  disseminate  the  work  of  southern
intellectuals, especially what he calls small and medium reviews “around which average
groups of intellectuals gather.”499 This, argues Gramsci, compels southern intellectuals
who wish to circulate their ideas to leave the south and rely on publisher outside the
south. Consequently, the southern agrarian bloc “have seen to it that the presentation of
the  southern  question  should  not  exceed  certain  limits,  should  not  become
revolutionary.”500 Gramsci also notes the complicated relationship that he has with Croce,
from whom he he both derived considerable influence, but also criticized for having
“detached the radical intellectuals of the South from the peasant masses, making them
share in a national and European culture, and by means of this culture he has caused them
to  be  absorbed  by  the  national  bourgeoisie.”501 In  both  instances  he  is  describing
conditions by which the would-be radical intellectuals are de-radicalized and effectively
brought to heel. The Polish dissident Adam Michnik also voices similar concerns in his
essays “Why you are not signing...”(1982) and “Why You Are Not Emigrating...: A Letter
from Bialoleka”(1982).  In  the latter  essay especially,  he explored the “eternal  Polish
question: here or there, real emigration or internal emigration, compromise and grass-
roots work or a firm stand and silence, work within the official structures or construction
of  independent  ones?”502 While  Michnik  approached this  as a practical  problem that
needed to be solved by the members of  Solidarity,  Havel  took something of a more
499 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 47.
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philosophical turn, but they all understood philosophy as more than a mere abstraction
but rather as a political and even revolutionary tool. 
“What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural "levels":
the one that  can be called "civil  society",  that  is the ensemble of  organisms
commonly called "private", and that of "political society" or "the State". These
two levels correspond on the one hand to the functio  of "hegemony" which the
dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of
"direct  domination"  or  command  exercised  through  the State  and  ''juridical''
government.  The  functions  in  question  are  precisely organisational  and
connective. The intellectuals are the dominant group's "deputies" exercising the
subaltern functions of social hegemony and politica government.”503
Thus Havel is clearly something more than merely an idealistic playwright, or, in the case
of Gobetti  an idealistic student activist and publisher.  In  both cases, their  movement
outside of existing politics should not be looked at as “an idealistic hypostatization of
politics.”504 It  is not the case that either Havel or Gobetti  are looking to retreat from
politics or to separate political life from the life of society, but rather to remain mindful of
the deterministic relationship that exists between the two. And it is on this matter that
Gramsci's  analysis of hegemony and Havel's own analysis of post-totalitarianism best
develop an understanding of this relationship.
  
Vico's analysis of culture and Gramsci's analysis of hegemony under bourgeois liberalism
and Italian fascism reflect Havel's own analysis of Czechoslovak life under communism
and post-totalitarianism. This was especially so during the period of “normalization” that
followed the defeat of the Prague Spring and contribu es to Havel's development of a
political  theory  that  explains  the  unique  character of  post-totalitarianism.  He  then
503 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 12.
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transforms  this  analysis  into  an  analytic  lens  through  which  a  broader  critique  of
modernity and the enlightenment can be understood, an  from which western democracy
is not exempted. In Disturbing the Peace Havel writes about how the crisis of modernity
as experienced through communism is not so different as that under western capitalism,
an idea alluded to in his most famous work ‘Power of the Powerless’. Here, he describes
the crisis as being a function of the organization of society and economy, whether it be
through Soviet-style communism or the laissez-faire capitalism of America. "The reasons
for the crisis in which the world now finds itself are lodged in something deeper than a
particular way of organizing the economy or a particular political system. The West and
the East, though different in so many ways, are going through a single, common crisis."505
Havel points to specific tendencies within western democracy—namely a shared legacy
of enlightened rationalism and scientism—that leads towards a highly evolved western
consumerism and the cultivation of what Popescu calls the “silenced citizen, the timid
disengaged witness of society.”506 It was a fear eluded to by Vico. Gobetti also offers a
similar  critique of  a  domesticated  citizenry when he describes  the  problem with  the
“apolitical  ones”.507 It  is  the  ‘ideological  veil’ of  ‘automatism’ that  accompanies  the
“silenced citizen” that helps the individual “preserv  the illusion of dignity.”508 This is
achieved by providing a “bridge of excuses” that enable the individual “to turn away
from  public  life”  and  encourages  “a  social  orientation  towards  private  needs  and
desires.”509 It  is  for  this  reason that  Havel’s  post-totalitarianism enlists  the power of
505 Havel, Disturbing the Peace, 10.
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‘consumerism’ in the effort to divorce the individual from public life. “This rift between
private  and  public  life  led  to  an  ethical  decoupling  from  the  larger  concerns  of
humanity.”510 And man is reduced from the status of autonomous citizen to that of a mere
consumer. Gobetti had voiced concern over this as well, pointing out that, “economists
and politicians have always preferred to concentrate on the figure of the consumer, a
mere logical construct, vulgar, parasitic, and apolitica .”511 It reduces the individual to one
incapable of acting politically, incapable of political consciousness. At best it  reduces
individuals to abstractions much as the Party does making political actors consumers of a
political product sold to them as voters. Gobetti felt that in the long run, “the efforts of
the free-marketeers to create a consumer consciousness were bound to come to nothing,
because the consumer is  not  a cipher,  not  an individual  capable as such of political
consciousness.”512 History has show, as Havel is clear to demonstrate hat the consumer
identity, far from coming to nothing, rests at the center of the post-totalitarian system it
reinforces. 
II
In her analysis of Havel's theory of political action, Popescu cites Jeffrey Isaac's popular
essay on the “silence of political theory” regarding the revolutions of 1989.513 This struck
Isaac as a shocking indictment of the condition of a field (political theory) which seemed
unwilling to welcome into the fold of philosophy “the writings of the principal Soviet
510 Ibid., 47.
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bloc democratic oppositionists.”514 Consequently, philosophy was inviting a 'blind spot'
which would render it powerless to come to terms with either the development of East-
European  communism  or  its  complex  relationship  with the  west  as  its  inverted
reflection.515 Isaac identified one of the primary arguments standing against these figures
as the perception that their analysis were historically narrow or limited in scope. This was
a criticism popularly made of Italian antifascist thinkers like Gobetti and Rosselli, whose
contributions are only just now being acknowledged b yond Italy, and only lifted with
regards to Gramsci in recent decades. Like Isaac, Popescu was unconvinced by those who
would say that while the dissidents of 1989 may have been gifted writers and otherwise
politically  or  historically  significant  figures,  they were  “not  especially  innovative  or
genuinely  theoretical.”516 Here  Gramsci's  own  analysis  of  the  ideological  nature  of
intellectualism  is  evoked,  recalling  his  criticism  of  the  “widespread”  method  of
identifying intellectuals by having “having looked for this criterion of distinction in the
intrinsic nature of  intellectual activities, rather than in the ensemble of the system of
relations in which these activities (and therefore th intellectual groups who personify
them)  have their  place within  the  general  complex  of  s cial  relations.”517 Just  as  an
intellectual may not look the same in every context, neither will political theory itself, but
it is no less revealing or important and perhaps even more illuminating.  Picking up on
Isaac's  critique,  Popescu  presents  a  compelling  argument  that  Havel  was  indeed  a
“serious”  philosopher  and  I  believe  she  she  is  correct.  However,  where  Popescu  is
514 Ibid., 639.
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committed to  persuading the reader  of  this point  through an intimate analysis of  his
political theory, this dissertation has endeavored to locate Havel in a wider alternative
tradition that can be traced back at least as far as Vico. One that has been obscured, at
least in part for the reasons identified by Isaac and Popescu. For those who are familiar
with the long legacy of Italian antifascism, Havel r ads as a remarkable second, or even a
third  or  fourth  act  that  builds  on  concepts  such  as Gramsci’s  concept  of  ideology,
‘philosophy as praxis’ and the role of the revolutionary role of the 'organic' intellectual.518
Havel and his like-minded “democratic oppositionists” evoke not just the experience, but
the principal orientation of those Italian Antifascists who followed Vico's philosophical
outlook with theories of action built on them. They too have fallen prey to the kind of
arguments made in Aviezer Tucker’s interpretation of Havel as a “blindly optimistic”
revolutionary.519 In  his book on  the philosophy and politics of  czech dissidence from
patocka to havel (2000) Tucker argues that Havel “anticipated an exist ntial revolution”
and that such a revolution “should restructure society” and “Havel, like Marx, left most
of the details of the postrevolutionary period out f his analysis.”520 A Popescu rightly
points out, Tucker is confusing the hope associated with anticipation for a kind of naive
expectation that doesn't take seriously Havel's deeper critique of society writ large. In To
the Castle and Back (2007) Havel is clear, “I don't think I ever had any great illusions... I
think that even during the revolution, I was sober, down to earth, and cautious, and did
not try to achieve the impossible. That does not mean that I  never succumbed to the
heady atmosphere of the time. But when I did, it was fortunately not in any basic political
518 Popescu, Political Action in Václav Havel’s Thought, 23.
519 Ibid., 15.
520 Tucker, The Philosophy and Politics of Czech Dissidence from Patočka to Havel, 163, 164.
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decision-making, only in my rhetoric.”521 What Tucker misses is a principle of political
realism that can be traced as far back as at least M chiavelli who, in the Prince spoke of
aiming one's arrows high so that you might hit your target. Havel—as skilled a dramatist
as there ever was—understood perhaps better than anyo e save Machiavelli—a dramatist
as well it must be noted—the deep connection between “th ater”, “drama” and “politics”.
In his 1996 speech before the Academy of Performing Arts, Havel made this connection
explicit, “political action cannot serve as a symbol or play an important role unless it is
know about.”522 In this sense, cultivating the anticipation of “an existential revolution”,
whether through speech-making or theater, is a necessary first step towards its realization,
especially where such a position might be otherwise understood as blind optimism. And it
is  such an “art  of  the impossible”  that  makes authentic  politics,  rather  than political
monologue possible. While Havel has long been recognized as an exceptional critic of
twentieth-century political  life,  Havel  the playwright  and dissent  is  a model  of  what
Popescu  calls  “applied  political  theory”  and  so  it  must  account  as  much  for  lived
experience as it  does an anticipated one.523 To those familiar  with the long dialogue
between Adam Michnik and Havel  this is not  a surprising argument, though it  is an
argument  that  is  well  made  and  perhaps  necessary  if only  to  secure  his  legacy  as
philosopher of political action. Adam Michnik, once d scribed Havel as “the conscience
of his time” or as “a man of witness” to his time.524 Political theorist Nadia Urbinati held
a similar opinion of Piero Gobetti whose essays she described as “witness to a liberalism
521 Vaáclav Havel, Karel Hvížda̕la, and Paul R Wilson, To the Castle and Back (New York: Alfred A. 
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conscious of its imminent and perhaps long-lasting wilight.” 525 Just as Urbinati felt that
Gobetti “fills a gap on the shelves of Anglo-American scholars, who already have books
by the main intellectual companions of Gobetti: Antonio Gramsci, Benedetto Croce, and
Carlo Rosselli”, it is important to fill the gaps in our understanding of the wider struggle
for liberal politics itself. Havel is a critical part of an historical struggle that lies at the
heart of our understanding of modernity and the enlightenment itself, in particular how
we have come to understand and accept the very terms upon which liberal modernity has
been built. While I agree with Popescu then when she argues that it is not essential that
Havel is the “new” or “novel” thinker that his critics insist he must be if we are to take
him seriously, I would add that it is precisely this lack of “newness” that makes him all
the more important. In this reading, Havel’s greatest contribution can therefore be said to
lie in his ability to make fresh and relevant a current of dissident political thought that has
persisted  alongside  history’s  dominant  course,  but  has been  routinely  marginalized,
dismissed or silenced. Philosophy understood in this way—be it  Gobetti,  Gramsci or
Havel—is critical not because it is necessarily ‘original’ or represents some as yet untold
‘truth’,  but  only  insofar  as  it  can  be applied  to  support  political  action.526 Havel  is
representative of a radical departure from what we have come to expect as the norm for
political philosophy and politics itself, which is precisely why scholars have faced such a
significant  challenge in categorizing him. Like many of his fellow dissidents, he has
escaped  general  categorization  and  as  such  neither  requires  nor  can  be  expected  to
provide a defense wholly within the terms of traditional categories. Havel's experience of
525 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, xv.
526 Popescu, Political Action in Václav Havel’s Thought, 23.
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post-totalitarianism represents a cautionary tale for western democracies who similarly
maintain  their  societies  on  the  basis  of  an  escapist  consumerism that  facilitates  the
abandonment of the public sphere and the political. For Havel this could be achieved
through breadlines and state issued ration books just as easily as lines for Target’s next
‘capsule collection’ or designer collaboration, Apple’s latest iPhone, the newest 'artistic'
effort musical or otherwise produced by some hit reality show's popular new act, or even
the latest pop-up restaurant. “By fixing a person’s whole attention on his mere consumer
interests, it is hoped to render him incapable of realizing the increased extent to which he
has been spiritually, politically, and morally violated.”527 “Modernity,” argues Popescu,
“is the child of European Enlightenment and the burden that the entire Western world has
to  handle.  This  assessment  naturally  calls  for  a  re-evaluation  not  only  of  Eastern
European society but also of Western democracy.”528 And this dissertation is nothing if
not an effort towards just this kind of re-evaluation. 
In this 1984 essay, “Politics and Conscience”, Havel argues that both communism and
capitalism constitute a mutual threat in that they r present “the irrational momentum of
anonymous, impersonal, and inhuman power—the power f ideologies, systems, apparat,
bureaucracy,  artificial  languages,  and  political  slogans.”529 It  is  an  idea  that  finds
expression in  automatism—a concept introduced in “The Power of the Powerless” and
one  that  gains  momentum  and  further  expression  throug  the  bureaucratic  society
satirized in Havel’s first and most famous play  The Garden Party.530 Havel traces the
527 Havel, Open Letters, 59.
528 Popescu, Political Action in Václav Havel’s Thought, 55.
529 Havel, Open Letters, 267.
530 Vaáclav Havel, The Garden Party and Other Plays, 1st Grove Press ed (New York: Grove Press, 1993).
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origin  of  this threat  to what he calls  the “scientific  model  of  the world”,  which has
alienated mankind from the “world of their  actual exp rience.”531 Vico voiced similar
concerns regarding the transfer of Descartes “new critical method” beyond the natural
sciences to the “sphere of practical wisdom” or the sphere of human life, which he had
considered  a  “great  fault”  that  “has  sometimes been the cause of  great  damage and
evil”.532 In  “The  Southern  Question”  Gramsci  was  similarly  cautious  regarding  the
application  of  “science”  as  a  frequent  instrument  used  to  crush  the  wretched  and
exploited, pointing to a dehumanizing southernist perspective by which a whole society
—bourgeois liberals and working class socialists alike—were conditioned to accept the
idea  that  “the  Southerners  are  biologically  inferior  beings,  semi-barbarians  or  total
barbarians, by natural destiny; if the South is backward, the fault does not lie with the
capitalist system or with any other historical cause, but with Nature, which has made the
Southerners lazy, incapable, criminal and barbaric.” 533 It has become a means by which
“science” was made to serve the ideological interess of the ruling bourgeois class and
according to Gramsci, it had even poisoned the socialists themselves. Havel recognizes—
as  did  Vico  and  Gramsci—that  it  represented  more  than  just  a  localized  problem
particular  to  either  an  Italy  that  had  somehow  been bypassed  by  the  northern
enlightenment, or an Italy suffering the trauma of fascism. For Havel it was,
...the symbol of an age which seeks to transcend the boundaries of the natural
world and its norms and to make it into a merely private concern, a matter of
subjective preference and private feeling, of the illusions, prejudices, and whims
of a "mere" individual.  It  is a symbol  of  an epoch w ich denies the binding
importance of personal experience including the experience of mystery and of the
531 Havel, Open Letters, 250.
532 Vico, Vico, 43.
533 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 31.
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absolute and displaces the personally experienced absolute as the measure of the
world with a new, man-made absolute, devoid of myster , free of the "whims" of
subjectivity and, as such, impersonal and inhuman. It is the absolute of so-called
objectivity:  the  objective,  rational  cognition  of  the  scientific  model  of  the
world.534
When Havel says that it “denies the binding importance of personal experience” he is
drawing attention to what were Vico's earliest concer s, that “were you to try to apply the
geometric method to life, 'you would succeed only i trying to be a rational lunatic',
steering in a straight  line amid life's  curves,  as though caprice,  rashness, chance and
fortune held no sway in human affairs.”535 This is to say that to accept the universal
authority of  the scientific  model  of  the world  would deny the reality  of  all  that  we
consider essentially human and is fundamentally dehumanizing. Vico cautioned against
the intellectual monopoly of geometric method of life, arguing that “those who transfer
this method to the sphere of practical wisdom” and re satisfied with the singular truth of
reason, “fail altogether to consider what men feel in common about this one truth or
whether the probabilities appear true to them.”536 This constituted a problem that had the
potential to cause “great damage and evil”537 However, in Havel's own time and our own,
some three centuries later, it has risen to the levl of crisis and borne bitter fruit socially,
politically, and environmentally. Like Vico, Havel's politics is centered on the need to
recapture humanity's freedom from the domination of “the power of “megamachinery””
in  the  form  of  ideology.538 Vico  finds  a  bulwark  against  this  threat  in  a  careful
interpretation of divine providence, which he understood as a manifestation of both a
534 Havel, Open Letters, 251.
535 Vico, Vico, 71.
536 Ibid., 43.
537 Ibid.
538 Havel, Disturbing the Peace, 10.
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transcendent [moral] authority and individual autonomy.539 Like Vico, Havel is concerned
with the manner in which scientism has affected a shift in the way that we understand
power in modernity; not as derived from personal lived experience or history, but rather
as a function of a “new, man-made absolute... the absolute of so-called objectivity.” This
understanding of power is seen as “free of the "whims" of subjectivity” and is therefore
ahistorical, or even anti-historical, and “inhuman”—rooted in the “rational cognition of
the scientific model of the world.”540 However, like Vico, Havel is “not proposing that
humans  abolish  smokestacks  or  prohibit  science  or  generally  return  to  the  Middle
Ages.”541 By  fixing  this  “objective”  construction  of  truth  as  universal,  a  scientific
conception  of  the  world  then  sees  all  other  truths  as  a  barrier  or  obstacle  to  its
confirmation as “reality”. The Vician “world of nations”, a historically constructed world
of diverse languages and cultures, appears to be a remnant of “backward ancestors, a
fantasy of their childish immaturity.”542 In this manner Descartes and all who follow in
this scientific view of the world would come to see themselves as destroyers of  the
“prejudices”  of  history  and  the  arbiters  of  “objectively  verified  truth”.  Havel  takes
specific issue with this as did Vico, not because sci nce was unable to provide certain
valuable truth. To both men this was an established “fact”, however, to assert its authority
at the expense of humanities “personal “pre-objectiv ” experience of the lived world”
539 Giambattista Vico, ed. Leon Pompa, Vico: Selected Writings. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), para. 310
Here I am inclined to think of divine providence in the same manner that we might think of the sphere 
of social media. Collectively it represents a force that guides, shapes, and influences the decisions and 
lives of its composite parts. However, social media does not exist as an independent force itself that 
externally influences humanity, rather is is humanity, or construct of humanity itself that in turn 
influences it. Vico's “divine providence” bears a striking similarity to the concept of the “inversion of 
praxis” explored by Gramsci and Gobetti.




was dangerous.543 Havel was interested in reinserting transcendent mystery to human life
not because such “pre-objective” conceptions of truth could or should be understood as
themselves universal, but rather the personal dimension of its morality would act as a
protective agent against the hegemonic domination of society by scientism. The fear here
is  that  as  humanity submits  more and more to  this  “objective  truth”  it  increasingly
separates itself from the lived history of humanity, it separates itself from the “memory of
being”, which for Havel represented a record of the historical development of human life
and is imprinted on all people. The idea of a collectiv  consciousness or in Vico and
Gramsci's  terms  a  “common  sense”  comes  to  mind,  and it  represents  a  kind  of
transcendent  truth—made  by  men—that  helps  to  shield the  individual  from  being
diminished,  but  neither  Havel,  nor  Vico  were  advocating for  the  re-establishment  of
revealed  truths  of  a  dogmatic  Church.  “To  begin  with,”  adds  Havel,  “I  have  never
created, or accepted, any comprehensive “worldview,” let alone any complete, unified,
integrated and self-contained philosophical, ideological or other system of beliefs which
would provide answers to all my questions.”544 This perspective was also central to the
philosophy of Kolakowski expressed in the essays “The Revenge of the Sacred in Secular
Culture” and “The Idolatry of Politics”.545 And it forms the core of Vico's project as he
tries  to  reinsert  the  sacred  in  his  New  Science,  particularly  through  his  novel
interpretation of providence.
543 Ibid., 255.
544 Vaáclav Havel, Letters to Olga: June 1979-September 1982 (New York: H. Holt, 1989), 190.
545 Kołakowski, Modernity on Endless Trial.
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III
To Havel, the post-totalitarian system was something much more than just a model for
the political and philosophic structure of the communist state, or means by which that
state imposed a way of life. It  represented a new and dangerous means by which the
individual within society—fascist, post-totalitarian, or otherwise—could be manipulated
and systematically structured, or re-structured as the case may be. This was best observed
as a consequence of the surveillance culture that dominated post-totalitarian society and
its effect on the shaping social interactions—particularly the introduction of corruption,
layered identities, social paranoia, and managed langu ge—and Czechoslovak society in
general, especially during the Soviet occupation beginning in 1968. Society was quickly
infiltrated by the surveillance state and this began to shape the reality of social relations.
Like  Bentham's  panopticon,  people  became  keenly  aware  of  a  constant  monitoring
presence, and the possibility that even friends and f mily were agents of this system. This
became a central feature of communist “normalization” regime and the relationships that
existed under such a regime. It was an experience captured in films like the black comedy
Brazil (1985) and more recently in the German drama The Lives of Others (2006) and it
led to a kind of heightened awareness and caution cl uding and distorting all  social
interactions, even with family and close friends. 
This is clearly expressed in works like The Garden Party (1969) and The Beggar's Opera
(1975) where relationships are dominated by distrust, self-deception, lies and the need to
“wear two faces.”546 For  Havel  the constant  need for  people to  “wear two faces”  is
546 Vaáclav Havel, The Beggar’s Opera (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 66.
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morally and psychologically crippling and this brings about a profound crisis in society.
Havel argues that first and foremost this is a “crisis of human identity”, which is to say
that  it  is  not  merely superficial  but  strikes at  the  core  of  our  'self''  and is  therefore
crippling in its capacity to influence society; and it is “brought on by living within a
lie.”547 This is because the values of one “face” don’t work in the sphere of the other, and
must therefore be kept separate. They cannot be transferred “mechanistically... without
undermining the very foundations on which the world stands.”548 In  the  The Garden
Party (1963) we see Hugo undergo a dramatic loss of identity as he becomes increasingly
enmeshed within the bureaucracies of the Liquidation and Inauguration offices, until in
the final scene in which he has lost himself so completely that neither he nor his family
recognize him any longer.549 While Hugo's loss of identity is an example of thekind of
profound loss of identity experienced under post-totalitarianism, Havel offers up a more
subtle critique in his portrayal of the relationship between the Secretary and the Clerk in
the Liquidation Office. Hugo's experience demonstrates the system's dependency upon an
alienated humanity to exist, however, in a brief exchange between the secretary and the
clerk we can see just how deep this alienation goes. At one point the Clerk points out a
flying sparrow to the Secretary, but he is unable to convey clearly how beautiful he thinks
the bird is as he fumbles over the kind of evasive techno-speak of the bureaucracy. For
her part, the Secretary is only able to muster a flat, “Oh, I see – nature!”, in response. It
quickly become clear to the reader that what the Clerk is trying to do here is flirt with the
Secretary. The Clerk then turns to the Secretary, and in the same awkward speech offers
547 Havel, Open Letters, 153.
548 Havel, The Beggar’s Opera, 66.
549 Havel, The Garden Party and Other Plays, 45–51.
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her incoherent compliments and passing references to her anatomy. At first it seems clear
that  the  Secretary  is  receptive,  “I  see,  you're  not married!”550 Muttering  a  mix  of
references to the bird they had observed together, herself, and the well rehearsed verses of
the bureaucracy, the exchange quickly breaks down in mutual frustration. Consequently,
the Clerk and Secretary return to work and the relativ  comfort of the office environment,
a comfort that is not merely physical, but primarily psychological. Read in contrast with
the other relationship referenced in the play, Amanda and Peter, the choice seems clear.
One either  embraces the  lie,  finding relative  comfort,  “peace”,  and what  the system
insists  on  calling  “freedom”,  within  society,  or,  one  rejects  it  in  the  effort  to  find
themselves  and  consequently  others  in  possession  of their  dignity,  capable  of  love.
Having been relegated to margins of the play and branded a failure in light of Hugo's
apparent success, Amanda and Peter run off. “Peter and I are in love with each other. He's
moving out of here and coming to live with me!”551 Just as Havel coached his reader in
the “Power of the Powerless”, Amanda and Peter have opt d to live withing the truth and
take part in “the independent life of society”.552 We can only conclude that Havel wishes
them well  and  would urge  us to  similarly embrace our raw emotion  as  a means of
rediscovering our humanity and as a means of emancip tion. However, this is not an easy
task and not without serious consequence, namely personal alienation from the wider
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In the Beggar's Opera, Jenny a prostitute and love interest of the lead protagonist, puts a
finer point on the issue declaring to Macheath that“you can't exist as two people—one
who does the will of others, and one who looks on in disgust.”553 Havel is drawing a
parallel to those in society who—like the greengroce  in the Power of the Powerless—do
the things they must, are obedient to the regime and the system, and therefore “have the
right to be left in peace”.554 The price of such obedience is high, but cheaply bought
argues Havel. And so too did Gobetti, who in his time observed that the fascist regime
also  welcomed  “skeptics”  and  “those  in  the  middle”  whom he  criticized  as  neither
“independent  nor  disinterested.”555 The  regime  welcomed  all  these  types,  from  the
greengrocer to the skeptic and the so-called independent. “All it asks of the citizens is to
surrender their dignity and their political rights”.556 For Havel, it is ideology—an illusion
of identity—that is offered up in exchange for ones dignity and morality.557 This stripping
of  ones  dignity  and  its  replacement  with  the  illusion  of  identity  through  ideology
represents  a  profound  social  crisis  precisely  because  through  a  brutal  act  of
dehumanization it  subjects all  of  society to domination of ideology masquerading as
Truth. The problem, as Jenny points out, is that “we all need—to a certain extent, anyway
—to  belong  to  ourselves,  because  not  belonging  to  ourselves  means  not  having  an
identity, and therefore, de facto, not to be at all.”558
“A person who has been seduced by the consumer value system, whose identity
is dissolved in an amalgam of the accouterments of mass civilization, and who
has no roots in the order of being, no sense of responsibility for anything higher
553 Havel, The Beggar’s Opera, 74.
554 Havel, Open Letters, 132–133.
555 Gobetti, On Liberal Revolution, 129.
556 Ibid.
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558 Havel, The Beggar’s Opera, 74.
231
than his own personal survival, is a demoralized person. The system depends on
this demoralization, deepens it, is in fact a projection of it into society.”559
 In  Havel’s  plays,  he  draws attention  to  one such  projection  through  his  characters
participation  in  absurd,  but  structured  language  games  and  what  he  calls  ‘evasive
thinking’. The games represent a kind of coded langu ge that must be learned to succeed
within the system. When the hero of Havel's play The Garden Party first arrives at said
party  he  confronted  with  a  problem  regarding  “the  events  organized  within  the
framework of the Liquidation Office Garden Party.”  Full  of confidence in himself he
proposes  a  solution  to  the  problem,  confident  in  its  correctness.  It  is  immediately
dismissed on the grounds that while “there's a logic in it... this kind of logic is merely
formal.”560 Havel is illustrating—much as Michnik did in his esay “Why you are not
signing...”—that the logic of the system doesn't correspond to “formal” reality rather it
seeks to induce “agreement”  with  the lie.  In  Michnik's case this was by signing the
loyalty agreement. In the case of Havel's hero, it was “trust [in] the resolutions of the
Organizing Committee.”561 It describes a system based on the “coherence theory of truth”
criticized by Kolakowski whereby “knowledge – that is, particular propositions – are
acceptable insofar as they fit  into the whole.”562 The logic governing the Liquidation
Office in Havel's play is “true”, rather than “merely formal” because it is consistent with
the self-contained nature of the system, whereas Hugo's logic is orientated towards a
conception of truth that does not reference the system itself. The successive adoption of
the systemic language begins a process of steadily breaking down the individual, who is
559 Havel, Open Letters, 153.
560 Havel, The Garden Party and Other Plays, 12.
561 Ibid., 13.
562 Kołakowski, Is God Happy?, 290.
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compelled to move deeper and deeper within this self-contained logic and farther away
from their self. This results in the loss of indiviual identity that corresponds with the
degree to which they commit themselves to the system. Havel is clear that this influences
and effects everyone from the highest political offices to greengrocer. This leads to a kind
of thoughtlessness as they increasingly adapt to their environment, which leads Havel’s
characters to become incorporated into the system. It is in this way that individuals, by
adapting to the game help to perpetuate it as reality, so that each becomes a collaborator
with  the  lie  upon which the system is built.563 The danger of  this  system lies  in  its
“unmediated perception of facts.”564 The mediator in this case is a truth that exists beyond
the reach of the “system”, but also one that does not simply turn itself over to another
doctrine or ideology. 
This is precisely why Vico had been careful in his construction of divine providence to
locate it within history, a history made by man, and thus preserving autonomy. Havel
evokes this reading of the divine and providence whn e describes God as “a horizon”
and all of human existence, which we make ourselves, b ing captured in the “memory of
being”, which points to this absolute horizon.565
The “memory of being” is perhaps one of Havel's most under-theorized concepts, but it is
vital  to  understanding how it  is  that  human autonomy can be preserved through the
pursuit of an “absolute horizon” that is non-determinist. It is the means by which Havel
distinguishes the lived truth of the “independent life of society” from the lies of the post-
563 Popescu, Political Action in Václav Havel’s Thought, 75.
564 Kołakowski, Is God Happy?, 290.
565 Havel, Letters to Olga, 101–102,140.
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totalitarian state. It is an idea that is intimately connected to humanist historicism and
points to memory of being as kind of record of the historical development of human life
and this record is imprinted on all humans and thus represents a kind of transcendent
truth of their existence or being. This truth as Havel understands it is both an expression
of a god as the “absolute horizon”, as well as the repository of collective human historical
development which man has made. “Everything remains in the “memory of being”—and
I too remain there—condemned to be with myself till the end of time—just as I am and
just  as  I  make myself.”566 Thus  for  Havel,  human  existence  is  on  the  one hand the
responsibility of the individual who has a hand in its making, but it also “extends beyond
the physical existence of its bearer” as it become permanently absorbed into the “memory
of being”.567 In a speech that Havel gave at Stanford University in 1994 he refers to
“man’s relationship to that which transcend him, without which he would not be, and of
which he is an integral part.”568 This is revealing because it simultaneously defends the
idea of the existence of transcendent truth, but locates that transcendence not in a world
external to man, but one in which man is an operative part. It is an understanding of the
contingent and yet knowable nature of human life that in many way evokes Vico’s ‘divine
providence’. Havel evokes Kolakowski who argued that rational animals want to know
about  the world  and their  purpose,  want  to  know the Truth.  For  Havel,  this truth is
captured in a historical and knowable “memory of being” that we all have a hand in
creating. Therefore, for Havel if liberty and democracy are to be understood as universal
concepts,  they  cannot  simply  be  the  result  of  any  si gle  expression  of  those  those
566 Ibid., 102. [emphasis my own]
567 Ibid., 139.
568 Havel, The Art of the Impossible, 180.
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concepts. This would be, by definition totalitarian d deterministic, but rather as the
result of an effort to find a genuinely universal expression of those concepts. This, argues
Havel,  “presupposes  a  critical  self-examination”,  it  presupposes  ‘living  within  the
truth’.569 This  process  of  self-examination  also  rests  at  the core  of  Vico  and  Italian
antifascist thought, much for the same reasons. Havel believes that by living in truth it is
possible to both recover ones authentic identity as a human, and in doing so discover “the
forgotten dimension of democracy that could give it universal resonance.”570 Not unlike
Tocqueville's concept of “self-interest well-understood”, Havel is arguing that through the
process  of  self-examination  and  turning  away  from  the  lies  and  the  constructed
“panorama” of the system the individual simultaneously extends themselves into the “life
of society”. Popescu notes that in this way the act of living within the truth is “apolitical”
or “antipolitical” insofar as it is an attempt to “shake off the blinding veil of ideology”
that is deeply connected to a political system that“encloses life in an abstractly defined
ideal model.”571 This understanding of “apolitical” varies considerably from Gobetti's use
of the term. 
For  Gobetti  the  apolitical  referred  to  those  who  refus  to  confront  the  system,  the
essential  element of politics as he conceived of it. Havel  is referring not to Gobetti's
“authentic” politics, but rather politics as participation within the dominant ideological
order. If people fear retaliation or punitive actions in response to their actions, or believe
their own actions to be futile, to the extent that they do not engage, then there is no
569 Ibid., 179.
570 Ibid., 181.
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politics. If people are merely parroting the ideology of the state or system, masked as
their  own,  there  is  no  true  politics.  Politics  under  such  conditions  is  replaced  with
ideological ritual and “automatism”.
Experience  has  taught  us  again  and  again  that  this  automatism is  far  more
powerful than the will of any individual; and should someone possess a more
independent will, he must conceal it behind a ritually nonymous mask in order
to have an opportunity to enter the power hierarchy at all.572
This is precisely what happens to Hugo during the course of the garden party.
And when the individual finally gains a place there and tries to make his will felt
within it, that automatism, with its enormous inertia, will triumph sooner or later,
and either the individual will be ejected by the power structure like a foreign
organism, or he will  be compelled to resign his individuality gradually,  once
again  blending  with  the  automatism  and  becoming  its servant,  almost
indistinguishable from those who preceded him and those who will follow.573
Those politicians or apparatchiks who exist within the system were “bound by traditional
[conformist] political habits” and it was for this reason that Havel turned to “those who
are not politicians” because they “are also not so bound by traditional political thinking
and political habits and therefore, paradoxically, they are more aware of genuine political
reality and more sensitive to what can and should be done under the circumstances.”574
The suggestion here is that the “politics” practiced within the system is inauthentic and
instead  represents a  societal  paradigm  in  which  ideological  domination—conditions
under which there  is  an  absence of  politics  in  the  Gobettian  sense—and no “public
competition for power”, forces the citizens to “live within a lie”.575 It evokes the position
that we have discussed at length from Gobetti through Gramsci, the idea that under the
social  conditions  imposed  by hegemony,  we  are  living  i  an  environment  in  which





political life and politics in general does not exist and must be restored. The parallel life
that  Havel—and especially Gramsci—seek to  create in opposition to  this  ideological
system is one that  tries to reconnect  humanity to the source of its autonomy and its
emancipation  from  ideological  domination:  the  thinking  historical  individual.  This
turning in on the individual—a focusing on the process of self-examination, personal
responsibility  and  the  construction  of  ‘apolitical’ spaces  parallel  to  the  established
political  sphere  of  government—is  a  process  of  reevaluating  politics  itself  and
discovering new forms of political action in service to society. This returns us to Vico and
especially his original concept of providence by which he challenges a deterministic and
ideological  science  as  a  similarly  closed  system  while  simultaneously  asserting  a
universal  moral  and  ethical  order  rooted  in  individual  autonomy.  For  Havel,  post-
totalitarianism is something much more than the dangers of life under communism, it is
representative  of  a  crisis  of  modernity  in  which  western  democracies  are  equally
vulnerable and Havel’s plays represent something far more than irony and humor. They
represent an attempt to break this restructuring mechanism and draw to the surface the
dehumanizing elements of post-totalitarianism. Havel’s theater read alongside his more
directly philosophical work is itself political,  not because “it  has political content but
because  it  constitutes  political  action.”576 It  was  an  attempt,  rooted  in  Gobetti  and
Gramsci's  own  efforts,  to  find  a  new  strategy  of  revolutionary  engagement  and
particularly  one  that  revealed  the  possibility  of  preserving  hope  and  dignity  where
previously there was none. The solution to the moral crisis that Havel observed was to be
found in the reintroduction of morality and personal responsibility made possible through
576 Popescu, Political Action in Václav Havel’s Thought, 78.
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the kind of self-examination provoked by theater. “What else is theater but an attempt to
grasp the world in a focused way”, the effort to comprehend and articulate a 'world-view'
in the Gramscian sense, and in this manner an act  th t is inherently philosophical.577
Theater “possess a special ability to allude to, and to convey, multiple meanings” and this
is precisely what is necessary if philosophy is to become political action.578
Gyorgy Konrad, Antipolitics
Lastly, I would like to turn to Gyorgy “George” Konrad, the Hungarian novelist, essayist
and dissident who, along with Kolakowski, Michnik and Havel stood as central figures in
the liberal anticommunist movement. Konrad's two best know collections of essays are
Intellectuals and the Road to Class Power (1974) and the more widely read Antipolitics
(1984)  in  which  he  developed  a  form  of  dissident  politics  known  as  antipolitics.
However,  antipolitics  did  not  develop  in  a  vacuum.  Through  the  publication  of  his
dramatic works Havel had hoped to prompt in his audience a rigorous self-examination of
those who were trapped “beneath a thick crust of lies.”579 Gramsci had also recognized as
central the task of ridding oneself of all “prejudices and incrustations” imparted by the
system.580 In many ways Havel's more overtly political essays had only acted as further
expositions on that purpose. In Konrad's work this process of self-examination took the
shape of a kind of moral individualism, which formed the basis for Konrad’s concept of
“spiritual authority” achieved not on theological or religious terms, but rather by showing
577 Havel, The Art of the Impossible, 250–251.
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ones “own face—every aspect of it.”581 It is a concept intimately connected to Havel's
own  concept  of  “living  in  truth”.  However,  since  itrelies  more  heavily  on  the
intellectuals as a revolutionary catalyst, it remains in direct dialogue with Gramsci. Such
a task was, for Konrad, the obligation of all intellectuals and central to the reclamation of
history from ideological domination. In the context of Konrad's own experience this was
especially true of Marxist-Leninism,582 but he is clear to point out that the West itself had
not escaped a similar threat. “God and democracy”, he argues, “there you have America's
Marxism-Leninism” and that this ideology is every bit as powerful and totalizing.583 “The
philosophy  of  history”,  he  argues,  “is  not  an  “objective  truth”  but  a  common
agreement.”584
The problem that was basic to Gramsci and a primary concern of his fellow antifascists,
as well as Havel and the East-European dissidents, was how to get a 'subaltern class', that
is the masses of people in society, to 'come to know itself' and, as Gramsci argued, to
position itself to develop beyond the economic-corporate stage and rise “to the phase of
ethical-political hegemony in civil society, and of domination in the State.”585 That is,
how is it that the proletariat are to become conscious of itself and “of its strength, its
possibilities,  of  how it  is  to  develop”  to  such  an extent  as  to  seize  state  power  for
themselves?586 This becomes a very critical question as it represents a cross-roads of sorts
in  which  the  'antipolitical'  position  held  by  significant  segments  of  the  dissident
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movement  argued  against  the  formal  seizure  of  state power,  fearing  its  corrupting
influence. Hungarian writer and activist Gyorgy Konrad addressed this concern when he
asks: “Is there, can there be, a political philosophy—a set of proposals for winning and
holding power—that renounces a priori any physical guarantees of power?”587 The focus
on internal emancipation and the force of moral resistance displays a reticence shared by
those  who  actively  resist  domination  by  the  state  to  take  up  the  reigns  of  power
themselves, fearful of its corrupting influence. Gramsci was no less concerned about the
infectious  potential  of  state  power  as  captured  in  his  concept  of  hegemony,  but  he
recognized the need to achieve state power nonetheless. The key for Gramsci was how to
do  so  in  the  name  of  an  ideology  of  the  masses  rather  t an  that  of  the  minority
bourgeoisie. To achieve this he leaned heavily on the idea of the possibility of cultivating
a leadership structure that is organic to the working class. Through the development of its
own intellectuals the working class could then assume state power under its own organic
leadership, rather than depend on the intellectual leadership of “traditional intellectuals”
and risk succumbing to state domination as illustrated in his analysis of political blocs in
'The  Southern  Question'.588 This  suggests  that  Gramsci  has  a  far  more  dynamic
understanding of leadership and intellectuals than t t of a mere politician, general, or
bureaucratic apparatchik. It is a rejection of political leaders as party representatives and
embraces  the  role  they  must  play both  in  achieving  state  power,  but  perhaps  more
importantly  as  “transmitter”  between  civil  society  and  the  state.589 This  was  critical
587 Konraád, Antipolitics, 92.
588 Gramsci, The Modern Prince, 37–38,44–48.
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because unlike the working class achieving state power under the guidance of a Leninist
vanguard party or some other externally imposed force, under the direction of organic
intellectuals they would achieve state power in a manner that remain committed to their
own “authentic” class interests as opposed to the int rests of  the party.  Autonomy is
preserved. Konrad recognizes the authority and even necessity of the state in the public
sphere, but remains reluctant regarding the possibility of achieving state power while
avoiding its corrupting influence, demanding instead a constant suspicion of “everything
organized, yet [he] knows that organization is unavoidable.”590 Still, Konrad's conception
of antipolitics builds on Gramsci's interpretation f the intellectual as the key to authentic
politics,  especially  in  this  age  of  consolidated  socialist  planned  economies,  'state-
monopoly capitalism' and what were in 1979 “the first signs of the technocratic global
hegemony of multinational economic organizations.”591 Such an environment was, by his
understanding, thoroughly dominated by ideology and“calls into being societies that are
half-informed, banal, accustomed to thinking in cliches” and this represented an essential
threat  to  what  Konrad  considered  the  “greatest  good”,  “a  permanently  open
democracy.”592
Konrad concluded that the only way to preserve an open politics under such conditions
was the preservation the public/private distinction and he saw ideological domination as
the primary threat to the maintenance of the this distinction. Preserving the private sphere
was recognized as essential to preventing the encroachment of ideological domination
590 Konraád, Antipolitics, 116.
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and Konrad sought to preserve it by placing it in the context of an independent world
culture, free from the controls and influence of any particular state. He hoped to achieve
this by first turning to Gramsci's interpretation of the intellectual as intermediary between
civil society and the state as primary agent of this struggle. However, he was not just
interested in intellectuals as an agent of competing state ideologies—which would have
reduced this  struggle to a mere propaganda war—but rather  as representatives of  an
independent class populated by antipoliticians, whose task it is to keep 'politics' in check.
This  antipolitical  struggle  provides  and answer  to  the  question  Konrad  poses  at  the
beginning of this section.593 It is, of course, a fundamentally liberal project and liberalism
understood in this manner is quickly tied to Vico's effort to recover both the authenticity
of human experience as well as history itself in the face of Cartesianism, and Croce's later
effort  to recover  these same elements  from Hegel  in the form of a critic  of  Hegel's
“absolute idealism” in favor of his own “absolute historicism” and his later critique of
historical materialism and the Marxist system. In both cases it is an effort that centered on
preserving human autonomy and personal  moral responsibility.  Without it  one cannot
maintain the liberal ideals of plurality and political antagonism necessary for democracy.
And  this  was  best  secured  through  the  moral  and  social  emancipation  of  separate
individuals. Economic liberalism, market economics, and constitutional design in itself
are  not  adequate  if  they  do  not  provide  protection  from  moral,  cultural  and  social
domination. And this it largely depends on a category of people with the ability to see
beyond  their  own  horizons,  a  class  that  Konrad  ident fi s  with  the  international
593 Ibid., 92.
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intelligentsia.  In Konrad, we can see a movement ceer d on the individual, and what
the activism of an autonomous individual in concert with a community network can do to
act as a check on power. To achieve this Konrad advances a theory of political action he
calls  antipolitics.  At  its  core,  antipolitics  seeks  to  preserve  political  conflict  by
establishing  itself  as  countermeasure  to  the  ideological  domination  of  civil  society.
Politics is used here to describe the action of the s ate alone, which are seen as critically
flawed and as inherently corrupting. The anti-politician or anti-political intellectual acts
as a social and moral counter weight to the dominatio  of the state. The key was for such
a  counterweight  to  exist,  it  had  to  exist  as  a  new horizon  beyond  the reach  of  the
“system”. On the level of a system that commanded control over all of modernity, as Vico
observed was quickly becoming the case with Cartesianism, such a counterweight would
have to effectively transcend the reach of Descartes new rational method. Vico believed
that he had identified human life itself as just such an area and that history, properly
understood, could provide that horizon. Through the proper study of history that horizon
could be discovered in what Vico called divine providence and it would provide truths
and knowledge just as valid as Descartes' methods. Moreover, it was these truths that
existed beyond the reach of Cartesian scientism that would mediate its dominance and the
“great damage and evil” that it had already demonstrated itself capable of in the hands of
“princes and rulers”.594 When faced with ideological domination at the hands of the post-
totalitarian  state,  Havel  famously  turned  to  'living  in  truth'  and  Patocka's  parallel
structures and civil society as the path of resistance. However, for Havel the problem of
ideological  domination  was  not  limited  to  the  post-totalitarian  state,  which  he  he
594 Vico, Vico, 43.
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ultimately saw as a warning of “something far more serious than Western rationalism is
willing to admit.”595 It was for him the “avant-garde of a global crisis” the only solution
to which was a decidedly Vician turn to God-as-absolute-horizon.596 It is in this manner
that  Konrad shared Vico and Havel's concerns around the danger of an an unmediated
ideological system. Where Vico had earlier turned to ivine providence, Havel had turned
to 'living in truth' and God-as-absolute-horizon as the ultimate counterweight. Konrad's
analysis,  perhaps measured  by his  academic  training i  sociology,  turned to  a  more
limited, though perhaps more conceptually manageable proposal. 
In  Antipolitics (1984),  Konrad  puts  forth  the  idea  of  civil  society  as  the  source  of
transformative energy in shaking loose the shackles of an oppressive Communist,  or,
post-totalitarian government. His theory largely hinges on his explicit structural distrust
of politicians and state politics in general, the mdium of which he describes simply as
“power over  people—power backed by weapons.”597 In  Liberalism after  Communism
(1994) Jerzey Szacki expresses his doubts about the viability and formative power of
civil society referencing Michael Walzer. “I believ that Michael Walzer expressed not
only his own personal disappointment when, after rereading G. Konrad’s Antipolitics, he
wrote: ‘His argument seemed right to me when I first read his book. Looking back…it
was easy to see how much it was a product of his time – and how short that time was!”598
This would appear to have been not only a premature condemnation since—though it was
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most certainly a work of particular resonance in its time—its arguments appear to remain
relevant and were, in fact, very much part of a broader historical perspective that I have
traced to at least Vico. Fundamental to Konrad’s antipolitical program is the idea that “we
ought to encourage the internal emancipation of all those whom we meet.”599 That is, we
ought to resist self-censorship in the effort to balance our individual autonomy and social
conscience. “The goal – freedom – is absolute; the road that leads to it is relative. It is
each and every individual’s personal road. It leads through a network of communities,
linked with one another by ties of spiritual sympathy.”600 Individual autonomy, solidarity
among citizens, and an active civil society are seen as vital to an effective opposition to
the state and its politics. Konrad further argues that one should be suspicious of “anything
organized” and of politicians in particular who, if they are any good, are by definition
concerned only with power.601 This then necessitates a form of opposition or pressure that
can exert  influence on the machine of the state, but without become immersed in its
politics.  Here  Konrad  invokes  Vico  and  Havel's  analysis  recognizing  that  “the  most
effective way to influence policy is by changing a society’s customary thinking patterns
and tacit compacts.”602 And this could only be achieved “by bringing the pace-setters to
think differently”, which required an external reference point or, in Havel's terms, a new
horizon.603 It is in this manner that the ideals of moral indivi ualism and civil society give
birth  to  the  central  concept  of  ‘international  culture’  in  Konrad’s  antipolitics.  He







state’s cultural dictatorship.”604 By influencing the culture of the state one can effectively
block the encroachment of ideological domination. “Antipolitics strives to put politics in
its place and make sure it stays there, never overstepping it proper office of defending
and refining the rules of the game of civil society.” 605 Communism, and in fact all forms
of ideological domination, effectively represent an attack on civil society and liberalism
itself, or rather liberal autonomy, in that they seek to dominate both the public and private
spheres  in  pursuit  of  a  perfect  unity.  Konrad  believ d  that  it  was  an  “international
culture”  cultivated  by  the  “personal  network  of  sympathy”  that  would  act  as  the
necessary mediator existing beyond the influence and reach of the system. Furthermore,
because it was, at least in principle, free from the controls and influence of any particular
state it would not readily turn itself over to another ideology. Thus, he saw it as “a global
culture with its own institutions.”606 In this manner Konrad's 'network of sympathy' while
not perhaps reaching the level of Havel's God-as-absolute-horizon, would function as a
similarly autonomous horizon located outside the reach of the state and within a history
made by man. It speaks to the same concerns pointed to by Havel's 'memory of being' as
well as Vico's concept of divine providence. International culture becomes the repository
of Havel's 'memory of being' and Vico's 'divine providence' of which intellectuals become
an integral part, but that also extends beyond any individual. 
David Ost, in his important work on Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics (1990),





is some radically new kind of society... that elusive “third road”.”607 However, while Ost
is indeed careful to point out the frustrations that the Solidarity movement had “being
pigeonholed in western categories of “right” and “left””, he still sees the movement in
context  of  modernity  as  we  know  it.608 To  this  end  he  refers  to  their  position  as
representative  of  a  “postmodern  left”.  Vico  too has been considered  in  light  of  this
postmodern interpretation, with Isaiah Berlin seeing i  him something of a forerunner to
postmodern radical theory. However, in both cases this would appear to miss the truly
radical aspect of their theories. Like Vico, the goals of Solidarity—as are Konrad's own
goals—are very much part of the early-modern project of human emancipation and a
movement  away from the kind of  truth  used to understand and circumscribe human
autonomy. The truly “radical” aspect of antipolitics was that it called into question the
very basis of that paradigm, but not in the escapist nihilism begun with Nietzsche. The
prefixes “post-”  and “anti-”  as they are used in “postmodern”  or “anti-modern” both
suggest an antagonistic relationship with modernity as such. Whereas the project begun
by  Vico  and  continued  by  the  Italian  antifascists  and  the  East-European  dissident
movements must be understood as an effort to fulfill that promise rather than dismiss or
sidestep it, and as the critique of a modernity that has as failed to live up to its promise. It
is  for  this  reason that  Konrad  follows  Croce,  Gobetti,  Gramsci  and  his  fellow anti-
communist dissents in advancing a permanently open politics.
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This dissertation argues that the political theory that emerges from 1989 is representative
of a larger established philosophical critique of modernity. Such a critique began with the
displacement  of  the  authority  of  the  natural  world  with  reformulation  of  truth  and
knowledge by Descartes new rational method. The devlopment of human technological
capacities, particularly in the hands of regimes committed to their own “scientific” truths,
brought into sharp relief dangers and evils anticipated by Vico in his essay On method in
contemporary  fields  of  study.  The  concerns  of  Vico  would  come  to  be  shared  by
generations of activists and intellectuals who confr ted the modern ideological state and
the “politics” that defined it. While confronting such dangers has become an increasingly
visible and vocal component of the political life of modernity, conditions are such that
such opposition has often been understood on the sam  terms. Whatever the ideological
perspective, each is drawn to the intoxicating promise of the Cartesian revolution, access
to a universal truth. This dissertation focused on  the work of Vico, Croce, the Italian
antifascists and the theorists of 1989. Theorists that I argue stand as evidence of another
liberal  modern tradition that  avoids the illusion of Cartesian modernity.  They will  be
positioned as key figures in the shaping of an unconventional critical perspective of the
two  great  ideologies  that  have  come  to  dominate  our modernity:  liberalism  and
communism. By bringing the varied and not often clearly related perspectives of Vico,
Croce, the Italian antifascists and the theorists of 1989 together in a coherent way (here I
am  thinking  especially  perhaps  of  a  liberally-oriented  Gramsci  for  example),  this
dissertation engages the foundations of liberal modernity from a new angle and in doing
248
so,  enlarges  the  scope  of  our  understanding  of  liberal  and  democratic  theory.  The
dissident  politics  of  the  revolutions  of  1989  characterized  by  Kolakowski,  Michnik,
Havel and Konrad represented something beyond an important localized contribution to
our understanding of the political theory of democracy. The challenge issued by 1989
dissidents  wasn't  merely  to  an  oppressive  and  in  some  instances  even  genocidal
communist regime, but rather to a widespread interpretation of modernity that has come
to dominate contemporary social  and political life and of which communism or post-
totalitarianism were merely a particularly crude and violent manifestation. Vico and the
Italian antifascists issue similar  challenges in  their  own time regarding the challeges
posed  by  fascism  and  in  particular  an  Italian  society  that  facilitated  fascism's
development. Both groups are representative of a critical approach to understanding both
the  meaning  and  trajectory  of  modernity  itself—evoking  Berman's  modernism  of
antimodernism—which  is  to  say they are  representative of  a alternative approach to
understanding modernity. It is an interpretation rooted in an entirely different conceptual
understanding of knowledge and truth, laid out by Vico and developed much later by
Havel and Kolakowski. Understanding the full  scope of these connections makes the
argument  for  their  contributions to  political  theory that  much more compelling.  And
perhaps most importantly, our world remains populated with the unresolved ideological
threats they identified, and so remains desperately in need of the tools they provide. 
The headline of  the last  ever  edition of  the newspaper  L'Unità,  founded in 1924 by
Antonio Gramsci, spoke volumes: "End of the line. After three months of battles, they've
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managed it: they have killed l'Unità."609 L'Unità's readers would know very well who
'they' were and to read the headline was a stark reminder of the persistent enemy that
Gramsci had identified in the “industrialists” who ad no party of their own, but rather
“utilise all the existing parties turn by turn” exploiting their resources to strengthen their
position and interests and “balance” power in their favor.610 So it was that the demise of
the journal the Italian Communist Party (PCI) founded ninety years ago was announced.
It  had been created to act as the mouthpiece of the party that Gramsci  led and be a
newspaper that would appeal to both the workers and peasants, bridging the divide that
he had identified in 1921 as “the central problem of national life in Italy”.611 Gramsci
believed that it was the task of the working class to unify the people as the bourgeoisie
had unified the territory.612 It was an effort to bring attention to the crisis of class politics
that faced Italy and a revolution that stalled at the defense of bourgeois privilege. L'Unità
sought to introduce to its cross-class readership a new critical world-view around which a
new organic  politics  could  form,  one  that  challenged the  efforts  on  the  part  of  the
industrialists to control intellectual activity and so control “public opinion”, cultural life
and society on the whole.  It  was so effective that  following a scathing attack on the
regime as little more than a facade for a dictatorship,613 it had come under fire and in
1925 its publication was threatened by Milan city officials. Shortly thereafter there was
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an  attempt  on  Benito  Mussolini's  life,  and  consequently  in  late  1926 publication  of
L'Unità was completely suppressed. Still, the journal survived, first as an underground
journal and later revived completely after the war. More recently,  L'Unità was threatened
by the former Italian conservative Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi who brought legal
action against it for their criticism of his administration. It seems that powerful market
forces finally achieved what Mussolini and Berlusconi could not. With L'Unità's closure
Italy looses a leading journal of the left and a powerful symbol of Gramsci's struggle to
unify the Italian people against the power and hegemony of industrial (bourgeois) elites;
against, in the words of Czech playwright and philosopher Vaclav Havel, the power of the
“megamachinery” and “automatism” of modern industrial-consumer society.614 “They”, it
was implied, had finally won.
Such a turn of events following so closely in the wake of the financial and economic
crisis of 2008 that turned Europe upside-down, and the bitter political conflicts over the
austerity policies imposed as a result—some as recently as last year615—is nothing short
of remarkable. It was a crisis whose persistent effects in the form of deepening economic
and  political  inequality  demonstrated  clearly, in  the  eyes  of  many,  that  liberalism
(especially neoliberalism and the politics of advanced capitalism) was dying, much as
socialism and the politics of the Marxist System had done a generation ago in the wake of
the Revolutions of 1989. And as the world once again becomes disillusioned by the false
614 Havel, Disturbing the Peace, 10; Havel, Open Letters, 207–208.
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promises of the agents of ideology, the old idols are brought out, among them religious
fundamentalism and ethno-nationalism. A recently translated conversation between Adam
Michnik and Vaclav Havel from shortly after the economic crisis reveals their own keen
insight to this startling manner of political inversion. Even Solzhenitsyn, says Michnik,
“went through a peculiar evolution. In his later years he became famous for his tribute to
the czarist regime, his demand for a reinstatement of the death penalty, and his support
for  Putin.”616 Havel  adds,  “he's  not  the  only  one.”617 In  the  vacuum  left  by  the
disillusionment with both socialist and capitalist utopianism, we see the return of the old
idols of blood, territory, and paternalism. And yet, this story is not new. Somehow, voices
go unheard and lessons go unlearned. Where Mussolini had once campaigned to reclaim
the lost national patrimony of Corsica and Savoy in the west and the Dalmatian coast
including Albania in the east, we now have Putin and his nationalist adventure to reclaim
“Russian  lands”  in  Crimea  and  Eastern-Ukraine,  as  well  as  China's  own  territorial
ambitions in the South China Sea and along the Indian border, not to mention its recent
efforts in Hong Kong to supress a democracy movement that Beijing claims threatens
“social tranquility”.618 This paternalistic attitude, while serving to unite some against a
Schmittian  other,  brings the people themselves no closer to political power or liberal
freedom because it cuts off the organic will of thepeople, submitting them instead to
paternal guardianship. The power of the state is used to reinforce not an autonomous
individual identity or the organic identity and will of the people, but rather the ideological
will of power itself—of the paternalistic regime. It was for this reason that Mussolini in
616 Havel, Michnik, and Matynia, An Uncanny Era, 151.
617 Ibid.
618 “Protesters Defiant amid HK Stand-Off,” BBC News, accessed September 29, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29405195.
252
the “Doctrine of Fascism” would declare that the fascist state “interprets, develops and
gives strength to the whole life of the people” and that “the nation is created by the State,
which gives to the people,  conscious of its  own moral  unity,  a will  and therefore an
effective  existence”  and  not  the  other  way  around.619 While  Mussolini  rejected  any
association with the communists, such a conception of the state is captured completely in
Havel's  own concept of  post-totalitarianism which characterized advanced communist
society. Furthermore, the relationship of the fascist and post-totalitarian “citizen” and the
state is nearly identical. The fascist philosopher Giovanni Gentile describes, 
“the relationship between the State and the individual [as] not between it and one
or the other citizen, but with every citizen. Every citizen shares a relationship
with the State that is so intimate that the State exists only in so far as it is made to
exist by the citizen. This, its formation is a product of the consciousness of each
individual, and thus of the masses, in which the power of the State consists.  That
explains  the  necessity  of  the  Fascist  Party  and  of  all  the  institutions  of
propaganda and education that foster the political and moral ideals of Fascism, so
that the thought and will of the solitary person, the Duce, becomes the thought
and will of the masses. Out of that arises the enormous difficulty in which it is
involved, to bring into the Party, all the people—commencing from their most
tender years.”620    
For Havel such paternalism no longer rested in a state embodied in the will of a solitary
Duce, but in that of the anonymous power of the system itself, which was perpetually
maintained  by  the  very  people  subject  to  it,  what  Havel  calls  “the  auto-totality  of
society”.621 In each instance the object was not merely the subordination of the people to
the system, but rather the “complete degradation of the individual” and this was often
“presented as his ultimate liberation”.622 On this point both the totalitarian government of
Italy and the post-totalitarian government of  Czechoslovakia were in agreement.  And
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both the antifascists and the liberal anticommunists understood that this wasn't merely a
phenomena of these particular states, but rather the necessary product of the modern era
“dominated by the culminating belief...that the world—and being as such—is a wholly
knowable system”.623 And the west would not be immune. Vico had anticipated the “great
damage and evil” that would emerge from the convergence of a popular faith in this
understanding of truth and the ambitions of the powerful in dominating society.624 It was
for this reason that Vico proposed a new science by which he would try to preserve the
achievements of Cartesianism, while simultaneously protecting human autonomy, thereby
retaining in humanity itself the capacity to dictate the terms of its own social and political
existence. The untimely demise of  L'Unità signals the incomplete nature of this task,
begun by Vico and carried by way of Benedetto Croce t  the antifascists Piero Gobetti
and Antonio Gramsci, and further developed in the lib ral anticommunist “antipolitics” of
Leszek Kolakowski, Adam Michnik, Vaclav Havel and Gyorgy Konrad. It  indicates a
movement away from the open politics pursued by Gramsci and consequently illustrates
the need to once again find the tools necessary to recover history, politics and especially
“truth”  in  the effort  to  fortify ourselves against  the great  damage and evil  that  Vico
anticipated  and  that  the  twentieth-century  and our  wn  brief  twenty-first  has  amply
demonstrated. 
If  a  pathway to open politics is  the enduring legacy of the tradition outlined in this
dissertation then the return to an era dominated by just the opposite ought to provoke
623 Havel, The Art of the Impossible, 89.
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increasing concern. The proliferation of liberal conservative economism, having emerged
dominant  from the  ideological  war  that  marked  the  better  part  of  the  previous  five
decades, preached the strategies and tactics that were seen to have won the day. They
were,  in many ways, carried forward by the force of their  own inertia,  fueled by an
unflinching  faith  in  the  potential  of  'free-markets'  and  'free-trade  zones'.  Yet  almost
immediately,  underlying  tensions  endemic  to  perceived  hegemonic  triumph  were
revealing themselves in painful fissures around the world—in the Balkans, Seattle and
Genoa to name a few—that indicated that 'victory' was perhaps much farther far from
complete than anticipated.625 In fact, it would seem that barring a selective reading of the
historical record, the experience of liberal conservative hegemony has been anything but
assured. Consequently, this new dominant order engaged in a powerfully armed culture
war, honing their instruments of propaganda and rheto ic. The better part of the 1990s, if
not the whole of the Cold War, was marked largely by a Gramscian 'war of position'
waged  in  full  and  around  the  globe  by  those  who  hadeverything  to  lose  with  the
ascendency  of  the  neoliberal  enthusiasms  that  followed  the  Soviet  collapse  and  the
Revolutions of 1989. The quiet murmur of this global w r was finally brought loudly and
violently to our doorstep on September 11th and yet it wasn't until America's centers of
finance collapsed of their own accord that the simmer—domestically at least—began to
bubble over and people of all walks of life turned to the temples they had built and then
625 'Victory' is a strange word. Its use as an exclamation indicating the final seizure of advantage from your
competition and a necessary end to the 'the contest' suggests a simultaneous reversion of initiative to 
the 'loser' should they decide the for themselves that the contest is not yet over. Aesop casts light on 
this negation in the telling of the story of the 'Tortoise and the Hare', a war of position if ever there was 
one. The Hare for all his dominance never anticipated n opponent whose native value system rejected 
his premises.
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to  each other  and began asking themselves in  earnest  th  question that  Lenin asked
himself a century before—what is to be done?626
Despite the increasingly pervasive and explosive pockets of frustration characterized by
“the new global revolutions”  there are indications pointing towards relapse rather than
revolution.627 Though they remain powerful  expressions of global  frustration with the
narrative  that  has  unfolded  since  Lehman  Brothers'   historic  demise  tipped  off  the
economic collapse that followed in 2008, there has been scant movement towards the
reconstitution of a truly liberal politics. And there is good reason for this. The strand of
liberalism,  so  closely  tied  with  the  great  achievements  of  modernity  has  also  been
powerfully  linked  with  its  greatest  atrocities.  The two—welded together  and  having
sprung from a unified historical trajectory in social,  economic, and political theory—
naturally culminated in an 'end of history' claim that declared that there was only a single
truth capable of fulfilling the scientific enlightenment promise of achieving perfect unity
in the form of a pervasive global free-market. However, what was true for the utopias of
Marx, Lenin and Stalin is also true for the utopias of Hayek, Friedman and Reagan.
Under  classical  totalitarian regimes individuals  are often manipulated directly by the
State and frequently through the direct application of power—in the case of Stalin, with
genocidal results—with the clear purpose of reinforcing state power in the hands of the
political  elite.  Havel  indicates  that  under  post-totalitarianism  there  is  a  shift  in  the
626 To be sure there were a great many incidents tha brought Americans into contact with this next 'great 
war'—the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and the USS Cole bombing in 2000 to name a 
couple—these events never really seemed to penetrate the American consciousness.
627 Mason, Why It’s Still Kicking off Everywhere.[This book was first published in 2011 and later revised in
this edition.]
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“technique of exercising power” away from these direct  forms (though not absent of
them) to more indirect methods resulting in what he calls “the auto-totality of society”.628
This shift is critical because Havel recognizes it as coinciding with the emerging global
dominance of consumer and industrial society. Such te niques of societal manipulation
in the West have, in the words of Havel, become “infin tely more refined and subtle than
the  brutal  methods  used  in  the  post-totalitarian  societies”.629 Though  perhaps  not
originating from the same centers  of  power,  the manipulation accompanying modern
democratic societies may be indicative of new forms of emerging totalitarianism.630 While
the commitment to fulfilling a utopian promise is an indication of the hope that lies deep
in the recesses of an otherwise cynical world, it is also one that is coupled with a great
danger that springs from our willingness at great cost to throw ourselves again and again
against those ancient walls that we see as standing between man and our accepted Truth.
And when finally we fail,  exhausted by our Sisyphean t sk to knock them down, we
return to those very same idols believing ourselves to have sinned grievously against
them, many of us swearing to defend them once again only this time without mercy or
compassion. 
On  October  15,  2008—shortly  after  the  collapse  of  Lehman  Brothers  had  begun  a
cascade  of  failure  that  revealed  that  the  emperors' indeed  had  no  clothes—the  The
Economist asked rather dryly: “What would Marx say?”631 Not long after, The Socialist
628 Havel, Open Letters, 130, 143.
629 Ibid., 208.
630 Sheldon S Wolin, Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Sp cter of Inverted 
Totalitarianism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
631 “What Would Marx Say?,” The Economist, October 15, 2008, 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/certainideasofeurope/2008/10/what_would_marx_say.
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Worker, announced 'The return of Marx'.632 And since that time the literature has exploded
advancing arguments seeking to reintroduce Marx—if not Lenin or Communism itself—
as both academically and politically relevant. Among the more strident works is Jodie
Dean's  The Communist  Horizon inviting its  readers  to  set  aside  the  lived history  f
communism in favor of its uncompromising promise of universal egalitarianism. In this
manner speaks to the frustrations of many who see th  galitarian promise of democracy
betrayed by compromise with dominant neoliberal ideologies. Born from the legitimate
and  widespread  frustrations  with  contemporary  “democratic”  politics  Dean  readily
attacks the lefts' “struggle for democracy” as “strange,” reading it as “a defense of the
status quo, a call for more of the same.”633 Yet, even as an increasingly large body of
literature emerges equally critical of the authenticity of our democracies, few claim the
need to forgo democracy itself as the “hegemonic form f contemporary politics”.634 This
dissertation should have made it clear why such effort that ought to be resisted or at least
approached  with  considerable  caution.  While  times  of  economic  crisis  and  social
disruption often invite the temptation to run into the arms of Marx or in Dean's case
Communism itself, it is important to recognize the manner in which the path is laid out.
The Marxist-Leninist path to salvation is laid before you concretely and 'scientifically' in
the form of one great universal concept: historical m terialism. I don't propose to re-fight
the old battles over communism and capitalism, but rather an understanding of  the reality
described in this dissertation of the premise of a scientifically constructed liberalism as
the dominant feature of modernity and establish that neoliberalism and communism sit at
632 Brian Jones, “The Return of Marx,” SocialistWorker.org, February 16, 2009, 
http://socialistworker.org/2009/02/16/return-of-marx.
633 Dean, The Communist Horizon, 57.
634 Ibid.
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the extreme ideological poles of a modernity thus defined. They are both deeply tied to a
particular understanding of the individual, political authority, and the state, as established
by the innovation in methodological tools of the Cartesian revolution and the concept of
truth that emerges from it. And to this end, one cannot escape the dominance of neoliberal
realism by running into the arms of fascism or communism anymore than the dangers of
post-totalitarianism could be escaped by running into the arms of western consumerism.
Just as it was in Italy following the First World War, both of these ideological poles have
been shaken to their foundations over the last two decades. Both have lost the interest and
support  of  all  but  their  most  committed ideologues. However,  as Piero Gobetti  aptly
points  out  with  tongue  firmly  in  cheek,  “with  what  do  you  intend  to  replace  it?
Theocracy?” This is the problem that we currently face. Unable to provide a compelling
alternative to this question we are either left perpetually rebounding between ideological
poles, with Dean's  Communist Horizon and Zizek's various revivals of Lenin represent
one such rebound. Otherwise we dust off the old idols of blood, territory and religious
dogma. With the painful memories of the former still o fresh in the mind's eye the old
idols of a century before are returning in increasingly painful and tragic ways. We need
only look towards the emergence of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, Putin's nationalist
adventurism, or the nativist politics of fundamentalis  conservatism here in the United
States to recognize it.
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